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SUMMARY
In this study it is asked why we do not consider ourselves guiltier and more responsible
with regard to the thousands of people who, through no fault of their own, die daily from
preventable, poverty-related causes. Such neglect of the global poor is not surprising from
certain perspectives. However, when the matter is approached from the perspective of
Emmanuel Levinas's ethical philosophy, one is faced with the paradox that Levinas claims
we are infinitely and inescapable responsible for the other, while the preventable dying of
thousands of poor people indicates that we do not behave as though we are infinitely
responsible for the other.
It would seem as though Levinas is crudely mistaken. However, Levinas distinguishes
between an interpersonal ethical relation and an impersonal political relation with the other.
The former is a relation of asymmetrical and infinite responsibility to which we are
summoned by the uniqueness of the other's 'face.' The latter is a relation in which the
'third' is present, therefore requiring that the self limit his responsibility to a specific other
and disperse it amongst numerous others. The presence of the third indicates the beginning
of impersonal justice, institutions, politics, knowledge, as well as equality and reciprocity
between the self and the other. However, every person that I encounter is a general other
with whom I stand in a political relation, while at the same time, also a specific other who
commands my infinite responsibility. With every other, I am simultaneously in a
symmetrical political relation and an asymmetrical ethical relation. This is the ambiguity of
political society: do I relate to the other politically or ethically? Both options enjoy
legitimacy; however, from a Levinasian perspective, the choice to politically respond to the
other less so.
To understand our indifference to the global poor, this study analyses the principal debate
about transnational responsibility, the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, from a
Levinasian perspective. Three ways in which the ethical relation with the extremely poor
global other have been suppressed, thereby contributing to our ethical indifference to him,
are identified. First, writers in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate seek to preserve the
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subject in the greatest autonomy and freedom possible and thereby 'legitimise' a political
response to the other. Second, when approaching the issue of global justice, cosmopolitan
and communitarian theorists suppress the otherness of the other, which is what reminds us
of our infinite responsibility for the other and the fact that justice is always incomplete.
Third, insofar cosmopolitans prioritise and advocate a greater concern for the global poor,
the strategy they favour (they emphasize human equality) is counterproductive for it
overlooks and suppresses the uniqueness of both the subject and the other in the
interpersonal ethical relation. The criticism of these three aspects of the cosmopolitan-
communitarian debate is then extended into claims that a more ethical relating to the
globally poor than is presently the case is possible.
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OPSOMMING
Hierdie studie vra waarom ons onsself nie skuldiger en meer verantwoordelik beskou
teenoor die duisende mense wat elke dag, sonder enige toedoen van hul eie, as gevolg van
voorkombare, armoed-verwante oorsake, sterf nie. Vanuit sekere perspektiewe is sulke
nalatigheid te wagte. Wanneer ons egter die kwessie vanuit die perspektief van Emmanuel
Levinas se etiese filosofie benader, kom ons voor 'n teenstrydigheid te staan, aangesien
Levinas aandring dat ons oneindiglik en onvermydelik verantwoordelik is vir die ander,
terwyl die daaglikse voorkombare sterftes van duisende arm mense aandui dat ons nie
optree asof ons onsself as oneindiglik verantwoordelik teenoor die ander beskou nie.
Dit wil voorkom asof Levinas eenvoudig verkeerd is. Levinas tref egter 'n onderskeid
tussen 'n interpersoonlike etiese verhouding en 'n onpersoonlike politiese verhouding met
die ander. Eersgenoemde is 'n verhouding van asimmetriese en oneindige
verantwoordelikheid waartoe ons beveel word deur die uniekheid van die ander se 'gesig.'
Laasgenoemde is 'n verhouding waarbyook 'n 'derde' betrokke is, en daarom moet die self
sy verantwoordelikheid teenoor die spesifieke ander beperk om so ook sy
verantwoordelikheid teenoor 'n veelheid van andere na te kom. Die teenwoordigheid van
die derde dui die beginpunt van onpersoonlike geregtigheid, institusies, politiek, kennis,
asook gelykheid en wederkerigheid tussen die self en die ander, aan. Elke person wat ek
teëkom is 'n algemene ander met wie ek in 'n politiese verhouding staan, asook,
tegelykertyd, 'n spesifieke ander teenoor wie ek oneindiglik verantwoordelik is. Teenoor
elke ander staan ek terselfdetyd in 'n simmetriese politiese verhouding en 'n asimmetriese
etiese verhouding. Die dubbelsinnigheid van die samelewing lê daarin dat ek moet besluit
of ek polities of eties teenoor die ander gaan optree. Beide opsies geniet 'n mate van
legitimiteit, alhoewel, 'n politiese respons teenoor die ander minder legitiem is vanuit 'n
Levinasiaanse oogpunt.
In 'n poging om ons apatie teenoor die wêreld se armes te verstaan, word die sentrale debat
rondom die kwessie van transnasionale verantwoordelikheid, die kosmopolitiaanse-
kommunitêre debat, vanuit 'n Levinasiaanse perspektief geanaliseer. Drie wyses waarop die
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etiese verhouding met die ander onderdruk word, en sodoende bydra tot ons etiese apatie
teenoor die ander, word geïdentifiseer. Eerstens poog skrywers in die kosmopolitiaanse-
kommunitêre debat om die subjek so 'n groot mate van outonomie en vryheid as moontlik
te handhaaf en te bewaar, en 'legitimiseer' in die proses 'n politiese respons teenoor die
ander. Tweedens, wanneer die kwessie van globale geregtigheid deur skrywers in die
kosmopolitiaanse-kommunitêre debat aangeraak word, word die andersheid van die ander,
wat ons aan ons etiese verantwoordelikheid teenoor die ander, asook aan die onvoltooide
aard van geregtigheid, herinner, onderdruk. Derdens, in soverre kosmopolitaanse skrywers
hulself beywer om 'n groter mate van besorgdheid teenoor arm persone regoor die wêreld
te ontlok, blyk die strategie wat deur hulle gevolg word (hulle beklemtoon menslike
gelykheid) teenproduktief te wees, aangesien hierdie strategie die uniekheid van die subjek
en die ander in die etiese verhouding misken en onderdruk. Die kritiek teenoor hierdie drie
aspekte van die kosmopolitiaanse-kommunitêre debat word dan uitgebrei na aansprake dat
'n meer etiese houding teenoor die wêreld se armes moontlik is.
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The dead have remembered - by Tadeusz Rózewicz
The dead have remembered
our indifference
The dead have remembered
our silence
The dead have remembered
our words
The dead see our snouts
laughing from ear to ear
The dead see
our bodies rubbing against each other
The dead see our hands
poised for applause
The dead read our books
listen to our speeches
delivered so long ago
the dead hear
clucking tongues
The dead scrutinize our lectures
join in previously terminated
discussions
The dead see stadiums
ensembles and choirs declaiming rhythmically
All the living are guilty
little children
who offered bouquets of flowers
are guilty
lovers are guilty
guilty are
guilty are those who ran away
and those that stayed
those who were saying yes
those who said no
and those who said nothing
the dead are taking stock of the living
the dead will not rehabilitate us
translated by Adam Czerniawski
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
1.1. Problem statement
Consider the fact that thousands die daily from preventable, poverty-related causes through
no fault of their own. We cannot say that we did not know about their plight. We cannot say
that we did all that could be done to prevent their deaths. We cannot say that we did not
possess the means to save more lives than we did. Still, despite our failure to prevent these
preventable deaths, we generally do not seem to consider ourselves unjust, bad, immoral, or
even responsible. From some perspectives our indifference to the global poor would not be
particularly striking, surprising or problematic. However, when we approach the matter
from the perspective of Emmanuel Levinas's ethical philosophy, we are indeed faced with a
paradox, because Levinas says Il am infinitely and inescapably responsible for the other.' It
is the paradox between the infinite responsibility Levinas claims the self has and our
indifference to the global poor that this study confronts.
However, an immediate objection appears: Is it not rather the case that our descriptive and
prescriptive Levinasian premise is dead wrong and that the self has no such demanding
responsibility for the other? Judging by the death toll exacted by global poverty;' it
1 The terms 'I,' 'subject,' 'individual,' 'existent,' 'ego' and 'self are used interchangeably and are referred to
in the masculine form. Further, when the word 'we' is used, it is generally meant to refer to an assembly of
individuals with no collective moral identity of their own. When 1 deviate from this, e.g. with regard to some
of communitarian writing in which the collective 'we' is given an identity of its own, the shift in meaning
should be quite clear from the context.
2 Responsibility is understood in a very wide sense. It covers a sweep from guilt, noticing the suffering of the
other, questioning one's usurpation of the place of the other, on the one hand, to the extremity of 'hollowing'
oneself out for the other, of always finding more to give the other, on the other hand. Though sometimes the
most appropriate ethical response to the other might be to not do anything, such passivity may not be the
result of indifference, but of concerned calculation. To be in an ethical relation with the other, that is, to be
'responsible,' is to not be indifferent to him.
1 am only concerned with individual responsibility. 1 do not enter the debate over whether institutions are
themselves moral actors (on this, see the contributions to Erskine, 2003), nor do 1 enquire after the most
appropriate institutional arrangement to alleviate global poverty, or why and how present institutions have
failed to more significantly reduce global poverty. I work from the assumption that institutions can be created
and altered to better serve human priorities.
3 The term 'global poverty' has found a place in the title but little mention in the body of this study. Global
poverty, especially insofar it is and has been severe and/or lethal, is taken as a clear indicator of how we, as
individuals, have not realised our responsibility for the other and how we are still failing to do so. 1 resist
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
2certainly does not seem as though individual persons behave as though they were 'infinitely
responsible' for others. This objection makes it necessary to briefly recall Levinas's
distinction between the 'ethical' and the 'political' relation with the other (while still
granting the accuracy of the premise that we are infinitely responsible for the other in the
ethical relationship).
When Levinas writes that the self is infinitely responsible for the other he is referring to the
interpersonal ethical relation, a relation with a singular human being, recognised as unique,
a 'face.' In the ethical relation, the self has been awakened to his having oppressed the
other through his naively exercised freedom. It is an awakening that occurs through the
other's ultimate resistance to being reduced to and contained in egoistic attempts at
totalisation and objectification, which are actions exemplary of a subject living
autonomously, a law unto himself. However, instead of annihilating the subject in guilt for
his domination, the subject is reaffirmed as uniquely, infinitely and asymmetrically
responsible for the other. In the interpersonal ethical relation the life of the other is
ultimately more important than my own. Important to note is that in the ethical relation the
self is affirmed as unique. It is the irreducible uniqueness of the other, expressed in his
'face,' that reminds me of my violation of the other and leads me to awaken to my infinite
responsibility for him.
I am granted temporary respite from the stringency of the ethical relation by the presence of
another person (the 'third') next to the other, who is also an other. In order to be just I have
to limit my responsibility for a specific other so as to divide it amongst innumerable others
who also command my responsibility. The presence of the third indicates the beginning of
politics, justice, institutions, knowledge, decisions, and equality; equality of various others
among whom I have to divide my responsibility, but it is an equality that also includes me.
In this, the political order, it is necessary to decide the substance of our equality, that is, the
providing a definition of who exactly the global poor are, for a number of reasons: First, the concern of this
study lies with the orientation of the subject toward the global poor, regardless of who specifically forms the
latter group; second, in practice and in the wider literature there are already a number of ways in which the
poor is defined, for example, as those living under the one or two 'dollar-a-day' mark; and finally,
categorising 'the poor' too precisely seems to me to go against the attention Levinas tries to bring to the
uniqueness of the other person, rather than the characteristics he shares with other people.
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3end of our responsibility for the other and the beginning of our freedom (from
responsibility for the other). Consequently, there is a need for justice and theoretical
knowledge, as well as for institutions to regulate our responsibilities to one other and to
secure our freedom against intrusion by others. In the asymmetrical ethical relation, the
other enjoys primacy over me, but in the political relation there is equality and reciprocity
between us. This means that I can and may demand justice and due consideration from the
other, can and may insist upon my rights against those of the other, and busy myself with
myself.
There is no chronology between the ethical relation and the political relation. Having been
born into a plurality, every person that I encounter is already a general other with whom I
stand in a political relation, while at the same time, also a specific other who commands my
responsibility (Critchley, 1992:231). With every other, I am simultaneously in a
symmetrical political relation and an asymmetrical ethical relation. This is the ambiguity of
political society: do I relate to the other politically or ethically? Do I claim reciprocity, my
rights and equal treatment from and against the other, or do I acknowledge his human
vulnerability and take up my infinite responsibility for his wellbeing, letting him go before
me? Both options enjoy legitimacy, though, from a Levinasian perspective, the choice to
politically respond to the other less so, for the extremity, infinity and urgency of the ethical
demand leaves the subject unable to rest in good conscience in the presence of the other-
there is so much to do and the subject is always too late in meeting his responsibility for the
other. Though the subject can suppress and try to ignore the ethical debt of responsibility
owed to the other, he ultimately cannot get away from it. The unmet responsibility for the
other gnaws at the self. Importantly for social theory, the ethical parallels and underlies the
political and is what drives moral progress in the political order. The extent to which we
have met our responsibility for the other" is the basis on which we discern a more just order
from one less so. In an ethical politics, the impersonal political order, which tends to forget
the particularity of the ethical and which cannot but fail in taking care of the other, is
constantly pierced by reminders of the ethical relation. The tendency towards
4 For Levinas, human rights provide the measure of the extent to which we have met our responsibility for the
other, and their imperfect realisation is a reminder of the inadequacy of our response (IWTA 178).
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4objectification and totalisation is constantly corrected by the ethical, only for the ethical
disturbance to be absorbed again, but leaving the political order more objectively just. In an
ethically aware political order there is a greater oscillation between the ethical and the
political; there is a much greater hesitation before deciding upon either an ethical or a
political response to the other; and there is a greater unease about opting for a political
response, which occurs comparatively less often than in a less ethical state. For Levinas,
liberal democracy is characterised by, and best suited for such a perennial ethical correcting
of the 'violence' inherent to politics.
That we are at least disturbed by the preventable deaths of thousands of extremely poor
people suggests that we are not wholly independent, isolated and self-regarding beings, and
hints at an ethical relation with the other and the responsibility this implies. On the other
hand, however, individuals generally do not consider themselves particularly responsible
for the fate of the poor or particularly guilty for having done so little, if anything, to
improve their lot. It is the discrepancy between the subject's general moral self-satisfaction
and the tremendous guilt that one would have expected from a Levinasian stringency (guilt
for having failed the other, judged in terms of the thousands of daily poverty related deaths)
that this study wants to investigate. Why do we, as individuals, not regard ourselves guiltier
and more responsible than we do with regard to those people dying from preventable,
poverty-related causes, since guilt is what our Levinasian premise would predict with
regard to such failure? Why has there been such a weak recognition and realisation of our
ethical responsibility for the other?5
In asking these questions, we are surmising about the attitudes, understandings, postures
and behaviour of real people in the social world, specifically as these pertain to
responsibility for the other at the global level. However, in this study I will not, for
example, carry out a quantitative survey of a representative sample of people to establish
their attitudes more precisely. Rather, I shall infer from the principal debate about
responsibility for others at the global level, namely the cosmopolitan-communitarian
5 I assume that, all things being equal, greater individual acknowledgement of guilt and responsibility would
have led to greater inroads into the persistent problem of global poverty than has been the case to date.
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5debate. On the one side of this debate are cosmopolitan writers who think of justice as
universal and impartial, human beings as 'fundamentally equal' and distributive justice as
global in scope." Communitarians, on the other hand, see (distributive) justice as bound to a
specific locale, attribute a strong unitary identity to respective political societies, and
prioritise their fellow citizens over outsiders to a considerable degree, citizens whose
individual identities are inextricably linked to their social setting," Although a survey
sample might have been more representative of the common view, focussing on the
cosmopolitan-communitarian debate has the advantage that its philosophical character
causes writers in this debate to be more reflective over and conscious of their underlying
assumptions, than respondents in a survey would have been. Still, in focussing on this
debate, I do take it to resonate with the variety of attitudes of people in the social world, as
well as properly articulating the assumptions that underlie these attitudes. For example, if I
judge that the writers in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate seek to preserve the
subject in the greatest autonomy possible, I believe I am justified in assuming that this has
some rough correspondence to the way individuals in the social world choose to live their
own lives. Further, if I judge understandings of justice in the cosmopolitan-communitarian
debate to have lost sight of ethical otherness, I believe I am justified in assuming that this
has some rough correspondence to the way individuals in the social world think about
justice. And, if I judge that those theorists in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate who
desire a more just global order, pursue such an order through a strategy in which human
equality is emphasized, I believe I am justified in thinking that this has some rough
correspondence with how social activists tend to campaign for a more just world order.
So, in this study, I by and large confine myself to the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate,
the principal debate about our responsibility for others at the supranational level. In
considering this theoretical debate I find three aspects of this debate that have forestalled
(and continue to forestall) people from a greater realisation/awareness of their
6 Influential cosmopolitan writers include Brian Barry, Charles Beitz, David Held, Charles Jones, Andrew
Linklater, David Luban, Onara O'Neill, Thomas Pogge, Henry Shue and Peter Singer.
7 Influential communitarian writers (in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate) include Alisdair MacIntyre,
David Miller, John Rawls, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer. Albeit that some of these
writers do not explicitly address the issue of global justice, but confine their focus to a national setting, I think
that much of their work is of considerable importance to the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate.
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6responsibility for others and/or legitimised indifference to the global other. Regarding the
cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, I shall argue that a disregard of our individual
responsibility for the other is not surprising on the basis of (A) the assessment that writers
in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate seek to preserve the subject in the greatest
autonomy possible; (B) the unapologetic suppression of otherness when approaching the
issue of global justice; (C) and insofar as some writers in the cosmopolitan-communitarian
debate (cosmopolitans especially) prioritise and advocate a greater concern for the global
poor, I find the strategy they favour (they emphasize human equality) to be
counterproductive for it overlooks the uniqueness of both the subject and the other in the
interpersonal ethical relation. In criticising these three aspects of the cosmopolitan-
communitarian debate, I employ Levinas's 'ethical philosophy' to develop my criticism,
but also to show that, with regard to the three aspects criticised, a more ethical posture is
conceivable.
In section 1.2 I reflect on this study and Levinas's inclusion in it, while in 1.3 I outline the
argument(s) and structure of this thesis. In the final section (1.4), I address the issue of
Levinas's deeply compromising statements (and silences) on some political issues, and
consider if his philosophy is implicated by these pronouncements.
1.2. About this study
I approach the issue of our general indifference to the plight of the global poor through a
reflection on the so-called cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, the umbrella under which
writings with implications for the issue of transnational responsibility and global justice,
particularly global distributive justice, fall. I shall not pay all that much attention to the
oppositions and differences between cosmopolitans and communitarians.8 My concern lies
rather with the underlying elements shared by these two approaches, underlying elements
that are problematic insofar as these features constrain a greater ethical concern for the
8 On the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, see, for example Brown (1992); Cochran (1996; 1999); and
Shapcott (200 I).
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7other, particularly insofar as this other is the extremely poor non-fellow citizen. Since
communitarians are by definition more concerned with their own citizens, I shall tend to
focus on cosmopolitan writing, which at least professes a deep concern for the global other.
I shall claim that the privileged view of the self by both sides of this debate is
commensurate with a disregard of the other whose life is threatened by extreme poverty. I
shall try to demonstrate that there is a tendency for otherness, and the ethical relation
implied by otherness, to be suppressed in theorisation about (global) justice. My view is
that the cosmopolitan tendency to emphasize human equality is useful to demonstrate the
extent of global injustice, but as a strategy to convince us that the global poor should be
treated with more or equal consideration it is deeply compromised for it suppresses that
which elicits our ethical concern for the other, his uniqueness, in Levinas's terminology, his
'face.'
I shall use Levinas's ideas in a number of ways. The first is that his thinking guides us into
identifying aspects of writing in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate that counter or
suppress (an awareness of) our ethical relation with the other. Levinas's relatively
underdeveloped ideas that political philosophy has failed to fundamentally question the
value and principle of freedom and that the ethical tends to be suppressed in the political
order led me to isolating the first two problems in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate
(A and B above). The more fully developed idea that we are reminded of our (ethical)
responsibility for the other by his 'face,' that is, his uniqueness, led me to identify and be
suspicious of the cosmopolitan strategy of emphasizing human equality so as to elicit
greater concern for the global poor (C). It is by having these Levinasian points in mind that
I have been able to identify the three problematic aspects of the cosmopolitan-
communitarian debate in chapter 2, without there making much mention of the Levinas's
thought itself. The second way in which I shall use Levinas's thought (and terminology) is
to explain why these three aspects of the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate indeed
constitute a suppression of the ethical relation with the other. This takes place at the
respective starts of chapters 3, 4 and 5. The first two ways in which I have employed
Levinas's work have been primarily critical. The third way in which I use his ideas is more
constructive, by stressing the ethical element of subjectivity, noting the possibility for
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sketching a strategy that reminds us of our ethical responsibility for the other. These
'constructive' developments are necessary to show that the limit of concern for the other
has not been reached in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, and that increased
concern for the global poor is possible. Fourth, and although I do not explore these issues,
by framing the issue of not responding to the globally poor other in the Levinasian terms I
have employed, certain questions are opened up for further study and which are discussed
in the concluding chapter.
I have stated that my critique IS informed, and indeed enabled, by an awareness of
Levinas's unique philosophy. This is not to deny Levinas's proximity to a number of
thinkers, both past and present. Indeed, as Derrida (1978) already pointed out decades ago,
Levinas is much closer to the great figures of Western philosophy than he realises/admits.9
In spite of these (unacknowledged/unwitting) proximities, in Levinas's writing these
disparate influences crystallise in a highly original philosophy. In this study, it has not been
my intention to criticise Levinas's thinking or situate his thought relative to other writers in
Continental philosophy. Rather, I intended to explore and exploit the richness of his ideas
insofar as it suited my purposes.l" So, in a sense, this study is an exercise in 'applying
Levinas' to a certain 'real world' problem, relying on the increasing esteem with which his
thought is regarded and on an anticipation of the answers he might lead us to as justification
for utilising his philosophy. One of the most striking and useful aspects of his philosophy is
9 I do not consider the enormous question of Levinas's relation with and distance from some of the great
figures of Western philosophy, particularly Kant, Hegel, Bergson, Heidegger and Husserl, and to a lesser
degree Merleau-Ponty, Blanchot, Buber, Rosenzweig, Derrida, as well as to Talmudic scholarship and
'Jewish ethics.' On the issue of Levinas's relationship to other thinkers, the starting point is Derrida's (1978)
essay, "Violence and Metaphysics." Levinas relation with other thinkers is further explored in a number of
books, including Bernasconi and Critchley (1991); Bernasconi and Wood (1988); Bloechl (2000); Caygill
(2002); Cricthley and Bernasconi (2002); Hand (1996); Peperzak (1993); and Wyschogrod (2000).
10 Levinas is absolutely central to this study. His centrality lies therein that it is his notion of 'infinite
responsibility' that has enabled our problem formulation. One might argue that Derrida has also said that
responsibility is infinite, but the quick answer to this would be that Derrida is simply employing an idea he
got from Levinas. One other thinker that springs to mind as being quite similar to Levinas in many respects,
although he would abhor the idea of this, is Richard Rorty. Rorty is very concerned with cruelty and the
suffering of others, recognises the violence of institutions and representations of the other, is aware that
cruelty often results the naïve exercise of human freedom, and also thinks that to emphasize human equality is
not a good strategy to elicit concern for suffering poor people. However, the fact that Rorty introduces a very
stark split between the public and the private, with neither realm enjoying an obvious priority over the other,
puts him at odds with Levinas, who would never admit to the equal legitimacy of public and private concerns.
On the affinities between Rorty and Levinas, see Jordaan (forthcoming).
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infinitely, asymmetrically and inescapably responsible for the other. It is through arming
ourselves with the tenet that there is an irreducible ethical relation between another and
myself that we are able draw out the above-mentioned problems and tensions in the
cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, problems and tension that result in a disregard for the
plight of the global poor. Il
However, talk of the interpersonal relation brings us into an immediate confrontation with
an 'institutional cosmopolitan' such as Pogge, who follows Rawls's method but applies it
as though all the world's people were present in a global original position (Pogge, 1989).
Pogge (1992:50) thinks that an institutional approach to international justice leads to a
"more plausible overall morality," and deems it unproblematic to "leave open" the issue of
the interpersonal ethical relation. Further, Pogge continuously plays down the need for
positive duties. I do not deny the importance of a cosmopolitan approach to global justice,
nor do I dispute that a cosmopolitan institutional approach to global justice leads to a 'more
plausible overall morality,' if this is understood as referring to the general arrangements
and principles of global justice. What I do contend is that it is deeply problematic to simply
'leave open' the interpersonal ethical relation as though it were of no real consequence.
From a Levinasian perspective, the self is always in both an ethical and a political relation
with the other. The self is concerned with institutional justice because he is concerned with
and for the other. The deeper the selfs concern for the other, the more he will be concerned
with the justice of the institutional environment in which the other lives. It is the
interpersonal, ethical responsibility for the other that informs moral progress in the political
order of which institutions form part; that animates a desire for a better (institutional)
justice for the sake of the other; that reminds institutions of their 'violence;' and that spurs
us to respond to the other when institutions fail to do so. However, an even more
Il Levinas thought has been receiving growing attention in recent years, although the secondary development
of the political aspect of his work has not been extensive; English-language exceptions include Bergo (1999);
Burggraeve (1981); Caygill (2002), Critchley (1992, 2004), Herzog (2002); and Simmons (1999). In the field
ofIntemational Relations, a discipline that strikes me as always eager to pick up trends from other disciplines,
Campbell (1996; 1998:171-184) has been the only writer to pay more than a few pages of sustained attention
to Levinas. While I found Campbell's work very useful for getting to grips with the political aspects of
Levinas's thought, I did not find any specific use for his treatment of Levinas in my study, and therefore do
not make any further reference to him.
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incriminating charge against institutional cosmopolitans is that the transfer of responsibility
for the other to institutions constitutes an attempt to establish a zone of legitimate
indifference to the need of the other, an evasion and suppression of the ethical accusation
levelled against the subject, who is always in both an ethical and a political relation with
the other. My criticism of institutional cosmopolitanism does not mean that I simply side
with 'interactional cosmopolitans,' such as Shue, Luban and Singer, who emphasize our
direct, personal responsibility for the other.12 As with institutional cosmopolitans,
interactional cosmopolitans also ultimately privilege the autonomous individual above the
other, which grants the autonomous individual the possibility of considering himself
perfectly justified in ignoring the need of the other. The interactional cosmopolitan
preservation of the autonomous individual continues to clash with a Levinasian position,
according to which the life of the other is ultimately more important than my own. One can
never be fully justified in turning away from the other.
There occurs some mention of 'institutions' in this study. However, institutions are only
considered in a very high degree of abstraction. When I do mention institutions, I am
referring to those of the state, especially the most capacitated states, the wealthy
democracies of the world. Reference to the institutions 'of the state' permits us to include
(powerful) international institutions insofar as they are extensions 'of the state.' In any
case, the behaviour of the most influential international institutions is never very far
removed from the interests and authority of the world's wealthy democracies.l ' A major
12 On the distinction between institutional and interactional cosmopolitans, see Pogge (1992), as well as
section 2.2 below.
13 On the topic of (the potential for) global/cosmopolitan democracy, see, for example, Archibugi, Held and
Kohler (1998); Held (1995); and Holden (2000). Regarding the purported growing inclusivity of the IMF, the
World Bank and the WTO, three of the world's most influential institutions, especially insofar as the matter of
global poverty is concerned, the following can be noted. Germain's (2002) assessment of the political agenda
behind the growing inclusivity at the IMF is that it is based on the IMF's need for less powerful states to
accept the legitimacy of the reforms they would have to implement domestically in order to secure system-
wide stability. Germain (2002:31-32) warns against seeing the "capitalist or American devil" behind the
IMF's recent effort to become more representative and inclusive, which, for Germain, represents "the most
radical overhaul of the structure of global financial governance since 1945." Still, this 'overhaul' corresponds
to the typical behaviour of hegemonically pivotal international institutions, which is to absorb transnational
conflict and to normalise and legitimise hegemonic values, which will come about if the dominant "are
willing to make concessions that will secure the weak's acquiescence in their leadership and if they can
express this leadership in terms of universal or general interests, rather than just serving their own particular
interests" (Cox, 1996:99). This seems to me to tally with Germain's description oflMF reform. Similarly, the
World Bank has implored states not to view its Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), announced
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change on the part of these international institutions toward a greater concern with the
global poor would have to occur via/with the (tacit) consent of the world's most influential
states. Hence, I generally focus on national institutions (which are also international actors
in their own right) as the institutional thoroughfare for greater concern for the global poor.
One might object that Levinas's writing only pertains to the interpersonal and should
therefore be kept out of the impersonal realm of the political.l" While Levinas does
occasionally theorise the political, he never develops the rich ideas he. raises to any great
extent.i ' Nowhere does he develop a 'political philosophy,' nor has anyone, to the best of
my knowledge, attempted to construct such a political philosophy. This dissertation is also
not an attempt at such a construction. Rather, I employ Levinas's thought primarily as an
analytical tool to help shed light on some of the those aspects of the cosmopolitan-
communitarian debate that forestall a greater ethical disposition towards the other. In this
regard, I find his thought sufficiently developed to guide us through the issues I want to
explore. In fact, I did not even find it necessary to employ his more popular political pieces,
as some of these are, shall we say, 'ethically' compromised, and I draw almost exclusively
on his academic philosophical writing. (I shall discuss Levinas's compromised political
comments in section 1.4 below).
in 1999, as a surreptitious attempt by the Bank to expand its influence in the domain of international
development, but rather as something for governments to 'own' (Cammack, 2002:36). So, while the World
Bank appears to have 'courted' wider acquiescence and participation, such a desire for congruency with the
Bank's objectives have instead been imposed. According to Cammack's (2002:49) assessment, 'The CDF has
been presented by the World Bank as a means of incorporating structural and social issues into development,
but on closer inspection it has turned out to be a means of tying them to a rigid IMF-prescribed
macroeconomic framework and a disciplinary agenda devised and promoted by the Bank ... With this goal in
mind, the Bank is now actively engaged upon extending the scope of its CDF-PSRP [Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper] framework and drawing its 'development partners' into the process." The third influential
organisation under consideration, the WTO, is notoriously undemocratic, because, even though all countries
enjoy representation in the WTO, most of its decisions are dominated by the USA, the EU, Japan and Canada
(Woods, 2000:218). As far as openness and responsiveness to civil society pressures are concerned, the
WTO's engagement with civil society has been largely confrontational, as the 'Battle of Seattle' testifies,
where civil society demonstrations scuppered the trade negotiations. However, there has been some
interaction with civil society, in the form of NGOs, but in these interactions, the balance of power has
remained unequivocally with the WTO, and by trying to build a relationship with some NGOs, NGOs
representing more critical spheres of public opinion have been marginalised (Wilkinson, 2002:204).
14 Caygill (2002) and Critchley (2004) caution us against the risk in Levinas, specifically with regard to Israel,
that a political response to the other be too quickly given.
15 See, for example, BPW 162-169; EN 18-38; EN 103-121; EN 189-196; LR 236-297; OB 157-162; TI 212-
216.
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1.3. Outline
The argument, with regard to the three problematic aspects of the cosmopolitan-
communitarian debate can be summarised as follows: (A) Writers on both sides of the
cosmopolitan-communitarian debate preserve a sphere of autonomy for the self, a sphere
that indicates a 'legitimate' limit to one's responsibility for others and a beginning of the
selfs indifference to the other in good conscience. Communitarian writers demand a
greater responsibility towards others (read: fellow citizens), though this is mostly because
communitarians fear that too much asocial individualism will erode the social fabric that
makes such individual autonomy possible in the first place. The autonomous self lives as
though the world is there for his enjoyment, not questioning his naïve freedom, or his very
right to be. By legitimising and entrenching the autonomous subject, writers in the
cosmopolitan-communitarian debate are making it less likely for the subject to be put in
question for having usurped the place of the other. Following Levinas, we might consider
the autonomously free subject to be oppressive of and/or indifferent to the other. However,
it is in the other that the independent self runs into the limit of his spontaneous freedom; the
other is a being that resists all efforts to subjugate his otherness, a resistance that is ethical,
a resistance suggested by his 'face,' his vulnerable uniqueness. It is the face of the other
that puts the hitherto imperial self in question, bringing home the injustice of his being. So
much then for demonstrating why the preserved autonomy of the self in the cosmopolitan-
communitarian debate is problematic. From here one can move to stake out aspects of a
more ethical subjectivity. Instead of annihilating the self in guilt for his offence, he is
reaffirmed in his bottomless responsibility for the other, a constant 'hollowing out' of the
self for the other. The extremity of responsibility for the other in the interpersonal ethical
relation is moderated by the presence of a third next to the other, which announces the.
impersonal order in which the self regains a provisional autonomy in being equal to the
other in the political relation. However, every other is both the ethical other to which one
owes everything and the political other with whom the subject is in a relation of equality
and reciprocity - the ambiguity of society. In the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate,
theorists view a political response to the other as a wholly legitimate option. However,
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having been awakened to one's ethical responsibility for the other, the two responses are
never of the same legitimacy. To be a more ethical subject in political society means to
respond 'ethically' more often, to be more hesitant before the offence of responding
politically, and to be more aware of one's responsibility for the other.
(B) In deciding the scope of justice, one is often able to detect a considerable amount of
ethical concern for and generosity towards the other (especially amongst cosmopolitans).
This is particularly noticeable in the proposed inclusion of those persons, such as the global
extremely poor, who cannot reciprocate the benefits that they will enjoy from being
included in the scope of justice. The generosity (supererogation/gratuitousness) of various
(cosmopolitan) starting points suggests the recognition of our asymmetrical responsibility
for the other, which implies a relationship with the other as 'face,' the 'face' of the other
being what reminds us of our responsibility for him. Despite the ethical concern professed
by these starting points of justice, the ethical relation (a recognition of the other as other) is
soon suppressed in the theoretical and institutional generality and objectivity justice aspires
to in the impersonal political order. It is the otherness of the other that reminds us, as
individuals, of the interpersonal ethical relation in which each one of us stand with him.
The interpersonal is what drives humanist progress in the political order. However, despite
the deep ethical concern of many writers in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, they
seem to have forgotten that all forms of theoretical and institutional justice constitute a
violation of the other, and instead of reminding us of the ethical relation with the other, as
signified by his face, we find a general reduction of what is other to the 'same' in their
writings about justice. So, despite an initial ethical concern for the other at the 'outset' of
justice, it appears as though the overriding function of justice turns into securing order, that
is, ignoring and suppressing disruptive otherness. The suppression of what is other amounts
to disregarding the ethical function of justice and letting the political function of justice
predominate, maintaining the self and the other in an ethically indifferent 'political peace.'
It is possible to separate the suppression of otherness in the tendency towards 'justice as
order' into a philosophical and a socio-political aspect. Concerning the philosophical aspect
of the tendency towards (justice as) order, 'justice as the suppression of otherness' is
located as part of a broader tendency in Western philosophy to reduce what is other to the
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same so as to contain it in a system of thought. In such a theoretical totality, units of the
system receive their meaning from their position in the system. However, the other is what
ultimately disrupts and resists the closure of a system of thought (e.g. on justice) and what
cannot be contained in a concept. Still, despite the violation of the other in representing
him, there remains a need for knowledge, objectification and theorisation to solve moral
and practical dilemmas of justice in the presence of the third. That said, it also remains
important that the betrayal of the other in the said be forever disrupted by otherness and
reminded of the 'pre-original' interpersonal ethical relation with the other, something that
can be effected through a constant emphasis on human complexity. Regarding the socio-
political dimension of 'justice as order': although suppressed, the ethical relation with the
other is already implied by the need for and the imperfection of social order, for its
imperfection shows that human beings cannot be contained in a system. Humans, by
definition, resist containment in a totality. Although one should be critical of the
institutional violation of the other, there is a need for justice and order in the presence of the
third. Having said that, the political order, which tends to forget the ethical relation with the
other, should forever be (made) mindful of the violence institutions commit against the
other. Furthermore, and in the name of our 'pre-original' responsibility for the other,
political institutions should be reminded of their unfinished responsibility for the other, in a
perpetual aspiration to a better justice. For Levinas, the liberal state, which is by definition
self-questioning, is the political form most eager and likely to alter its institutional complex
so as to reduce its violation of the other in the order of justice.
(C) Cosmopolitans want to demonstrate that all humans are substantially equal to one
another and/or should be treated as such, the case for which they argue along two routes.
First, the interdependence of the global political economy means that we are all participants
in a cooperative undertaking of which the benefits and burdens are to be distributed fairly.
Second, cosmopolitans also appeal to an impartial assessment to show the current global
)
distributive order to be unjust by even the most inegalitarian (national) standards. To
(theoretically) yield ajust distributive order, the perspectives of the global poor would have
to be granted an equal weight in the consideration of what such an order would look like.
What these two strategies share is the view that, if persons are to be regarded as more
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substantially equal, that is, their perspectives are given greater currency, then the current
global distributive order could be shown to be unjust. This type of argument is of great use
to indicate the injustice and inequality of the current global order. However, insofar as this
argument is also used as a strategy to convince us that others ought to be treated more
equally and be brought into a greater equality it runs into problems, especially in the
anarchical international system in which there is no authority to enforce a better treatment
of others, as exists within states. The unenforced better treatment of others (particularly by
those in a better position to help) requires the ethical recognition of the other as a face,
which is the opposite of emphasizing his equality with all others. The ethical relation
between the subject and the other, which parallels the political relation, is what drives
humanist progress in the political, drives justice to be more just. We are awakened to our
responsibility for the other by his 'face,' that is, how the other is different from all others,
how I have nothing in common with him (BPW 16). Furthermore, in the ethical relation,
the subject is individuated in the uniqueness of his election as responsible.i" According to
this line of thought, an emphasis on human equality deadens our awareness of the ethical
command that issues from the face of the other. How are we then to represent the other so
as to elicit concern for him if emphasizing equality is not a good strategy? I propose that we
pursue a strategy of emphasizing human complexity, which carries the dual benefit of
articulating and drawing attention to the numerous ways in which we have oppressed and
neglected the other, and of being more suggestive of the other as face.
In chapter 2, I try to demonstrate the suppression of the ethical relation with the other in the
cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, with regard to the three problematic aspects that were
mentioned above. In chapters 3-5, I elaborate on what indeed makes these three aspects
problematic from a Levinasian perspective, while drawing out the ethical dimension of our
relation with the other.
16 The focus is only on how the uniqueness of the other is suppressed, not the uniqueness of the subject,
because the other is individualised in recognising and responding to the other as face.
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1.4. A comment on Levinas's compromising political pronouncements
Doubts might remain about Levinas's relevance to politics, in the light of some deeply
compromising pronouncements he made on politics, pronouncements that are particularly
damaging in the light of the ethical force his thought projects. I? One might surmise that it is
exactly because of the ethical stricture of Levinas's thought that these statements are so
compromising. The most significant examples of Levinas's missteps include the occasional
disdain for Islam, a racist reference to Communist China as a "yellow peril," and Levinas's
ambivalence about the massacre at Sabra and Chatilla in 1982/8 the latter fitting into a
wider ambivalence about the legitimacy ofIsraeli state (see Caygill, 2002: 159-198).
In Levinas's philosophical thought proper, the movement from ethics to politics is always
marked by an unease about the violence inherent to institutions and political necessity, a
violence that is always to be corrected, to be 'unsaid.' One is able to detect this hesitancy
with regard to Levinas's thinking about Israel, as Levinas's ambivalence at times lapses
into permitting state violence on behalf of the Israeli 'other.' For Levinas, Israel has two
principal meanings, two histories: 'universal' and 'holy.' The universal history refers to the
development of Israel as a modem state, similar to other states. The holy history of Israel
refers to the religious character and promise of the Jewish state (Caygill, 2002: 160). Israel
finally proffers Jews the opportunity to "carry out the social law of Judaism." For Levinas,
the 'holy' history of Israel lies therein that "[t]he subordination of the State to its social
promises articulates the significance of the resurrection of Israel as, in ancient times, the
execution of justice justified one's presence on the land" (DF 218). The difficulty for
Levinas lies in reconciling these two histories, for he recognises the geopolitical quagmire
in which the state of Israel finds itself, and that its very survival is dependent on a certain
'political' response to its neighbours, that is, a side-lining of the ethical promise of Israel
for reasons of state.
17 Apart from the issue of Israel, Critchley (2004) identifies four further problems Levinas's politics, which
Critchley summarises as "fraternity, monotheism, androcentrism [and] the family" (p. 172).
18 Shortly after the massacring of Palestinian refugees by Christian soldiers with the complicity of the Israel
Defence Forces at the Chatilla and Sabra camps in Lebanon in 1982, Levinas participated in an interview on
an Israeli radio station. During this interview he failed to condemn Israeli complicity and further went against
the grain of his philosophy in saying that "in alterity we can find an enemy" (LR 294). For the interview, see
The Levinas Reader (pp. 289-297).
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In the political, it is necessary to decide, to act, and to choose sides. Undoubtedly, Levinas
has let himself down in forgetting the ethical relation in with the other, a relation that is to
shadow political interaction with the other, when he failed to condemn the massacre at
Sabra and Chatilla. Though Israel and the fate of the Jewish people is a significant issue for
Levinas, his unfortunate comments and silences on the matter of Israel is but one possible
response to a concrete, historically specific situation. Ethics does not determine what a
politics should look like, because that would limit the freedom of the response to the other
(Critchley, 2004: 178-179). Levinas's response needed not have been what it was. In fact, it
is in light of the generosity of his philosophy that his comments seem so out of place and
uncharacteristic. But, is there not after all a link between Levinas's philosophy proper and
his ill-advised political comments?
In Levinas and the Political (2002), Caygill portrays Levinas as a thinker concerned with
zo" century horror "with an intensity and bleakness unrivalled in philosophical writing"
(p.1). Caygill shows us a Levinas for whom "war" was never far away, a precarity of the
ethical in the face of the political. After all, Levinas, most of whose family was murdered
by the Nazis, has described his life as "dominated by the presentiment and the memory of
the Nazi horror" (DF 291). While Levinas's perception of the flimsiness of the ethical
might explain his willingness to resort to a political response in the concrete political
problem of Israeli geopolitics, I don't think there is anything in Levinas thought that
necessarily leads to a (harsh) political response to the Arab Muslim, to a preclusion of an
ethical response to him or her. It is instructive to see how Caygill suggests such a link. He
focuses on the notion of 'proximity,' a central concept in Levinas's thinking that indicates
being in an ethical relation with the other, that is, a relation that is not understood by
Levinas in terms of geographical proximity or as based on the social identity of the other
(for Levinas, the other is naked, human). In the presence of the third, there is a need for
ontology, justice, theory, principles and decisions; there is a search for answers, which are
always bound to a certain social context. However, the ethical relation is not lost in the
impersonal political order, for "justice remains justice only, in a society where there is no
distinction between those close and those far off, but in which there also remains the
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impossibility of passing by the closest" (OB 159, which Caygill also cites, p. 142). In my
view, this passage is a simply a warning against losing sight of specific needs of the other
in the abstractions of justice, and does not prejudge the identity of the other in asking 'who
is closest?' However, for Caygill (2002:142-143), on the basis of the foregoing quotation,
[t]he problem with Levinas's resort to the correction of ontology by means of proximity is that
it potentially leaves intact the worst forms of state in the name of the other. It seems as
permissible on Levinas's account to wage war by forgetting the self in the proximity of the
other, as it is to pursue the work of justice. Thus as long as responsibility for the other is given
precedence over responsibility for the third, it is hard to see that there is the importance that
Levinas claims in the distinction.
Caygill is forgetting the nudity of the other. In Levinas's view, the other does not have a
social identity, or rather, the other is other because he is irreducible to his social identity. It
seems as though Caygill's reading is prejudiced by the notorious 1982 interview mentioned
above, in which Levinas contradicted his entire oeuvre by identifying the other as "the
neighbour, who is not necessarily kin, but who can be" (LR 294), that is, identifying the
other as the Israeli 'other.' While, in his later work, Levinas often described the other as the
'neighbour,' he never, to my knowledge, identified the other as "kin," for this clashes with
his view of the other as 'face' and the self as being responsibility for whoever shows up. To
sum up, for Levinas, in the ethical relation, proximity is not spatial and the other is noticed
in his uniqueness, how he has nothing in common with other people. In the freedom of the
political decision, one has the choice of siding with the Israelis, or whoever. But, following
Levinas's own philosophical work, one should not lose sight of the ethical, despite the
imperatives of politics, however (badly) one may interpret these imperatives, as Levinas
seems on occasion to have done.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2 - SHARED DIFFFICULTIES IN THE COSMOPOLITAN-
COMMUNITARIAN DEBATE
2.1. Introduction
The issue that concerns us is that people generally do no consider themselves guilty and
responsible, despite living in a world in which thousands die daily from preventable,
poverty-related causes. The apparent lack of guilt is even more puzzling when
considering the Levinasian contention that, in the interpersonal ethical relation, the self
is infinitely and inescapably responsible for the other. To be sure, the extremity of the
interpersonal ethical command is tempered in the presence of the third person, when it
becomes necessary for my infinite responsibility to be limited, divided and dispersed
among a multitude of others. However, that every person is both the general other with
whom I stand in a reciprocal, political relationship and a specific other with whom I
stand in an asymmetrical ethical relationship means that my responsibility is never
finished. I am forever under an ethical accusation; my very right to be is always in
question for my neglect of and violence against the other.
In the presence of the third next to the other arises the need for the impersonality and
objectivity of justice, politics, knowledge and a 'theoretical attitude.' It is against the
backdrop of stark global material inequality and widespread life-threatening poverty
that the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate! delineates theoretical attempts at
establishing how we are to limit, disperse and realise our responsibility to numerous
others in the global political relation. The need for the cosmopolitan-communitarian
debate lies therein that it is not obvious how we are to best disperse our responsibility in
the presence of the third party and as such we find a good number of (partial)
suggestions about how the world ought to be arranged.
I There is also a liberal-communitarian debate in political theory. In the cosmopolitan-communitarian
debate the moral standing of states is questioned, whereas it this is not done in the liberal-communitarian
debate (Cochran, 1996:30). Note that Rawls and Rorty are considered liberals in the domestic debate, but
communitarians in the international level debate. For an overview of the liberal-communitarian debate,
see Mulhall and Swift (1992) For examples of works addressing the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate,
see Brown (1992), Cochran (1996, 1999), Cohen (1996), Hutchings (1999), Morrice (2000), Nardin and
Mapel (1992), and Shapcott (2001).
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Although the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate is in part an attempt to amve at
answers about how best to meet our responsibility for the other, it seems as though the
'pre-original' ethical responsibility for the other and the guilt this implies for the
subject, have largely been overlooked and/or suppressed. Below, I indicate three ways
in which the ethical relation has been deadened in the cosmopolitan-communitarian
debate. The three ways in which I find global moral concern and progress to have been
stifled in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate are through the unquestioned
centrality accorded the autonomous subject (section 2.2.); in the tendency to suppress
otherness in the search for general organising principles of global justice (section 2.3.);
and through the strategy of emphasizing human equality in order to bring about a more
just order (section 2.4.). Regarding the first way in which the ethical relation is
suppressed in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, I will attempt to show that, in
the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, the value of freedom and the autonomy of the
free subject are never questioned fundamentally. The sovereign individual is taken as
the most important element of moral concern. By prioritising the autonomy of the
subject, the subject is legitimised in responding to the other 'politically' (insistent on its
own interests) and the likelihood of the subject questioning his own being is reduced,
leaving the self bound to consider himself blameless and not responsible for the
suffering of the other. Against such a tradition, for Levinas there is something more
important than my own life, and that is the life of the other. Regarding the second
manner in which the ethical relation with the other is undermined, in the political order
there is a need for a 'theoretical attitude' to guide us in the division of our responsibility
for the other according to principles, a theory or a framework of justice. However, in the
aspiration to fulfil this need for a system of justice, there is a tendency for ethical
otherness to become lost in generalisation, which means we are not confronted by what
reminds us of our infinite responsibility for the other, his face. Regarding the third way,
insofar as cosmopolitans pursue a strategy of emphasizing human equality in order to
exact greater global (distributive) justice, this strategy overlooks the asymmetrical
ethical relation between subject and other, in which the other is not equal (similar) to
others, but unique, and the subject is not equal but uniquely and individuatingly
responsible.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the three problematic aspects of the cosmopolitan-
communitarian debate in the rest of this chapter, it will be useful to briefly distinguish
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between the cosmopolitan and communitarian positions. Though the cosmopolitan-
communitarian distinction is somewhat simplistic and definitely not watertight.'
features that distinguish the two sides can be discerned. The cosmopolitan approach
stems from the Stoic self-identification with humanity as such (Nussbaum, 1997);
Kant's liberal moral universalism, regard for human beings as ends in themselves,
visions of a "pacific federation" forming the supra-national background maintaining the
freedom of individual states' (Kant, 1970: 104) and concern with injustice everywhere;"
and the utilitarian view of all persons and their needs as being worthy of equal
consideration and attempts to arrive at what is common to all humans, that is, roughly,
how the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people is to be achieved. The
roots of all present-day cosmopolitan approaches still reflect these origins. Despite some
variation within the cosmopolitan position, the various strands can be said to share the
following elements.' First, for cosmopolitans, universal principles of justice exist; the
need for "a single universal criterion of justice" being driven by increasing global
interdependence (Pogge, 1999:339; also O'Neill, 2000: 117), as well as the need for a
moral yardstick against which existing institutions, practices and policies are to be
judged (Beitz, 1994:124 and 1999b:519). Second, principles of justice should be arrived
at impartially, that is, answers to the question as to what is just should not reflect the
inequality of power and privilege among those deciding what is just. Third, all forms of
cosmopolitanism view humans as being equal "in some fundamental sense" (Barry,
1998a: 146; also O'Neill, 2000: 190), in other words, rules and principles of justice
should apply to everyone equally. Fourth, cosmopolitan morality insists that distributive
justice is an international issue (Beitz, 1994:125; 1999b:520; Barry, 1998:145; Pogge,
1994: 196), which does not mean that the state is not significant in the realisation of the
2 To the best of my knowledge, Brown (1992) was the first to delineate the cosmopolitan-communitarian
debate. In a more recent book (2002), he retracts some of the emphasis on this debate, seeing it as too
simplified a view.
3 This is not to say that all cosmopolitans endorse the Kantian vision of a "pacific federation" of states
(see Franceshet, 2001). Rawls's (LP) society of states approach comes closer to Kant's internationalism
than the proposals of many cosmopolitans.
4 Already during the late 18th century was Kant (1970:107) able to claim the development of a universal
community to the point "where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere."
5 A number of quite distinctive approaches within the cosmopolitan frame can be identified, such as the
dialogic cosmopolitanism of Held (1995) and Linklater (1982; 1998a; 1998b); the contractarian
cosmopolitanism of Barry (1973; 1989a; 1995; 1998a; 1999), Beitz (1979a; 1979b; 1988; 1994; 1999a;
1999b), Pogge (1989; 1992; 1994; 1999; 2001; 2002), and Wenar (2002); the rights based
cosmopolitanism of Vincent (1986), Luban (1985a; 1985b; 2002), Shue (1980), and Jones (2001);
O'Neill's Kantian constructivism (1986; 1996; 2000); and utilitarian cosmopolitanism (Singer, 1985).
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international distributive justice," but that the role of the state is to be judged from a
universal and impartial perspective. On the whole though, cosmopolitans argue for a
shift away from the state as the principal locale for distributive justice. (Beitz,
1999a:292; Pogge, 1992:58; O'Neill, 2000:171-2, 179).
Communitarians posit a greater unity between the members of a political community
than one finds in cosmopolitanism, and also views the link between the identity of the
individual and her political community as more intimate and intractable. So strong did
one of the antecedents of communitarianism, Aristotle (1980:179, emphasis added),
assume this link to be, that he asked "whether we ought to regard the virtue of a good
man and that of a sound citizen as the same virtue, or not?" Apart from Aristotle,
present-day communitarian thought also traces its roots to other classic writers such
Rousseau, Herder and Hegel. Rousseau (1968:153) linked individual and collective self-
determination, whereby individuals realise their citizenship and freedom through the
general will. Herder linked communal and individual identity, common language and
the state (Barnard, 1965), while in Hegel the tension between the individual and other
members of the civil society with who slhe is in competition is reconciled in the state
(Frost, 1996: 148). Against the Enlightenment view of freedom, Hegel held that the state
provides the context in which individual autonomy is fully attainable without needing to
tum one's back on one's affective community (Brown, 1992:65). Turning to some of
the features of present-day communitarian writing (that has to confront the problem of
international distributive justice), some commonalities can be discerned," First, for
communitarians, principles of (distributive) justice arise in a specific locale. Though it
might be possible to recognise universally similar principles of justice, these only find
content in specific contexts. Second, not all humans are attributed equal moral weight
and consideration, except in a very bare sense of the term. The reasons for this lie in
citizenship and the importance of special relationships, whether affective or civic. Third,
communitarians attribute a much greater unitary identity to a political society than do
cosmopolitans. Communitarians exhibit a much stronger conception of the communal
6 Pogge distinguishes between "legal cosmopolitanism" and "moral cosmopolitanism." The former
aspires to a world state, whereas the latter stresses that all people are morally related (Pogge, 1992:49).
7 It is possible to identity a number of communitarian approaches, such as the 'first wave' of respondents
to Rawls's A Theory of Justice, which include MacIntyre (1981), Sandel (1984a; 1984b; 1998), Taylor
(1979; 1995), and Walzer (1983; 1990; 1994); political realism; the liberal nationalism of Miller (1988;
1993; 1994; 1998) and Tarnir (1993); Rawls's 'Society of States' approach (CP; JF; LP; Tl); Gilligan's
(1982) ethics of care, (also Mendus, 1993); Frost's (1996) communitarian constructivism; and Rorty's
liberal ironism.
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good, and give the communal good greater priority over private conceptions of the
good, in comparison to cosmopolitans. Even in liberal societies, where presumably the
right enjoys priority over the good (see Tl 27-28), the freedoms enjoyed in these
societies require sacrifices, obligations and commitments from citizens in order to
sustain such a political order (Taylor, 1979). Fourth, for communitarians, an
individual's identity is inextricably linked to the society/ies in which he lives or chooses
to identify with. Any attempt at self-reflection or individuation inevitably incorporates
some of the elements of one's social situation.
2.2. Preserving the autonomous subject and the limiting of responsibility
Even though freedom is the least questioned value in political philosophy, it is widely
recognised as problematic, seen as being in tension with the value of equality (the
egalitarian critique) and/or as undermining the social bonds that enable a lesser but
more stable freedom (the communitarian critique). Freedom as a value is never
questioned as such, but rather to the extent that it clashes with other social values such
as equality and community. What is more, it seems as if in our era of economic
liberalism and a wider recognition of individual human rights than ever before,
individual freedom has become institutionally and ideationally strengthened at the
expense of the competing values of community and equality. The horrors of the
twentieth century remind us of the pride of place of freedom ought to enjoy, as the
regimes that most deeply subordinated autonomous freedom, whether in the name of
community (e.g. Nazi Germany, apartheid South Africa) or equality (e.g. Khmer Rouge
Cambodia, Stalinist Russia) are as close as we can get to universally accepted examples
of socio-political evil.
When the value of freedom is questioned in writings of political philosophy, this is
hardly ever done fundamentally. Authors who stray too far towards a celebration of
other values at the expense of freedom are quickly rebuked.' That being said, no
political philosopher seriously holds a position advocating unrestrained freedom. Even a
libertarian such as Nozick (1974) admits the legitimacy of a certain curtailment of
8 See, for example, the criticism of Sandel's recent book, Democracy's Discontent, by Dagger (1999).
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liberty. Unchecked and egoistic freedom would make society impossible and would
spell disaster for those in weaker positions. What is usually in question is rather the
extent to which freedom ought to be restricted vis-á-vis the values of equality and
community. The tension between freedom and the values of equality and community is
reduced by pointing to the role of these two values in actually enabling the exercise of
freedom, facilitating a greater freedom still compatible with the freedoms of others.
Despite moments of generosity and concern with the liberties of others, the curtailments
of freedom vis-á-vis the social values of equality and community ultimately serve to
shore up self-interested individual liberty. Communitarians often remind us that too
much atomistic freedom will undermine the very polity necessary to sustain the
subject's freedom (Taylor, 1979). Egalitarians point out that inequality undermines both
the stability on which the freedom of the privileged classes are based and the effective
realisation of various freedoms by the poorer classes. At its core, political philosophy is
concerned with searching for an appropriate balance between the republican ideals of
liberty, equality and fraternity, though freedom remains the pivotal point of normative
reference among this trinity of republican values.
Forgetting for a moment the economic connotations of equality," equality refers to there
being similar constraints placed on people's freedom, but also that people be similarly
enabled to effectively realise their liberty. In this sense then, so-called 'struggles for
freedom' are also 'struggles for equality.' To politically struggle for freedom is to strive
for an equal political limitation of everyone's freedom, as well as the equal endowment
of people (by institutions) so as to enable them to effectively and meaningfully exercise
their liberties. As mentioned, recognising that individual freedom has to be curbed in
equal measure in order to make social life possible and to allow others the space to
exercise their freedoms (our so-called 'negative' duties to others) is a widely accepted
notion. What is more controversial, is that a self has a 'positive duty' to assist and
enable another person to exercise a more meaningful and effective freedom (This
corresponds to an attempt to shift the meaning of 'equality' from referring to the similar
limitation of everyone's freedom to indicate the promotion of a more meaningful
freedom for the other). The relatively more controversial character of positive duties
suggests that the autonomy of the self is assumed to be foremost, compared to the needs
9 The strong economic connotations of the notion of equality lie therein that in society the curtailment and
the enabling of freedom are to a large extent monetised, that is, taxes curtail and redistribution enable.
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of others. In the terms of our discussion, positive duties constitute the most extreme
form of general responsibility for others demanded in traditional political philosophy.l''
Despite the spirit of generosity and genuine moral concern that motivate arguments in
favour of a greater universal equality and a promotion of the freedoms of the weak vis-
a-vis the freedom, interests and rights of the powerful, arguments that often insist upon
a greater taking up of duties towards the poor, there remains a moment in which these
progressive arguments compromise themselves by limiting their concern and
responsibility for others, and doing so in good conscience. Such a compromise runs
counter to the ethical expiation for the other in responsibility that global humanist
progress requires. While in traditional political philosophy disagreement exists over the
extent to which freedom should be limited, over the substance of equality, and the
extent of one's responsibility for others, what is not in dispute in these traditional
understandings is that there ought to be a limit to the demands others may make upon a
subject and to the duties the subject owes others. The restriction of demands by others
suggests a space where the subject is free, beyond the political reproach and demands of
the other, justified in enjoying an autonomous liberty equal to that of the other. Freedom
as autonomy is to not have to answer to anyone, to not consider oneself responsible, as
long as one remains within certain bounds, such as those articulated by principles of
equality, law, decency, morality, etc. Behind the apparent agreement that there ought to
be a limit to what others may demand of the subject lies the assumed centrality of the
subject, a subject that is either equal to others, or superior in the sense that the equality
of the other to the subject has to be demonstrated/granted. The self is assumed not
10 Duties are corollary to rights. If someone has a certain right it means that some agent has a duty to
ensure the satisfaction of that right; a right is a "demand upon others." (Shue, 1980:16). Shue argues for
the acceptance of "basic rights" (consisting of 'security rights' and 'subsistence rights' - pp. 20-29),
which are "everyone's minimal reasonable demands upon the rest of humanity" (Shue, 1980:18). A right
is "a justified demand that some other people make some arrangements so that one will still be able to
enjoy the substance of the right even if ... it is not within one's power to arrange on one's own to enjoy
the substance of the right" (Shue, 1980:16, emphasis added). Elsewhere Shue states "that the relevant
other people have a duty to create, if they do not exist, or, if they do, to preserve effective institutions for
the enjoyment of what people have rights to enjoy" (p. 17, emphasis added, see also p. 55). One is struck,
firstly, by the vagueness of who is to be responsible for ensuring these rights of the other. It is here that
much of the 'controversy' over positive duties lies. As the italicisation shows, not all people are
responsible. Who is to be responsible is not clear. In the case of a negative duty not to torture, it is easy to
identify the violator of this right of another person. By contrast, in the case of a positive duty to provide a
starving person with food, it is not clear who has violated the starving person's right to food and against
whom this right should be enforced (O'Neill, 2002:136). Shue, as a rights-based cosmopolitan, counters
that if negative duties are acceptable, then positive duties should also be since there is a negative
dimension to economic rights and a positive dimension to political rights (for criticism, see O'Neill,
2000: 134-136).
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responsible for the other until proven otherwise, which has been hard to do, as the
'controversial' character of positive duties to the other show (see Shue, 1980). Never is
the protagonist subject assumed to be of a lesser importance than the other, whether in
theory or in actuality.
By permitting certain limitations of freedom, the extent of which is of course heavily
contested, these compromises preserve the autonomy of the subject in a system of
justice (what Levinas terms a 'political peace' with the other). Furthermore, by arriving
at some point where our responsibility for others ends (or where it spills over into the
domain of supererogation), the subject is left with a clear conscience about not
concerning himself with others. The aim of the rest of this section is to try to show how
a number of writers in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate tend to prioritise
freedom and/or limit the demands that may legitimately be made of the subject,
tendencies that combine to shield the autonomous subject from ethical criticism that
would dispel him from his central position. II These tendencies indicate the centrality the
autonomous subject enjoys in political theory, a sovereignty that is transplanted onto
political society. The ubiquitous endorsement of liberal autonomy fortifies the supreme
position of the theoretical and political subject and forestalls his being put into question
by the other, whom the subject affects in the exercise of his freedom. Considering that
the subject finds himself simultaneously in an ethical and a political relation with the
other (Critchley, 1992:230-231), the pre-eminence of the autonomous (asocial) subject
in political thought and political society demonstrates the 'legitimacy' of a political
response to the other (rather than an ethical response), reassuring the subject of his own
justice in disregarding the other. The hitherto cursory Levinasian suggestions of the
problematic character of the precedence of individual autonomy will be elaborated in
chapter 3. The place of this section in the context of this study is to highlight "the
tradition of the primacy of freedom" (TI 302) in the cosmopolitan-communitarian
debate, which forms a small part of the wider discipline of political philosophy. It is to a
discussion of some of the principal writers in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate
that we now tum. This section ends with a discussion of Rorty's liberal ironist subject,
which attempts to steer a path between the cosmopolitan and communitarian positions,
Il I tend to focus on cosmopolitan and communitarian writers that have written about justice, further
favouring those who have written about distributive justice, given our background concern with global
poverty. As a consequence, important International Relations theorists such as Andrew Linklater and
Mervyn Frost are only mentioned in passing.
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though ends up succumbing to the same problem as the other authors discussed in this
section.
Thomas Pogge's cosmopolitan writings are marked by a deep concern for the plight of
the global poor and a persistent critique of the factors that contribute to and sustain
global poverty, inequality and injustice. However, in spite ofPogge's morally generous
cosmopolitanism, he makes a theoretical move that undercuts the stringency of the
normative case he tries to assemble in favour of the global poor. What Pogge (1992)
does is to draw a distinction between 'institutional' and 'interactional' cosmopolitanism,
preferring the former approach himself.V Institutional cosmopolitanism is concerned
with presenting "certain fundamental principles of justice," whereas interactional
cosmopolitanism is concerned with proposing "certain fundamental principles of ethics"
(p. 50). Interactional cosmopolitanism involves the direct relations between people and
assigns persons or groups of persons with the responsibility of ensuring human rights.
Institutional cosmopolitanism, as the name suggests, locates the responsibility for
ensuring human rights with institutional schemes, which set the framework that governs
and guides human interaction. According to the institutional approach, responsibility for
others is indirect - responsibility is realised through the justice of the institutions one
supports and participates in, which means that "one ought not to participate in an unjust
institutional scheme (one that violates human rights) without making reasonable efforts
to aid its victims and to promote institutional reform" (p. 50). While Pogge sees
institutional and interactional cosmopolitanism as potentially supplementary, he leaves
this issue undecided and argues that privileging the institutional view "leads to a much
stronger and more plausible overall morality" (p. 50). According to Pogge, a major
advantage of institutional cosmopolitanism lies in not having to demand any
"notoriously controversial" positive duties to correct a wrong such as preventable
starvation, but merely to require that persons not participate in unjust institutions that
permit such starvation without making "reasonable efforts" (p. 50) to reform the
institutions in question. Insofar as citizens from rich countries participate in institutions
that have extra-national consequences, they become morally connected to poor people
affected by these institutions (pp. 52-53). Pogge's "broadly eonsequentialist assessment
12 O'Neill can also be classified as an institutional cosmopolitan. The significant place institutions enjoy
in her constructivist cosmopolitanism is indicated by her view of, for example, the 'right to food,' about
which she says that "without one or other determinate institutional structure, these supposed economic
rights amount to rhetoric rather than entitlement" (O'Neill, 2000: 125).
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of social institutions" (p. 54) draws attention to the fact that our lives are entangled and
that our actions affect other people, seeking to "broaden the circle of those who share
responsibility for certain deprivations and abuses" (p. 52). Having outlined Pogge's
cosmopolitanism, I want to consider some of the ways in which it preserves the subject
in autonomy, undermining the potential for him to be put in question by the other: (i)
The personal acknowledgement of responsibility that might have followed from
recognising our complicity in the suffering of others, whom we have (unknowingly)
oppressed or harmed, is dissipated by locating responsibility at an institutional level and
dispersing responsibility among an increasing number of people. Responsibility for the
other is turned into a political matter, that is, a concern of the plurality, not of the self.
By emphasizing responsibility for others as institutionally mediated, Pogge, apart from
dissolving much personal responsibility, (ii) purchases considerable freedom from
responsibility outside these institutions. (It permits an 'egalitarian' to earn a large salary,
whilst poor people starve, without necessarily considering himself irresponsible or
unjustified in doing so, because, for an egalitarian institutionalist, responsibility is the
task of institutions.j':' (iii) Furthermore, the ambiguity of requiring that persons make
"reasonable efforts" (p. 50) to reform unjust institutions leaves a gap for doing nothing,
leaving persons with 'reasonable' excuses for not doing anything. (iv) What is more,
Pogge underplays the interactional element ('positive' duties) necessary to bring about
greater institutional justice, a shrewd strategy since his aim is to convince that it would
take little to improve the plight of the global poor. He states, "For the first time in
human history it is quite feasible, economically, to wipe out hunger and preventable
diseases worldwide without real inconvenience to anyone" (Pogge, 2001b:14). While
we are outraged by the injustice and inequality Pogge demonstrates throughout his
work," the matter and effort would seem to require more than merely taking from the
rich and giving to the poor.
Pogge (1992:50, note 5) classifies Shue and Luban as interactional cosmopolitans. As
mentioned, interactional cosmopolitanism rests responsibility for the realisation of
human rights on the shoulders of agents, not institutions. Saying nothing of institutions,
u I think this is a consequence of Pogge's institutionalism, even though he is critical of the same in
Fishkin, who claims that people have "an indefeasible right" (Pogge's words) to a "robust zone of [moral]
indifference" (Fishkin in Pogge, 1989:261).
14 Pogge, for example, cites a recent Human Development Report on the extremity of global inequality:
"The assets of the top three billionaires are more than the combinded GNP of all the least developed
countries and their 600 million people" (Pogge, 2001b:14, note 20).
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Luban (1985a:209) defines human rights as "the demands of all of humanity on all of
humanity." Similarly, for Shue (1980:13), "to hav~ a right is to be in a position to make
demands of others." People enjoy human rights regardless of the institutions under
which they live. In fact, the universality of human rights sets a "moral limit" to the
pluralism of societies and institutions (Luban, 1985b:242). Both Luban (1985b:209) and
Shue (1980:14-15) draw a distinction between human rights and (civil/legal) rights that
are institutionally guaranteed, neither of which enjoy an automatic priority over the
other. For Shue, we have a duty to create institutions where they do not exist, in order to
protect the rights of others.P Luban's approach is commendable for its criticism of the
state-centredness of the international relations, an order in which "individual human
beings amount to little more than an ontological curiosity" (Luban, 2002:83). His
cosmopolitanism is also quite demanding in that he describes a human right as a right
"whose beneficiaries are all humans and whose obligors are all humans in a position to
effect the right" (Luban, 1985a:209, emphasis added). However, this is where a problem
with Luban's position appears. By leaving the effecting of rights incumbent upon those
in a position to do so, Luban leaves an escape route, for is there not always a justifiable
case to be made for not being in a position to effect the human rights of others? Is it not
always possible to latch onto some spurious principle to explain why one is not in a
position to promote and protect the rights of others?" It is conceivable that, with the
exception of a few extreme cases, one is always in a position to promote another
person's human rights. According to Levinas, I am responsible regardless of my
position. In the ethical relation, the subject finds always more resources within himself
to meet his responsibility for the other. Clearly, no one incessantly promotes the rights
of others. Why this does not occur, given the obligation Luban identifies, or the
Levinasian contention that the subject is infinitely responsible for the other, is a
question this study is trying to answer. In Luban's case, permission is granted to the
subject to decline his responsibility, and to do so legitimately. The opening up and
15 For institutional cosmopolitans, asserting rights where there are no institutions to implement them,
amounts to "manifesto rights" (O'Neill, 2000). For O'Neill (2000) and Pogge (1992), rights follow
institutions, and not the other way round.
16 Shue provides a similar escape route, which was quoted in footnote 10 above. For Shue, a right is "a
justified demand that some other people make some arrangements so that one will still be able to enjoy
the substance of the right even if ... it is not within one's power to arrange on one's own to enjoy the
substance of the right" (Shue, 1980: 16, emphasis added). Elsewhere Shue states "that the relevant other
people have a duty to create, if they do not exist, or, if they do, to preserve effective institutions for the
enjoyment of what people have rights to enjoy" (p. 17, emphasis added, see also p. 55).
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legitimising of this avenue of escape from responsibility for the other put a political
response to the other on a par with an ethical response.
Another example of an exacting cosmopolitanism is that of Peter Singer, as set out in
his well-known article, "Famine, affluence and morality" (1972/1985). The central
argument is that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening [Singer
constantly refers to the Bengal famine of the early 1970s as an example of something
bad], without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought,
morally, to do it" (p. 249). Furthermore, each individual is morally obliged to act
according to this principle, regardless of what others do (p. 250). So, when we are
confronted with a choice between buying another pair of trousers or giving that money
to famine relief, we ought to give money to famine relief, without this deed being able
to claim the status of 'charity', 'generosity' or 'supererogation'. By Singer's standard, it
would simply be "wrong" not to give the money to the famine relief effort (p. 253). One
of the difficulties utilitarian thinkers such as Singer face is to specify where the line
between duty and charity is to be drawn, for it requires the measurement of the moral
importance of things. For Singer, this is a "very difficult" empirical question; but one
that he presumably thinks can be answered (p. 255). The limit of what we owe others
appears when we reach the "level of marginal utility" (p. 259). We here find Singer
establishing a very literal and substantial equality between him and others (currently)
less fortunate than him.!" What Singer proposes is a level at which reciprocity can be
established, where all have become equal(s) and where the subject's concern for the
other may legitimately end.
Against a view of justice as mutual advantage, whereby people cooperate because the
benefits to oneself are thereby greater than being in constant and all-out conflict with
one another, and the outcomes of justice hence reflect differences in power between
social agents, Brian Barry advances a view of justice as impartiality. Barry aspires to
this, partly, because viewing justice as the self-interested distribution of the spoils of
social cooperation leaves the weak and the poor, who perhaps do not contribute much to
international society and the world product, without much claim to be included in the
consideration of justice (Barry, 1995: 46 and 50). The view of justice as impartiality
17 Singer would like other affluent people to join him in providing for the poor, but is quite pessimistic
about the potential for this. At a minimum then, Singer desires equality between him and the poor.
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holds "that there has to be some reason for behaving justly that is not reducible to even
a sophisticated and indirect pursuit of self-interest" (Barry, 1989b:7), and much of the
reason lies in us wanting to justify ourselves to others (p. 285). If we take the
defensibility of our actions seriously and hence do not appeal to force to justify our
actions, then impartially just principles would be those that others in a similar position
"could not reasonably reject" (Scanlon in Barry 1989b:284). However, one of the major
challenges facing cosmopolitanism is to specify how partial we are permitted to be (that
is, without facing 'reasonable' censure from persons affected by our actions) towards
those with whom we have special relationships, given that at some point our
commitment to those close to us comes into conflict with the interests of outsiders.
Barry's solution is to invoke a Scanlonian method so as to have people decide "just the
right amount" of partiality after having weighed everyone's perspective equally.
Presumably people would be able to agree that one is justified in singling out certain
people for preferential treatment (Barry, 1995:191-207). Regardless of the vagueness of
stipulating 'just the right amount' of partiality and the problems of such a decision-
making process, what Barry arrives at is, as with the abovementioned cosmopolitans, a
limitation of the demands outsiders may legitimately make of the self. After the subject
has settled his scores with outsiders as determined by the principles of justice as
impartiality, the subject has secured for himself a retreat where he may regard himself
justified in not concerning himself with the plight of the other, a sphere where the
subject thinks itself autonomously free from the ethical demand of the other.
The cosmopolitan writers discussed above recognise a deep responsibility for the other,
but at the same time permit the self a zone of autonomy, of legitimate indifference to the
other. From a Levinasian perspective, there is a qualified legitimacy to a political
response to the other, to turning away from my responsibility for him, to concern myself
with myself. However, this limit and 'turning away' is always provisional and uneasy,
as I remain aware of my neglect of the other in the political response. In an uneasy and
provisional response it is recognised that, ultimately, the life of the other is more
important than my own. In the cosmopolitan writing discussed above, a political
response to the other is considered to at least be on a par with an ethical response to the
other. In granting a primacy/equivalence to a political response to the> other,
cosmopolitans are affirming the self as morally central and are permitting the subject to
rest in good conscience despite the preventable dying and suffering of the global poor.
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The preceding criticism of the autonomy granted to the subject by cosmopolitan writers,
reminds one of the communitarian castigation of liberalism's unencumbered subject, a
conception of the subject considered too asocial to carry the sociality assumed by, for
example, the difference principle (Sandel, 1984b). I think one could also level a
communitarian charge against cosmopolitans, to the effect that their endorsement of a
universal subject is too asocial to activate the global social progress cosmopolitans
desire. From a communitarian perspective, such a high degree of concern for the
(global) other assumes and requires a stronger sense of community, which hardly exists
at the global level, and especially not between the rich citizens of the wealthy
democracies and the poor of the Third World.
It will be recalled that, in the presence of the third, it is necessary to decide how to
respond to the other. Though we now possess over the means to intervene in far-off
places with great efficiency, it is generally accurate to say that the state remains the
most efficient and feasible mechanism for realising our responsibility to others,
especially in the light of the communitarian contention that some stronger sense of
community is needed for there to be a deeper concern with others. However, one of
principal problems with communitarian writing is that the empirical contention that our
responsibility for the other is best realised in the localised setting of the state is always
coupled with a normative insistence that justice ought to be so bounded, which
functions as a justification for being less concerned with others outside national borders.
Barry (1989b:241) draws attention to the sinister link between self-interest and
confining responsibility for the other to a state, when he writes that "[i]f we press the
question of why justice has to be confined to those who are engaged in cooperative
relations we cannot long escape the conclusion that the driving force behind it is the
idea that everyone must gain from justice." And while the presence of (communal) self-
interest might appear quite obvious in such a circumscription of responsibility, the
primacy of the autonomous subject in communitarian thought might be less so. In fact,
the relative importance communitarians attribute to community requires certain
sacrifices by the subject for the sake of others. Still, it will be argued that
communitarian writers also preserve the subject as central, and even though they view
the subject as more encumbered and responsible, such communal duties ultimately refer
back to the importance of sustaining the individual in as great an autonomy as possible.
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John Rawls, a communitarian in the terms of the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate
(though a liberal in the liberal-communitarian debate), is explicit about the normative
and theoretical primacy he affords the individual. In A Theory of Justice, he asserts the
precedence of liberty over other values, coupled with the inviolability of the individual
vis-á-vis the demands of society, that is, the priority of the right over the good. For
Rawls, each individual has "an inviolability founded on justice, or as some might say,
on natural right, which even the welfare of every one else cannot override. Justice
denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by
others" (TJ 24-25). The two principles of justice that Rawls claims rational persons
would adopt from behind a veil of ignorance in the original position puts this
inviolability of the individual in more formal terms, whereby the priority of the first
principle of justice, the liberty principle, over the egalitarian second principle affirms
the 'basic' liberty of the subject. Increased social and economic benefits cannot justify
or compensate for the curtailment of the basic negative liberties Rawls claims as
inviolable (TJ 53_4).18Apart from his liberal emphasis on freedom and equal liberty,
Rawls's writing further works to shore up the subject against the ethical demands of the
other in a variety of other ways: (i) The very acknowledgement of 'supererogatory
actiona'" indicates that Rawls sees our responsibility to others as limited.
Supererogation indicates an act that holds very good consequences for the other, but
requires too much from the subject, and thus leaves the subject perfectly justified in not
performing such an act (TI 385).20 (ii) However, we need not look to the extremity of
supererogation to see that Rawls thinks us responsible for the other only in terms of
what could be reciprocated. We are also "at liberty to do or not to do" good acts, that is,
an act that advances another person's good, which is to say that we are equally justified
to respond to the other either ethically or politically. (iii) The priority granted to the
subject vis-á-vis the other is also apparent in the claim that a natural duty of mutual aid
18 Basic liberties may only be restricted "for the sake of liberty," so that "a less extensive liberty must
strengthen the total system ofliberties shared by all" (TJ 266).
19 Rawls (TJ 385) defines a supererogatory action as "one that brings much good for the other person and
when it is undertaken at considerable cost or risk to the agent as estimated by his interests more narrowly
construed. "
20 Although Rawls recognises that "the moralities of supererogation provide the stage for shame," a
Levinasian demandingness is thwarted when Rawls (TJ 424) writes, "It would be a mistake, however, to
emphasize the perspective of one feeling more than the other in the complete moral conception. For the
theory of right and justice is founded on the notion of reciprocity which reconciles the points of view of
the self and of others as equal moral persons."
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is to be performed when "the sacrifice and hazards to the agent are not very great" (TJ
385). According to Rawls, the subject may persist in good conscience at having secured
his interests first. (iv) Furthermore, the natural duty of mutual aid is based on a
calculation of self-interest, for commitment to this principle ensures that others "are
there if we need them" (TJ 298). (v) The priority of politically relating to the other is
clear in Rawls's view of justice as fairness as being founded on the principle of
reciprocity, whereby persons benefit according to their contributions to society (with
some protection for the least advantaged), the scale of which is. determined in the
original position.
Against the (earlier) Rawlsian position, the first wave of communitarian criticism
contained the argument that the type of social arrangement Rawls proposes is
impossible without assuming prior communal ties (Sandel, 1984b:89-90) and that the
atomistic individualism Rawls assumes and normatively endorses will undermine the
very society that makes 'basic liberties' possible (Taylor, 1979; Sandel, 1984b:94).
'First-wave communitarians' contend that more than an insistence on individual rights
is necessary to sustain the liberal polity, and argue that a constant commitment to and
engagement with national political institutions and other members of the polity are also
required. Sandel (1984b:92-4) sees the state's ability to govern as being frustrated by
the primacy individual rights enjoy in liberal society. Taylor (1979; 1995) makes a
similar assessment of the negative consequences of individual rights, particularly when
these rights are coupled with a purely instrumental view of society, that is, when rights
are claimed without recognising the political obligations to the society that sustains
these rights. However, one senses that for Taylor the value of freedom is more
important than for Sandel, and as such Taylor reminds us that the freedoms enjoyed in
liberal societies are not the outcome of some historical necessity, but in part based on
the choices made by a political community. Referring to the liberties enjoyed in the
societies of the West, Taylor (1979:56) remarks, "We constantly forget how remarkable
that is, how it did not have to be so, and one day may no longer be so." Taylor's concern
about the deleterious consequences of a freedom that does not recognise concomitant
obligations is that such freedom might undermine the commitment and institutions that
sustain liberal society. Taylor's concern about the adverse effects of freedom is for the
sake of freedom. For Taylor (1979:57), "the free individual of the West is only what he
is by virtue of the whole society and civilization which brought him to be and which
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nourishes him; ... [which] creates a significant obligation to belong for whoever would
affirm the value of this freedom; this includes all those who want to assert rights either
to this freedom or for its sake." However, fulfilling one's obligations to the political
society one belongs to and not merely being concerned with oneself remain a self-
interested undertaking, "since the free individual can only maintain his identity within a
society/culture of a certain kind, he has to be concerned about the shape of this
society/culture as a whole ... It is important to him that certain activities and institutions
flourish in society" (Taylor, 1979:58). Taylor's view of society remains instrumental,
something atomists have been accused. Furthermore, Taylor also views other members
of his society instrumentally, as, for example, when he endorses "patriotism," which for
him "is based on an identification with others in a particular common enterprise. I'm not
dedicated to defending the liberty of just anyone, but I feel a bond of solidarity with my
compatriots in our common enterprise, the common expression of our respective
dignity" (Taylor, 1995: 188, emphasis added). What seems clear is the absence of ethics
(in the Levinasian sense) in Taylor's view. Other people are important principally
insofar as they can help sustain a society in which the self-interested individual can
flourish as free. Reciprocity between members of a polity is merely moved to a more
demanding level than one finds in Rawlsian liberalism, but it is still reciprocity.
Taylor's endorsement of a greater acceptance of the sacrifices and obligations owed to a
society whose members enjoy considerable freedoms, in the end appears very much like
the enlightened self-interest he criticises in liberal atomism.i!
While the communitarian stress on the sociality and contextuality of moral concern is to
be welcomed, it comes at a high price, for an endorsement of such a view of moral
relations strongly tends to confine moral concern to other members of one's political
community, to the detriment of the poor who happen to find themselves outside the
borders of those states most capable of alleviating their plight. Richard Rorty also
recognises the deeply social/communal character of moral concern, but tries to avoid the
exclusion that typically accompanies such a communitarian position, without thereby
lapsing into the relative ahistoricism of cosmopolitan universalism. What further attracts
21 One may indeed wonder about how great the difference between Taylor's 'holist individualism' (an
intellectual trend that recognises our social embeddedness but still prizes individual freedom and
difference) (see Taylor, 1995:185) and Rawls's position is, especially Rawls's later views. Much of
Taylor's article is directed against Nozick, whose views are so asocial, that on may wonder of Taylor is
not attacking a straw man.
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us to Rorty's work is his self-professed concern with the suffering of outsiders and his
recognition that there are "tendencies to cruelty inherent in searches for autonomy" (CIS
144). These two commendable aspects of his thought find their expression in the type of
subject Rorty endorses, the 'liberal ironist. '
According to Rorty, humans cannot help being "accultured" as we are and that certain
ways of being seem natural, possible, and/or good to us, whereas certain choices and
forms of life seem foreign or unavailable. For Rorty, there is no "God's-eye point of
view" from which to judge others or ourselves, as cosmopolitans seem to think (ORT
13). Instead, we have to start with the moral baggage of the community into which we
have been socialised and with which we identify (CIS 198; ORT 202). An awareness of
the dangers (and undesirability) of being too enamoured with one's coincidental forms
of life, which communitarians often do not take seriously, leads Rorty to sketch a type
of person, the 'liberal ironist, ' who thinks "that cruelty is the worst thing we do" (the
liberal part)22 and who "faces up to the contingency of his or her own most central
beliefs and desires" (the ironist part) (CIS XV).23Liberal ironists are unable to say why
we should not be cruel, nor when the oft-conflicting imperatives of either self-creation
or social justice should prevail, or when to favour members one's group over random
other people (CIS xv).
Ironists recognise the contingency of the identities and the vocabularies they have been
socialised in, and, motivated by a fear of moral parochialism, try to acquaint themselves
with lives and people that seem strange from their perspective (CIS 80). Ironic
redescription makes us aware of the contingency of our social and moral affiliations, our
(unwitting) cruelty to others and sketches those people who we have thought of as
strange (if we even gave them any thought at all) in a fuller humanity. Ironic
redescription destabilises fixed perceptions of ourselves and others so as to pave the
22 Kekes (2002:74) stingingly attacks the "intellectual vacuity" of this definition of a liberal, which Rorty
has taken from Shklar. "This slogan is mere verbiage that cannot withstand the most elementary
questioning. Why is cruelty the worst thing we do? Why not genocide, terrorism, betrayal, exploitation,
humiliation, brutalisation, tyranny, and so forth? If it is said in reply that all serious evils are forms of
cruelty, then the liberal becomes one who believes that serious evil is the worst thing we do. But who
would disagree with that?"
23 Rorty (CIS 75) writes that the "ironist spends her time worrying about the possibility that she has been
initiated into the wrong tribe, taught to play the wrong language game. She worries that the process of
socialisation which turned her into a human being by giving her a language may have given her the wrong
language, and so turned her into the wrong kind of human being."
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way for the reconstitution of solidarities. When we recall that for Rorty moral concern is
a matter of "we-intentions" (ORT 200), of solidarity, irony becomes more than a
recognition of the contingency of one's personal identity - irony also becomes a
recognition of the contingency of one's moral identifications and the arbitrary disregard
for the suffering of persons excluded from our 'we.' Therefore, when irony is coupled
with a liberal concern for the suffering of others, we find a type of subjectivity freed to
direct itself towards a concern with the global poor.
However, the moral promise of liberal ironic subjectivity necessarily is soon waylaid.
For Rorty, as I have mentioned, to be a liberal means to be concerned with the suffering
and oppression experienced by others. However, for Rorty, to be a liberal also means to
insist on a stark separation between the private and the public, and seeing no reason why
pursuits in one sphere of life are more important than pursuits in the other (CIS 83,
194).24 For Rorty there is no necessary link between a person's public and private
sides25 and uses Heidegger's involvement with the Nazis as a case in point." Even if we
24 The pursuit of self-perfection is strived for in the private realm, where the subject struggles to invent a
new description of himself, trying not to rely on those of other people (CIS 28). However, is successful
self-(re)creation as available as Rorty thinks? Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida (Rorty's examples) have
certainly created unique private vocabularies and new metaphors, but these are still presented in the terms
of the philosophical canon and indeed language itself, neither of which can entirely be freed from their
social character. These "strong makers" use "words as they have never before been used" (CIS 28), but
many of the words and their uses remain the same. These 'strong makers' certainly resist easy
understanding, but the fact that we can read what they have written remains. How original is Derrida if
we recognise his roots in Nietzsche and Heidegger (also see McCarthy, 1990/2002:187)? Rorty
recognises this problem. Though "[m]etaphors are unfamiliar uses of old words, ... such uses are possible
only against the background of other old words being used in familiar ways. A language which is all
metaphor would be a language which had no use, hence not a language but just babble" (CIS 41).
Moreover, in order to maintain this split, Rorty wants to convince us that private vocabularies developed
by ironists are "irrelevant" to public life (CIS 83), but at times he seems ambivalent. Rorty wants us to
view these writers as only helping us become "autonomous" (CIS 141), and of not saying much about our
cruelty to others. Though new vocabularies need not have an influence or create solidarity, the new
vocabularies created by writers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger, can be socially useful by exposing us to
new articulations of the human situation. Consider a "literary" philosopher (CIS 84) such as Nietzsche:
Though many of Nietzsche's battles were with himself, we gained new insights into being human from
him. Nietzsche did not seek to reduce cruelty (one could probably argue the opposite), but after reading
him we have more empathy, if not necessarily sympathy. Many of the strange new metaphors created by
ironist writers find their way into greater literalness and common-usage. Although these terms are soon
vulgarised (CIS 126), they do provide us with more ways of describing the human condition, they expand
our imaginations, they help overcome "a certain blindness in human beings" (William James in CIS 38;
see also RSC 44). The strong maker cannot claim more than "that his differences from the past, inevitably
minor and marginal as they are, will nevertheless be carried over into the future - that his metaphoric
redescriptions of small parts of the past will be among the future's stock of literal truths" (CIS 42). But,
for these reformulations to be socially useful, even if they were never intended to be, the inadvertent
correspondence of a private expression with a public necessity is required (CIS 37).
25 Rorty wants to insist on the absolute sanctity of the private, so as to allow someone to think what he
wants in private, as long as it does not harm anyone else. "For my private purposes, I may redescribe you
and everybody else in terms which have nothing to do with my attitude toward your actual or possible
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disregard Heidegger's association with the Nazis, we have to wonder if it was not
because of people like Heidegger being legitimised in thinking what they wanted in
private, legitimised in obsessing with their own being in a hut at Todtnauberg, that the
indifference that enabled the decimation of the Jews was possible. Can one truly say
that during the Third Reich the demands of self-creation and social concern were
"equally valid" (CIS xv)? Indifference permits too many injustices that are not
necessarily anyone's doing. Rorty thinks that as long as someone did nothing wrong, he
has no responsibility. Again, only a few Germans actively killed Jews, but the turning
away from the problem, wanting to be left alone, making it someone else's problem,
created the conditions for horror. Our 'legitimate,' private self-absorption permits
thousands to die daily from preventable, poverty-related causes, a catastrophe to which
most of us are indifferent. Statements such as that the "desire to be autonomous is not
relevant to the liberal's desire to avoid cruelty and pain," (CIS 65) and "our
responsibilities to others constitute only the public side of our lives," (CIS 194,
emphasis in original) justify indifference through a reification of the theoretical public-
private split, especially when there is no 'automatic priority' for public responsibilities
over the imperatives of the private (CIS 194). The negative consequences of restricting
our responsibilities to others to the public side of our lives, is exacerbated by Rorty's
vision for a small public sphere and a large private sphere (CIS 100), which even his
view of a liberal as someone who is deeply concerned with the suffering of others
suffering. My private purposes, and the part of my final vocabulary which is not relevant to my public
actions, are none of your business" (CIS 91). However, Rorty softens his stance in the next sentence by
running irony with liberalism: "But as I am liberal, the part of my final vocabulary which is relevant to
such actions requires me to become aware of all the ways in which other human beings whom I might act
upon can be humiliated. So the liberal ironist needs as much imaginative acquaintance with alternative
final vocabularies as possible, not just for her own edification, but in order to understand the actual and
possible humiliation of the people who use these final vocabularies" (CIS 91-2). Rorty often avoids the
problems with being an ironist and not a liberal, by usually mentioning the two postures together (e.g.
CIS xv and 85).
26 Heidegger, the great philosopher, tells us much about how to seek private perfection, and in this regard
strikes us as "an immensely sympathetic figure" (CIS 120). Heidegger, the public figure, the
"Schwarzwald redneck" (CIS Ill) on the other hand, was "resentful, petty, squint-eyed, obsessive - and
at his occasional worst, ... cruel" (CIS 120). However, Rorty sees Heidegger's public and private lives as
unrelated; it should be unimportant to us "whether these writers managed to live up to their own self-
images" (CIS 79). Rorty wants us to stop wondering about one of the great puzzles of the twentieth
century, namely how one of the greatest philosophical minds could be so unbelievably stupid and obtuse
regarding his involvement with the Nazis and his subsequent silence about the Holocaust. While people,
such as Paul Celan, hoped and waited for the "thinking man's coming word in the heart," Rorty thinks
Heidegger justified in his silence. For a critique of such a quest for a personal aesthetic, a deep thinking
that does not necessarily think of ethics, see Cohen (2001).
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cannot offset" In our complex (global) society there are many things that cause
suffering, but that are no one in particular's fault. Levinas contests the notion that the
subject is only responsible only in so far as he caused a situation, for the other is always
his concern.
Claiming a private sphere amounts to insisting on an arena where the ethical
responsibility to the other enjoys no special priority, where concern for the other
becomes a private choice, where saying 'yes' or 'no' to the other is equally acceptable.
Although Rorty points out the contingency of the personal and social constitution of the
self, he is unable to push this contingency to the point where 'being' itself becomes
problematic due to his insistence on the inviolability of the private and the legitimacy of
private 'searches for autonomy.' Rorty recognises the contingency of identity and moral
association, but ignores the contingency of existence. In fact, he reinforces and justifies
it. Rorty still thinks of letting "citizens be as privatistic, 'irrationalist', and aestheticist as
they please as long as they do it in their own time - causing no harm to others and using
no resources needed by those less advantaged" as unproblematic (CIS xiv). From a
Levinasian perspective, insisting on one's right to be and being ethically concerned for
the other tends towards opposite poles, as, in the ethical relation, the subject is affirmed
in as much as he is hollowed out in responsibility for the other.
This section has argued that in both cosmopolitan and communitarian writing there is an
overwhelming concern with the preservation of autonomous freedom, despite the
variation that exists with regard to what is required of citizens and what the extent of
our responsibilities to others are. The priority given to the autonomy of the subject
27 Rorty does seek to soften 'tendencies to cruelty' that result from the exercise of naïve freedom by
saying it is important for the liberal to "notice" suffering, to think that "cruelty is the worst thing we do."
Yet, we are left with no way of persuading the person who observes such a state of affairs to actually do '
something. The problem we have hit upon here, namely the element of inaction in Rortian liberalism,
results from Rorty's 'real-life' reification of the theoretically divided public and private. This inaction
defers achieving the social, moral and political progress he aspires to. Consider his definition of a liberal
as someone who "thinks cruelty is the worst thing we do" (CIS xv, emphasis added), as well as his
contention that what "matters for the liberal ironist is not finding [a reason to care about suffering] but
making sure she notices suffering when it occurs" (CIS 93, emphasis in original). Note that he does not,
for instance, define a liberal as someone who tries to prevent cruelty. At times, Rorty forgets the human
activity and engagement behind the liberal institutions that he thinks contain the seed "for their own
improvement," (CIS 63) gradually expanding "the imagination of those in power" so as to get them to
include more diverse people into when they use the term 'we' (ORT 207). At other times however, Rorty
advocates the creation of groups seeking to express and exercise a fuller personhood for themselves and
recognises that they may face "ruthless suppression" (TP 223). However, Rorty does not clarify the
liberal's role in helping others realise a fuller personhood.
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indicates the centrality of the autonomous subject in the cosmopolitan-communitarian
debate. In his procured sovereignty, the autonomous individual is left in good
conscience about his disregard of the other, about the limiting of his responsibility for
the other, about the effects his exercise of freedom has on the other. This undermines
the ethical potential of whatever unease the subject might experience with respect to his
dominance over and disregard of the other, an ethical awareness and relation that are
necessary for moral progress in international relations in general, and a greater concern
with and redress of global poverty specifically.
2.3. Justice and the suppression of otherness
InLevinas's thought, otherness evokes the ethical relation with the other. Generosity in
justice suggests the recognition of the other as other, as face, that is, vulnerable and
unique. To recognise the other as other is to be in an ethical relation with him, to be
infinitely responsible for him. As has been stated a number of times, it is necessary, in
the presence of the third, to limit our infinite responsibility for the specific other and ask
after the arrangement of justice that will best realise our responsibility for numerous
others. In the presence of more than one other there is a need for objectivity, institutions
and general principles. In order to achieve the generality and objectivity of justice, what
is other, and therefore disruptive of the totality, has to be suppressed and ignored in
order to treat various others as equals. This betrayal of the other's uniqueness is
tolerable as long as our ethical responsibility for the unique other, which has been
betrayed in the quest for objective and general institutional and theoretical designs, so as
to concretely respond to the numerous others, is not forgotten. Justice is always a
violation of the uniqueness of the other, and must be disrupted by the ethical so as to
yield a better justice.
It is by asserting the necessity for justice to be constantly interrupted in the name of the
underlying ethical relation with the other that my (Levinasian) position deviates from
those held by writers in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate. Even though these
writers often recognise an initial ethical generosity towards the other in establishing
justice, the generosity and acknowledgement of the other as other are quickly
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
41
suppressed in (aspirations to) the impersonal universality, reciprocity and equality of
justice.
Why is a suppression of otherness in the impersonal order of justice problematic? The
aim of this dissertation is to understand the apparent indifference to widespread global
poverty-related suffering and death. To be approached by the other as face, as an
absolutely unique being, is to be put in question for one's violence, usurpation and
indifference. Guilt for our domination and neglect of the other becomes positive in
assuming responsibility for him, in fearing for him. It is human otherness/difference that
reminds us, as individuals, of our ethical responsibility towards the other, that puts us
under accusation. And even though the extremity of our guilt is tempered in the
presence of the third, every person is still a unique other to me, and therefore correctly
accuses me for failing in my first-person responsibility; I am always guilty, always
responsible. So, when what is other is lost sight of in the impersonal order of justice,
when the main function of justice appears to be order, keeping 'allergic egoisms' at bay,
then politics becomes its own justification and we begin to court the danger of
'inhumanity.' In failing to notice the other as face, in the suppression of what is other,
we become indifferent. This section aims to demonstrate the suppression of what is
other in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate.
One can appreciate the generosity of the justice cosmopolitans aspire to by noting
Barry's (1995:46) observation that, as long as justice is calculated in terms of 'mutual
advantage' and power, the poor have no moral basis from which to stake their claim for
an arrangement more amenable to their needs. Insofar as cosmopolitans start from a
position in which the global extremely poor, whose influence is negligible in terms of
the gross international product or as a percentage of global trade, are acknowledged as
being part of a system of justice, we are in the presence of a very generous starting
point. Cosmopolitans desire that the global poor should be included in calculating the
terms of justice, without the poor necessarily being able to offer any reciprocal benefits
to those better off. In Levinasian terms, the generosity of the cosmopolitan inclusion of
the poor constitutes an 'ethical' response to the other, as opposed to a 'political'
response in which the subject would have been insistent upon an initial quid pro quo.
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However, despite the initial ethical generosity at the 'starting point' of justice and the
recognition of the other as other this implies, impersonal terms of justice are soon
established and the ethical is subordinated to the political in the positing of, or
aspiration to, universal principles of justice. It is necessary that there be political and
impersonal interaction among people, with the caveat that the ethical relation may not
be forgotten. However, when considering some of the examples of cosmopolitan ideas
of justice below, it will hopefully become clear that the impersonal political relation
predominates in the universalist aspirations of cosmopolitan justice. That the ethical
relation with the other has been lost sight of in the generality of justice, concurs with
Levinas's assessment of the 'will to totalisation' in Western philosophy, in which there
has been a general reduction of what is other to the same, a tendency that still conveys a
view of the autonomous subject as socially and theoretically most central and powerful.
Our indifference to the suffering of the other partly stems from this tendency to suppress
what is other, whereby we are left in good conscience with regard to the suffering of the
other.
In cosmopolitan and communitarian attempts to establish global theories and principles
of justice and in thinking about the institutions that are to effect such justice, there is a
certain lack of what one could call 'ethical hesitation.' By this is meant that
cosmopolitans and communitarians do not recognise/acknowledge the violence they
commit against the unique other when positing theoretical/institutional principles of
justice and consequently do not qualify these general principles. Cosmopolitans do not
recognise that there will be a violation of the other regardless of the generosity of their
theories of justice, regardless of the justness of institutions, in which humans remain
reduced to units in a system of justice, albeit a system of ever-increasing complexity,
but a system nonetheless. I first consider some cosmopolitan positions to establish that
they are indeed guilty of such a reduction of what is other to the same and in the process
lose sight of the uniqueness of the other as face and the interpersonal relation this
implies. Next, it is asked whether communitarian justice does not display a greater
sensitivity to otherness. Thereafter, I consider the potential Rorty's social thought holds,
since he tries to steer a path between cosmopolitan and communitarian positions.
Peter Singer's (1972/1985) exacting cosmopolitanism was discussed above, a
cosmopolitanism that would, by Singer's own admittance, hold "radical implications"
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and for some might require "too drastic a revision of our moral scheme" (p. 254). His
central claim is that if we have the ability to prevent something bad from occurring,
such as involuntary starvation, without thereby "sacrificing anything of comparable
moral importance," we are morally obligated to do it (p. 249). Failure to do so would
simply be "wrong" (p. 253). Clearly, in Singer's we witness a very demanding moral
position, one that demonstrates a huge amount of concern for the other. Two of the
challenges faced by utilitarian thinkers such as Singer are to indicate where the line
between duty and charity is to be drawn and to measure the 'moral importance' of
things. To measure the moral importance of things constitutes an empirical difficulty,
one that Singer believes can be surmounted (p. 255). The limit of what is owed to other
people is reached at the "level of marginal utility - that is, the level at which, by giving
more, I would cause as much suffering to myself or my dependents as I would relieve
by my gift" (p. 259). What Singer proposes is the establishment of a universal and
substantially equal relation between subject and other. The type of justice Singer seeks
would require considerable self-negation for the sake of the other. From a Levinasian
perspective, one could ask if there is not a contradiction in the heavy ethical burden
assumed by Singer's subject, suggesting a subjectivity increasingly hollowed out in
expiation for the other, and in Singer's contention that this burden can be set down at
the point of equality, the subject restored as autonomous. Furthermore, in Singer's
approach to justice, we find a tremendous ethical concern at the outset, but this concern
is set down at the point of equality. This constitutes what we identified earlier as the
suppression of the initial ethical generosity upon working out the terms of justice. The
suppression of the ethical by settling for a political relation with the other in equality is
amplified by an extremely simplified view of human beings and of what is 'morally
important,' simplifications that amount to an extreme reduction of what is other to the
same. But one does not necessarily need Levinas ' s thought to reproach a utilitarian such
as Singer on this point. Rawls, for example, has already noted that "[u]tilitarianism does
not take seriously the distinction between persons" (Tl 24).
Perhaps I have set up a straw man by criticising the extreme objectification of Singer's
utilitarianism. Perturbed by the distributional consequences of our present-day global
institutional scheme, an arrangement that permits and engenders widespread poverty,
inequality and starvation, some cosmopolitans writers have tried to imagine alternative
"economic ground rules, which regulate property, cooperation, and exchange and
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thereby condition production and distribution" (Pogge, 1992:56), institutional ground
rules that would yield more just global outcomes. Alternative (hypothetical) schemes
are to be judged in terms of their (hypothesized) consequences. In order to imagine a
more just global institutional scheme, Beitz (1979b) and Pogge (1989) have both argued
for a global application of Rawls's contractarian method, whereby agents decide on fair
principles of justice from behind a 'veil of ignorance.' A principal aim of Pogge and
Beitz is to show that principles of justice derived from a global original position would
take greater account of the material needs of all individuals (i.e. global distributive
justice), and not merely confirm the familiar (and conservative) fundamental principles
of the law of nations as Rawls maintains (TI 332). While it is certainly necessary, also
from a Levinasian perspective, to seek principles whereby to judge the justness of
institutions, one should remain mindful that institutions, even just institutions, by
definition, violate the uniqueness of the other. Neither Beitz nor Pogge pay any
attention to the objectifying violence inherent to even these just institutions. Beitz
(1979b: 171) does recognise that when the natural duty of justice, as worked out in ideal
theory, moves to the non-ideal world it may be found to conflict with other natural
duties, such as duties of mutual aid or not harming the innocent. Beitz here comes close
to recognising the inevitable violation of the other when one employs general principles,
but instead of acknowledging this aporia as a limit the other as face poses to totalisation,
Beitz goes the other way and suggests the issue to be resolved through a
eonsequentialist calculation, thereby absorbing what has the potential to put the system
in question. Though one cannot fault cosmopolitans such as Beitz and Pogge for a lack
of concern for the other, the suppression of otherness in the aspiration to universal
principles and solutions to justice amounts to a stifling of what reminds us of our
responsibility for the other, of the shortcomings of justice, and of our neglect and
violence against him, and thus leaves us in good conscience, despite our unfinished
responsibility.
Our criticism of cosmopolitans like Singer, Beitz and Pogge seem like a mere slap on
the wrist. The significance of overlooking and suppressing the uniqueness of the other is
that it is the other's difference, his signifying outside of any theoretical or institutional
enclosure, that shows the subject to be unjust in his neglect and violation of the other.
This recognition opens up a path towards assuming responsibility for the other.
Theorising without taking cognisance of the asymmetrical ethical relation perpetuates
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and affirms the centrality of the subject as autonomous, undermines the ethical
otherness that drives humanist progress, and perpetuates a predominant understanding
of justice as order. Communitarian approaches to global justice profess to pay more
attention to difference, by arguing that the thick workings of justice are most
appropriately worked out in relatively more decentralised national political communities
and that the state is the most appropriate level at which to realise our responsibility for
the other. Cosmopolitans might find a global framework of justice in which the state is
the primary locale for realising our responsibility to numerous others (e.g. through
distributive justice) acceptable, were the efficiency of realising our responsibility the
only matter at stake. However, communitarians always link the empirical claim that the
state is the most effective locale for realising our responsibility for others with a
normative endorsement of this empirical claim. But, while it is obvious that universal
principles of justice struggle to take the numerous national variations of justice into
account, communitarian categories of justice also suppress otherness by exaggerating
intranational similarity and cross-border difference.
One finds such an exaggeration of national commonality in some of Walzer's work
(1983; 1994). In trying to justify his view that justice is a matter best dealt with by a
particular community, Walzer argues that although we recognise the meaning of a
concept such as 'justice' across borders, it only has a minimal ('thin') meaning at a
global level, for the specifics of justice (its thickness) have to be worked out in specific
locales in line with communal boundaries. It is in specific communal settings where
understandings of justice can be enacted so as to reflect the particularity of a
community, for instance, because "some things that we consider oppressive are not so
regarded everywhere" (Walzer, 1994:16). Never mind that Walzer ignores the
oppression behind thick moralities, he also generalises what people in one community
actually have in common. The history of social science has been to look for similarities,
but I think the closer one looks, the more different one will find members of a polity to
be. To speak of a communal identity requires one to clearly indicate where the
boundaries of a community lies, what makes people inside similar and what makes
people on the outside so different, all of which are not so straightforward in our
globalised world. Most importantly, to emphasize communal similarity is to disregard
people as others with individual 'faces.'
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
46
Though Rawls is a communitarian in terms of the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate,
it is useful to recall that he is a liberal in the liberal-communitarian debate. This is
significant, because as a liberal, Rawls is uncomfortable with claiming too great a unity
among members of a community, out of a liberal reticence for the oppression that often
lies behind the creation of such unity, but also because he does not think that consensus
can be reached on the important things in life (JF). Rawls therefore relegates intractable
differences, which are potentially divisive, to the private sphere, and sees it as necessary
that citizens be united in political culture only. It is interesting to note that otherness is
pushed to the private where it does not threaten the political order. Be that as it may, we
are more concerned with Rawls's understanding of justice in international relations.
Rawls has a very statist conception of international relations; he views states as unitary
actors; and thinks about distributive justice as confined to a national society, a
consequence of his questionable starting point whereby he thinks of states as quite
autarkic (TJ 4, 401). The Law of Peoples is where his thinking about international
relations finds its clearest expression. In this work he is quite explicit that his "ultimate
concern" in international relations is not the wellbeing of persons, but the justice of
societies (LP 119), societies that he refers to as "peoples." That Rawls thinks one can
theorise based on the notion of 'a peoples' is telling enough, but that Rawls judges the
individuals living in "outlaw states" by the government over them strikes me as an
objectification too far (The consequence of being an outlaw state is exclusion from the
"Society of Peoples" (p. 4).) Furthermore, Rawls acknowledges a "duty of assistance" to
"burdened societies," but denies the legitimacy of claims for international distributive
justice (Rawls, 1999c:106).28 Instead, and true to form as communitarian, Rawls
stresses the importance of politically just national institutions (which can be enabled
through assistance from the outside), as political culture is the most important factor
determining a country's level of material well-being (p. 117).29Our duty of assistance to
burdened societies reaches its limit once these societies "are able to manage their own
affairs reasonably and rationally" (p. 111).
28 Distributive justice requires the existence of relations of mutual benefit among people (reciprocity),
relations that cannot be said to exist in international society as they do in a national society.
29 Rawls's position is supported by a UNDP administrator, according to whom, "poverty can be a political
problem ... This report [HDR 2003] shows that there are many countries where income levels are high
enough to end absolute poverty, but where pockets of deep poverty remain, often because of worrying
patterns of discrimination in the provision of basic services" (www.undp.org).
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Rorty seems quite conscious of not losing sight of the otherness of the other in the
categories of justice, a malady we have identified in the abovementioned examples of
cosmopolitan and communitarian thought. In Rorty's thought, we find two ways in
which he seeks to soften the categorisation and objectification of justice. The first way
may be regarded as an attempt to soften the violence of abstract, 'objective' justice,
which we have criticised cosmopolitans for. The second way in which he demonstrates
sensitivity to the violating potential of justice is by being aware that the normative
confinement of justice to a community where the meanings of justice are already 'thick'
leads to a disregard of outsiders. Regarding the first, Rorty recognises two dimensions
of justice, the first views justice as static and objectifying. Here, a "society built around
procedural justice" does not want its "agents of justice"/"guardians of universality" to
give too much thought to the 'sentimental' stories of those they apply their objective
rules to. For example, when sentencing the war criminal to death, this task is made
easier when we did not watch him grow up, did not travel "the road he had travelled,"
for otherwise ''we might have had difficulty reconciling the demands of love and justice.
But it is well for society that in most cases our ignorance permits us to avoid this
dilemma. Most of the time justice has to be enough" (ORT 205-6). Rorty is here
endorsing an extreme objectification of humans so as to enable justice. The war criminal
is objectified and reduced to his evil deeds. Justice so understood is a wilful forgetting
of the human features that may present the war criminal as more endearing to us,
viewing him as being someone's son or husband. However, in the same article we find a
second view of justice as malleable and able to incorporate diversity and of being
sensitive to the particularity of a person, amending the stark objectification of the first
understanding of justice mentioned above. For example, twentieth-century America was
able to include Indians after "the vast majority of nineteenth-century Americans took no
more notice of them than they did of criminal psychopaths or village idiots." The
gradual recognition and inclusion of strange people were helped along by "connoisseurs
of diversity"/"agents of love" (ORT 206), an ever-expanding justice Rorty sees as a
feature ofliberal societies.Ï'' So, Rorty exhibits an awareness of the violating objectivity
of justice. Regarding the second way, Rorty is also very concerned about the disregard
30 Rorty is here expounding his usual view of liberal democracy as involving a characteristic and constant
extension of its "sympathies" (ORT 204). Rorty locates this drive to seek greater justice as inherent to the
institutions of liberal society and as an expression of a morality loyal to its own communal self-image
(ORT 199). Rorty writes that "we should simply keep doing what our liberal society is already in the
habit of doing: lending an ear to the specialists in particularity, permitting them to fulfil their function as
agents oflove, and hoping that they will continue to expand our moral imagination" (ORT 207).
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of outsiders that result from confining justice to a political community. It is for this
reason that he endorses liberal society, for a feature of this society to is "the tradition ...
that the human stranger from whom all dignity has been stripped is to be taken in, to be
reclothed with dignity" (ORT 202). Ironic redescription destabilises the fixity of moral
and social affiliations, exposing the cruelties and disregard behind current practices of
justice and permitting the formerly excluded and oppressed to be brought into the ambit
of justice.
However, the two advances promised by Rortian thought tum out to be
disappointments. Regarding the first, Rorty is still too willing for justice 'to be enough,'
to simply accept the violence institutions perpetrate against the other. Once formerly
excluded persons "have been shepherded into the light," that is, have come to be
regarded as equals before the institutions of justice, "they are [to be] treated just like the
rest of us" (ORT 206). In other words, treating the other as equal is good enough, in
Rorty's view. Regarding the second promise held by Rorty's social thought, here too we
are disappointed, for it turns out that, when Rorty speaks about 'reclothing strangers
with dignity,' he is only referring to internal outsiders/'strangers' despite creating the
impression that he has people beyond state boundaries in mind. Rorty does recognise
the problematic character of state sovereignty in international relations through a quote
from Orwell, namely that the "democratic vistas seem to end in barbed wire" (CIS 86),
but beyond that he does not question the state boundaries or sovereignty principle that
keep external outsiders out, nor does not concern himself with cosmopolitan
contributions about how citizenship has changed.
In this section it was argued that otherness is suppressed in theorisation about global
justice. In cosmopolitan writings it occurs by quickly moving to establish universal and
impartial principles of justice. Communitarians suppress otherness by exaggerating the
internal similarity of a state's citizenry and drawing a sharp, normatively sanctioned
distinction between communal insiders and outsiders. Despite trying to steer a way
through the cosmopolitan-communitarian opposition, Rorty ends up succumbing to
similar problems. We pick up the matter of suppressing otherness from a more explicitly
Levinasian perspective in chapter 4. There we shall focus mostly on the cosmopolitan
writing, since a disregard of outsiders as others is almost by definition included in the
communitarian position.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
49
2.4. The emphasis on equality
Cosmopolitans are generally deeply troubled by the extent of global material
deprivation and inequality and therefore try to include the global poor in the
considerations of distributive justice. For such a justice to be applicable and indeed be
just, the poor have to be demonstrated to be equal 'conversational partners,' at least with
regard to the issue of distributive justice." Their inclusion in the deliberation about
what would be globally just would presumably point to a global distributional scheme
that is considerably more egalitarian than the present one.32
As one would imagine, the idea of treating outsiders as equals with regard to
distributive justice would meet with some resistance from communitarians.
Consequently, and apart from asserting it to be so, cosmopolitans follow two paths to
argue that outsiders ought to be recognised as equals, at least with regard to the issue of
distributive justice. The two paths followed by cosmopolitans reflect understandings of
'justice as mutual advantage' and 'justice as impartiality,' respectively (see Barry,
1989b). 'Justice as mutual advantage' reflects the idea that people are to be rewarded in
terms of their contribution to a cooperative venture for mutual benefit. Consequently,
insofar as a view of justice as mutual advantage is acknowledged, cosmopolitans
attempt to demonstrate that the global political economy is integrated enough for it to
qualify as such a cooperative venture, which would require the inclusion of poor people
who participate in this global political economy. Failing to demonstrate that the world
political economy is 'a cooperative venture for mutual advantage,' and thus that all
persons ought to be considered in the distribution of benefits and burdens because they
contribute to this scheme, cosmopolitans resort to a second type of argument, in which
they base their claims for greater global distributive justice on a view of 'justice as
impartiality.' Such a view of justice relies on a great deal of generosity in the moral
appeal it makes to the wealthy, reflecting the realisation that the global poor do not have
the capacity to force a type of justice that would require significant bargaining leverage
against the wealthy. By requiring people to adopt an impartial point of view, a
31 As Sen (1992:3) writes, "Ethical plausibility is hard to achieve unless everyone is given equal
consideration in some space that is important to the particular theory."
32 Pogge has demonstrated that global material inequality is more severe than that found in even the most
unequal national societies of the world. So, the cosmopolitan argument runs that if we have become a
global community, then the current distribution of material goods and life-chances are unjust by even the
most inegalitarian standards (Pogge, 2002).
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framework and principles of justice are arrived at, and insofar as power and self-interest
cannot be ignored, proposals of (impartial) justice are required to be acceptable to those
who stand to be affected. An important variant within the impartial view of justice
draws attention to the negative and unfair consequences various institutions have for the
global poor. It also adds that institutions and practices can have harmful effects on non-
members/participants, which is unjust and require rectification. By including effects on
bystanders, justice as impartiality moves to a universal scope, for it is conceivable that
all humans are affected by at least some international institutions and/or transnational
practices. Justice as impartiality differs from a view of justice based on mutual
advantage, since in the latter view of justice the poor are not considered significantly
influential in enabling, shaping and maintaining the benefits that derive from current
international practices, yet, in the hands of cosmopolitans both aspire to an
acknowledgement of the global poor as equal 'conversational partners' about what
constitutes justice.
For communitarians, the state remains the highest institution for regulating the benefits
(and burdens) of social cooperation between individuals. Among all communitarians,
one finds a view of the state as a relatively closed system.v' Importantly, in all
communitarian writings an element of competition between states is assumed, with
political realism being the most extreme example thereof. Communitarians typically
link the wealth and stability of rich countries to particular characteristics, choices and
commitments of the corresponding citizenry, such as Rawls's (LP 117) connection
between national material well-being and political culture. The successes of the West
have prompted a "loyal Westerner," Richard Rorty, to recommend the choices and
commitments of Western societies as worthy of emulation. Rorty writes, "Here is what
we in the West look like as a result of ceasing to hold slaves, beginning to educate
women, separating church and state, and so on. Here is what happened after we started
treating certain distinctions between people as arbitrary rather than fraught with moral
significance. If you would try treating them that way, you might like the results" (JLL
56).
33 Even liberals who often assert the universality of certain rights, "restrict the scope of justice [to the
national setting], the implication [being] that people's rights are somehow derivative from their position
as citizens" (Black, 1991 :355).
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However, what communitarians cannot dispute is that part of national wealth derives
from interaction with agents outside their national economiea." The process of
globalisation has made the interrelatedness of national economies, and the actors within
them, more evident than ever before. It is to the transnational sources of national wealth
that cosmopolitans point in order to establish some grounds on which to claim that the
poor outside wealthy national societies should enjoy a more just share of the spoils of
transnational interaction than is presently the case. Insofar as the global political
economy is seen as a 'cooperative venture for mutual advantage' the poor are to be
included in the calculations of justice.
At stake then in this part of the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate is the degree to
which the world's population is cooperating for an increase in the general benefit. The
more inclusive the empirical judgement, the larger the number of people that are to be
included in determining a just distribution of the spoils of cooperation, insofar as justice
is understood as mutual advantage. Consequently, cosmopolitans are at pains to
illustrate a high degree of global integration. A well-known example of a cosmopolitan
writer illustrating the breadth and depth of global integration is David Held's
Democracy and the Global Order (1995). Held (1995:127-34) explains increased global
interconnectedness in terms of a movement from the "Westphalian order" to a "United
Nations system" (p. 127). In the 'United Nations system' it has become possible to
speak of a 'world economy' (instead of an 'international economy'), based on the
internationalisation of production, finance and trade (p. 127).35 Economic integration
34 Walzer potentially undermines the force of arguments that criticise communitarians for ignoring the
transnational sources of national wealth. For Walzer, "the idea of distributive justice presupposes a
bounded world within which distribution takes place: a group of people committed to dividing,
exchanging and sharing social goods, first of all among themselves" (Walzer, 1983:31). Walzer's
localisation of distributive justice follows from his view that all objects of distributive justice are "social
goods," with different meanings in different settings (p. 7). "There is no single set of primary goods
conceivable across all moral and material worlds" (p. 8). However, even if we grant the radical
particularity Walzer attributes to primary goods, the severe need for basic goods in many parts of the
world remains, regardless of their social meaning. Walzer drastically overestimates the cultural role of
basic goods vis-a-vis the urgent physiological needs these goods fulfil. Needs are not as "elusive" (p. 66)
as he claims. Furthermore, the fact remains that the wealth distributed within Walzer's bounded
community is often achieved through interaction beyond this bounded world. Global economic
interdependence has created benefits and burdens that would not have existed if all states were autarkic
(Beitz, 1979b: 149).
35 Apart from the rise of a global economy, Held (1995:99-140) discusses four other domains within
which state sovereignty is being undermined. Firstly, in international law, the claims and rights of
individuals have been strengthened against the state. Raison d'état can no longer be used as an excuse for
individual wrongdoing, a precedent created by the International Tribunal at Nuremburg (and Tokyo).
Secondly, much political decision-making has been internationalised, the growth of international regimes
and organisations indicating this fact. International regimes and institutions range from the
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
52
has been accompanied by political and institutional integration, as the growing number
of international organisations, institutions and regimes testify. Parallel economic and
political integration is a welcome occurrence for cosmopolitans, as O'Neill (2000:125)
warns that without some form of institutional structure, certain rights will remain
unfulfilled, as some institutional agency is needed to apportion obligations and
entitlements. By re-linking the globalised economy with the global political structures
that have developed in its wake, the incongruence that economic globalisation has
caused between political and moral boundaries (Linklater, 1999:36; also Held, 1995:16)
can be partially remedied.
There are two major strands of criticism against Held's position. The first holds that his
envisioned "post-Westphalian order" is a Trojan horse for the continued dominance of
global capital (Hutchings, 1999:25). The other strand of criticism is communitarian in
character and comes from realists in particular, who dispute the alleged 'retreat of the
state.' Regarding Held's more direct claims, realists are not convinced that the state has
lost as much sovereignty and capacity to act as Held's "post-Westphalian order"
purports. For realists, the international political order provides the framework in which
transnational econormc interaction can occur (Gilpin, 1986:310). Economic
interdependence is largely a consequence and in the service of political power and the
interest of the major powers, and not of freestanding technological developments
(Thomson and Krasner, 1996:320). Even though a greater sensitivity for human rights
has developed, the continued widespread abuse of human rights demonstrates the
persistence and primacy of national sovereignty. In fact, respect for and the global
enforcement of human rights stand in tension with the sovereignty norm, and for realists
(and for many communitarians, one should add), the latter prevails (Krasner, 1993:165).
While communitarian assessments harbour the normative commitment that distributive
justice ought to take place at the national level, the same cannot be said of
uncontroversial and technical (e.g. the Universal Postal Union) to the controversial (e.g. the World Bank),
and from the formal (e.g. the United Nations and the EU) to the informal (e.g. the Group of Seven).
Thirdly, security structures have also witnessed the upward movement of decision-making, albeit only to
a regional level, as one fmds in the case of NATO. Fourthly, as the national media was instrumental in
creating national identities (Anderson, 1983), the global reach of modem media and communications
networks are similarly enabling the creation and fostering of transnational identities through the
consumption of similar cultural products. However, despite a certain homogenisation of global culture,
interconnectedness has also made people more aware of difference, and has in some cases led to assertion
thereof in the post-Cold War era.
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cosmopolitans. However, this does not mean that all cosmopolitans think that the global
economy constitutes a form of social cooperation that warrants viewing distributive
justice as a global matter and in terms of 'mutual advantage.' Barry (1989a:445-7) for
one, does not think that international 'society' is marked by the mutual dependence one
finds in national societies.i" While it is true that the world's financial, production and
trade structures are increasingly integrated, some sub-national groups and even states
remain insignificant in terms of their contribution to and effect on the global economy.Ï'
An underclass, excluded from the world economy, is found in most non-OECD
countries, a class that cannot be considered to be cooperating in a joint transnational
activity from which one cannot withdraw. Furthermore, it is doubtful that one could
view the relations between the globally marginalised and the more active participants in
the global economy as interdependent enough to fulfil the requirement for justice as
mutual advantage to be applicable. If anything, one could say that the level of economic
integration within the OECD bloc is such that these states could be seen as cooperating
for mutual advantage and that the difference principle could apply to their interaction,
but this would still not improve the fate or strengthen the claims of citizens of poor
countries (Brown, 1992:176).
Where does this marginalisation of the global poor (in the terms of participation in the
global economy) leave cosmopolitans who base their claims for increased global
responsibility, assistance and redistribution on a view of justice as mutual advantage?
Are cosmopolitans now unable to claim on behalf of these excluded persons that they
should be included in the considerations of distributive justice? When justice is viewed
in terms of mutual advantage, the prospects for greater international distributive justice
indeed seem slim. Foreseeing this very problem, Barry notes that the desire to behave
'morally' is more likely in circumstances where actors are more or less equal in power
rather than in conditions of "radical inequality" (Barry, 1989b:290; also Bauman,
1998:19). For an enactment of justice as mutual advantage the parties involved are to be
of roughly equal power (Barry, 1995:44)/8 which even Rawls (CP 213) acknowledges
36 Beitz (1979b: 144) used to see the interconnected world economy as such as a cooperative venture, but
has since retreated from this position. On Beitz's earlier stance, see Barry (1989a:445-7) and Brown
(1992:170-7).
37 In 2000, Africa, for example, accounted for only 2,3% of the world's merchandise exports and 2,1% of
merchandise imports (African Development Bank, 2004: 151).
38 Justice as mutual advantage, that is, justice as a functional arrangement whereby actors willingly
restrain their self-interested pursuits for selfish reasons, and not out of a sense of justice, is problematic
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by saying that "it would indeed be unwise to underestimate the importance of such a
balance [of forces between the parties] in securing justice." However, approaches to
justice that accept the influence of power in the determination of what is just, provide no
moral basis for claims by the (global) weak to be included (Barry, 1995:46 and 50). For
Barry (and other cosmopolitans), justice is most needed where mutual advantage does
not exist (Brown, 1992: 180). In reminding us of this function of justice, cosmopolitans
are recalling the ethical responsibility for the other that informs justice; that the function
of justice is not merely to maintain order and to calculate benefits and burdens, but also
to disperse our ethical responsibility to all others.
To circumvent arguments about justice that reflect global power, cosmopolitans seek an
impartial assessment of what would be just, an assessment that does not seek to exploit
contingent natural or social advantages in setting the terms of justice. In the case of
nationally bound justice, Rawls's employment of the veil of ignorance in the original
position is a well-known strategy for impartially deciding the principles of justice,
which would hence be fair.39 Pogge (1989) and Beitz (1979b) have both argued for a
global application of Rawls's theory, so as to arrive at impartial principles of
international justice. As mentioned, to convince that distributive justice should occur at
a global level cannot rely purely on the level of global integration, interdependence and
mutual advantage. Seeking to create conditions that would lead to a readier acceptance
of arguments based on impartiality, cosmopolitans attack the premises of arguments that
justify excluding poor non-citizens from having a claim to some of the wealth
concentrated in rich countries, by, for example, pointing to the ghastly consequences of
global poverty and inequality; questioning the trump that the sovereignty principle
usually holds over human rights; arguing that nationality is an "arbitrary distinction,"
like race or gender, and so on. But despite aspirations to impartial justice and the
since it undermines peaceful cooperation as parties constantly seek to strengthen their own positions;
arrangements of 'justice' as mutual advantage often do not correspond to what is normally regarded as
just; and justice as mutual advantage does not provide a moral foundation for the weak from whence to
assert their claims (Barry, 1995:46-48).
39 Rawls writes, "An impartial judgement, we can say, is one rendered in accordance with the principles
which would be chosen in the original position ... The idea of the original position is to set up a fair
procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just. Somehow we must nullify the effects of specific
contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their
own advantage. Now in order to do this I assume that the parties are situated behind a veil of ignorance"
(TJ 165 and 118). Barry (1989:423) utilises Scanlon's understanding of impartiality, whereby we are
required to justify our actions "on grounds that others can't reasonably reject," derived from Scanlon's
original position in which parties are aware of their positions and interests (there is no thick veil of
ignorance as one fmds in Rawls) and are motivated to find an agreement.
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protection of basic human rights, power, self-interest and sovereignty remain facts of
life in international relations. The problem of extracting the extensive sacrifices of self-
interest required by justice as impartiality is compounded by the absence of an
"international sense of community" (Beitz, 1979b: 155). The import of this absence is
informed by Sandel's (1984b:90) criticism of Rawls, whereby isolated individuals
would not permit an intrusive and communal agreement, such as the Rawls's difference
principle. This absence of solidarity at the global level undermines the willingness of
people to make sacrifices for a globally desirable goal, or to comply with what is
demanded by international regulations and laws (Nagel, 1991: 178). Furthermore, there
is a relative lack of institutional capacity at an international level to enforce such
extensive compliance.
What about the large number of international institutions that have developed in recent
decades? For the Rawlsian-influenced cosmopolitans, institutions are the focal point of
distributive justice (e.g. Barry, 1989b:358; Pogge, 1992, 1999). Various institutional
ways of shaping domestic economic cooperation can have various domestic
distributional outcomes, with regard to which "we have a natural duty to remove any
injustices" (TJ:216). Pogge (2001:15) argues that the same holds true for an
international society marred by inequality and deprivation.· In the Rawlsian
understanding, institutions distribute the benefits and burdens of social cooperation
undertaken for mutual advantage. But, as mentioned, global mutual advantage and
universal inclusion do not exist in the global political economy.
However, Pogge (1999:338-340) reminds us that institutions can have harmful effects
on non-participants, that is, those who do not live under these social institutions,
institutions that are nevertheless proclaimed to be just (Pogge, 1989:276). "It is ...
because all human beings are now participants in a single, global institutional scheme -
involving such institutions as the territorial state and a system of international law and
diplomacy as well as a world market for capital, goods and services - that all human
rights violations have come to be, at least potentially, everyone's concern" (Pogge,
1992:51). Our global institutional interconnectedness highlight the consideration these
effects demand, as through our blindness to these effects, we may be "active [ly]
impoverishing, starving, and killing millions of innocent people by economic means"
(Pogge, 2001:14). Even international institutions (such as the IMF, World Bank and the
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
56
WTO), of which most states are members, maintain and exacerbate global relations of
inequality (Pogge, 2001:14). As an institutional cosmopolitan, and reflecting the
Rawlsian influence on his thinking, Pogge asserts, "one ought not to participate in an
unjust institutional scheme ... without making reasonable efforts to aid its victims and to
promote institutional reform" (Pogge, 1992:50 and 1989:276).
However, the dispensing of justice by international institutions seems unlikely in the .
near future. Despite some official recognition of our interdependence and
interconnectedness in the change from the "Westphalian order" to a "United Nations
system," the rudiments of the Westphalian order have not changed in terms of their
"logic and structure" (Held, 1995:97; also Frost, 1996: 276). Despite the change
towards a "United Nations system" involving greater institutionalisation of international
interaction, recognition of and concern for human rights, a concomitant limit on the way
states may exert their 'sovereign' authority over its subjects, and greater emphasis on
our common humanity and concerns (Held, 1995:86), the cosmopolitan potential of the
United Nations system remains in tension with the "form and dynamics" of the
Westphalian state system (p. 98). In this Westphalian system the state remains the
virtually exclusive regulator of distributive justice between people.
The potential for pursumg distributive justice at an international level is further
constrained by the character of (influential) international institutions themselves. The
most influential international institutions maintain and advance the interests of the
powerful, and their continued existence remains dependent on a continued congruence
between the interests of these institutions and those of the powerful, and on hierarchy
and inequality (Hurrell, 2001:44). Even though international institutions "take on their
own life" (Cox, 1981: 136), without the support of the most powerful states, they are
powerless talk-shops, unable to affect hegemonic ally central issues. However, when
issues are not of central importance to the global balance of power, more scope exists
for change away from hegemonic interests.
We have started to run up against the practical difficulties of getting the global poor to
be acknowledged as substantially equal, that is, equal enough to be considered when
working out the principles and framework of global justice. Arguments that judge the
justness of the global distributional scheme based on a consideration of all humans as
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fundamentally equal are very useful to point out how unjust and unequal the global
distributive order is. However, insofar as emphasizing human equality at a theoretical
level is used as a strategy to convince us that others ought to be treated with greater
consideration and be brought into the beneficent ambit of our scheme of distributive
justice, this strategy runs into problems, especially in the anarchical international system
in which there is no central political authority to enforce a more equal treatment of
others on distributive matters. Treating others more equally when they cannot force my
more considerate treatment constitutes a generosity, an ethical relating to the other.
However, such generosity implies recognition of the other as a face, which is the
opposite of emphasizing his equality with all others. We are awakened to our ethical
responsibility for the other by his difference from all others, not his equality to them.
The ethical relation between the subject and the other, which parallels the political
relation, is what drives humanist progress in the political (humanist progress would, in
this case, be construed as a more equal consideration and treatment of outsiders).
However, the strategy to emphasize human equality deadens our awareness of the
ethical command that issues from the face of the other.
2.5. Conclusion
I have come to the end of a reflection on the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate. In
this chapter, three ways in which the ethical relation with the other is stifled, thus
leaving us unperturbed by the preventable suffering and dying of the global poor, have
been identified. With regard to the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, our
indifference to the plight of the global poor was located in the privileging of the
autonomous self; the suppression of what is other when theorising about justice; and the
counter-productive strategy of emphasizing human equality so as for the poor to be
treated with greater consideration. This chapter has served as a preparation for the
taking up of these three problems from a more explicitly Levinasian perspective in the
next three chapters.
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CHAPTER 3 - LEVINAS AND A QUESTIONING OF AUTONOMOUS FREEDOM
3.1. Introduction
It is my aim to find some answers as to why people do not consider themselves guiltier and
more responsible with regard to the millions of extremely poor people who have already
died from preventable, poverty-related causes, an indifference that extends to the millions
currently facing a similar fate. In section 2.2 of the previous chapter it was argued that
writers in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate seek to preserve for the self as much
autonomy as possible, an autonomy that was interpreted as indicating a limit to the selfs
responsibility for the other. A sphere of 'legitimate' indifference to the other is established,
by, for example, fixing some point of equality between people, shifting responsibility for
the other onto the shoulders of institutions, or by splitting the private from the public. By
institutionally and theoretically limiting the responsibility of the self for the other, and
through the general prioritising of the value of freedom above all others, the self is propped
up in his self-assured right to dominate the world and the other in it, thereby forestalling an
ethical awakening to the other. In considering himself justified in his usurpation of the
place of the other, the likelihood that the independent subject might consider himself guilty
for having dominated and neglected the other, and thereby opening a path towards
assuming responsibility for the other, is eroded.
In this chapter I shall move directly to Levinas's depiction of autonomous subjectivity, the
form of subjectivity he considers unjust, because of the disregard and oppression of the
other it harbours (3.2). The autonomous subject Levinas chooses to put in question strikes
one as similar to the Kantian conception of subjectivity that one finds in the cosmopolitan
thought of Pogge, Beitz and Barry, albeit that these writers are mostly concerned with the
moral aspects of the universal ising subject and also evade Kant's metaphysics through the
contractarian method. Nevertheless, their Kantianism remains in seeking to establish
universal principles (of justice) through reasoned argument alone. Even though the more
contextually situated communitarian subject's autonomy is curtailed to a greater extent than
the Kantian subject of liberal-cosmopolitanism, it is also vulnerable to a Levinasian ethical
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critique of the autonomous subject, because the purpose of a communitarian curtailment of
individual autonomy is to preserve the social conditions that make the exercise of
individual freedom possible in the first place. In the subsequent section (3.3), the ethical
case against the autonomous self, who is charged with neglect and oppression of the other
in the exercise of his naïve autonomy, is developed (3.3). Having specified why an
autonomous subjectivity is problematic, in the sense of forestalling the experiencing of
guilt for having neglected the extremely poor global other, I attempt to draw out the ethical
dimension of subjectivity, with the implication that more concern for the other is possible.
Instead of destroying the self in guilt for having oppressed the other, the self is reaffirmed
as uniquely and infinitely responsible for the other in the interpersonal ethical relation (3.4).
As has been mentioned, there is always a third person next to the other, which announces
the impersonal order in which the self has to limit his responsibility to the specific other so
as to respond to multiple others in the order of justice I (3.5).
3.2. Levinas and autonomous freedom
As Levinas's work progressed, he placed less emphasis on the arising of the subject as an
autonomously free being, separating himself from the world and asserting his mastery over
it, a separation and uprightness Levinas used to see as necessary to successfully respond to
the ethical demand of the other. In his latter major work, Otherwise than Being or Beyond
Essence, freedom understood as that of a "constituted, wilful, imperialist subject" is still a
point of contrast with freedom oriented towards the other in responsibility (OB 112, see OB
76-80; 110-112). However, in this work, the movement of separation is of a lesser
significance; instead, without the preliminaries of positing a self separating himself from
the anonymity of the 'there is,' the self is uniquely responsible for the other from the outset
(OB 163). As the importance of positing a separated subject subsided, more emphasis came
to be placed on the ethical responsibility for the other as having preceded the subject, that
is, the subject having had no choice in the matter - responsibility for the other is a modality
I Levinas 's use of the term justice differs between his earlier and later work. In his earlier work, justice refers
to the face-to-face situation (the ethical relation), whereas in his later work, justice refers to a situation where
the third is present (the political relation) (IWHA 171).
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of being.' What remains of freedom is the choice whether to respond to the other III
responsibility or not, whether to be 'good' or not.' Note that in Otherwise than Being or
Beyond Essence, the verb 'to be' refers to the enjoying, dominating, totalising way oflife of
an entity self-centredly caught up in his own projects and which corresponds to Levinas's
earlier descriptions of the naively free and separated subject. Such a being is 'interested;' it
is for-itself. Hence Levinas's attempt to describe the 'otherwise than being,' dis-interested
being, being-for-the-other (EI 100). What is important for our purposes is that, even though
the ethical responsibility for the other is a modality of being that precedes the self, an
element of awakening to the other must remain, for without the awakening to the other and
the temptation of irresponsibility, the freedom of the self to be good or not, would be
negated: "Freedom is put into question by the other, and is revealed to be unjustified, only
when it knows itself to be unjust" (CPP 50, emphasis added). Let me briefly describe the
separated, self-referential, interested self, unquestioning of its autonomous freedom, but
which is put in question by the other.
One is forced to exist. In not taking up one's existence, not positing oneself as an existent, a
subject, one is still reminded of the fact of one's existence. This reminder takes the form of
the horror of anonymous existence, of not existing as a subject, not separated from the
world. When the 'world' is removed, behind this nothingness, we find "the fact that one is,
the fact that there is" (EE 21, TO 46). In the absence of everything there is "presence" -
"the place where the bottom has dropped out of everything, an atmospheric density, a
plenitude of the void, or the murmur of silence" (TO 46). The self arises out of such
oppressive anonymity. Action indicates a taking up of one's existence - it is the moment in
which the existent posits himself in existence (EE 34). The instant of the present gives a
being the opportunity to break with anonymity, to begin. The instant of the present shows
an indifference to the duration, flow and history of time. It breaks with the past, yet in
retrospect it seems as though this instant has always been part of the melody of history (EE
73). In the instant, the present is ripped open and stitched back up again (TO 52).
2 This is not to say that responsibility for the other, as a modality of being that precedes the subject, is not
present in Totality and Infinity (see TI 218-9, 271, 302).
3 "The will is free to assume his responsibility in whatever sense it likes; it is not free to refuse this
responsibility itself; it is not free to ignore the meaningful world into which the face of the other has
introduced it" (TI 218), for responsibility for others 'overflows' freedom (CPP 136).
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It might appear as though the self-referential present, unencumbered by the past, grants the
self a heady freedom. This is not entirely the case - we are imprisoned by our identification
with the instant - in positing oneself as an existent the being one assumes is a "burden" that
cannot be cast off, it is a burden because the act of existing requires constant effort (EE 79).
To exist is not simply "light like grace" (EE 87). Rather, in taking up one's being an
"instantaneous maturity invades" (EE 79) for one is ultimately responsible for one's own
being. The solitude of being lies therein that one "can exchange everything between beings,
except existing" (TO 42); the subject is "riveted" to itself, to being (EE 79). In his self-
referential egoism, the subject is ignorant of the other as other.
The world exists for the enjoying, egocentric and free self; the existent lives as though he
were at the centre of the world. The existent approaches objects from himself, illuminating
objects as though this 'light' emanated from himself (TO 64). The world seems as if it is
for us, it "offers the bountifulness of terrestrial nourishment to our intentions" (EE 39). The
existent does not question his dominating freedom with regard to the things of the world; he
does not realise that he could be unjust through the very act of existing. The limits to one's
freedom are merely obstacles to be overcome (EN 139); resistance to subjective freedom is
not yet ethical. The enjoyment of things, consuming more than is strictly required,
constitutes "the grace of life" (TI 112). One lives from, but also enjoys "good soup," the
elements, work, etc. One is not only in a direct (physiological) relation with these 'objects,'
but also in a reflective relation with this relation (TO 110-1), "an enjoying of enjoyment" as
it were (OB 73).
In his naïve autonomy and self-preservation, the self also exerts his dominating force on the
other. Through labour the ego can forestall threats to his freedom and enjoyment (TI 166).
Knowledge and labour are ways of coping with the exigencies of the world, of bringing
what is other under control, an otherness that includes nature as well as the other person
(EN 179-180). In the need for predictability, the other is reduced to a concept in a system
that is to guarantee a world in which the self can be free. The other is treated as an object of
knowledge, but, in order for the system to be maintained, the other has to be 'disciplined'
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so as to conform to the concept by which he is known and controlled, so as for him to be
useful and/or not to pose a threat to the social totality. The egoistic force of the self is
reflected in his 'com-prehension' of the other, whereby the other is reduced to and
maintained in a concept imposed by the knowing ego. Yet, to understand the other "in
terms of his history, his environment, his habits" is to be evaded by the other as other,
unique (EN 9).
In light of the aforementioned, the question might arise as to the relation between
interestedness, existence, essence, separation, enjoyment, etc. and freedom as it is broadly
used in political philosophy. Caygill (2002:32), for example, and referring to an early
article of Levinas's (RH), claims that "the concept of freedom that Levinas evolves has
little to do with liberal notions of freedom figured as autonomy and more to do with
Bergson's notion of freedom as creative spontaneity." Admittedly, freedom in Levinas is
closely related with the upsurge of the spontaneous existent, enjoying the world. But the
'Levinasian, ' responsible self is also seen as starkly individualised and deeply empowered,
initially in its totalising mastery over the world and later in the 'here I am' of substitution
for the other. What Levinas's descriptions of the separated subject and the autonomous
subject in political philosophy have in common is the supreme and justified position of the
individual subject in deciding and realising his or her life-plans with the least amount of
interference from other people or institutions. Similar to the Western tradition in which the
well-being of the individual, protected by various institutions and having claim to various
rights, remains the ultimate point of normative reference, the separated subject that Levinas
sketches regards himself as central and considers himself justified in his resultant
behaviour. Furthermore, what Levinas's separated subject shares with one of the central
notions of liberal political theory is a repudiation of fate. In both Levinas and liberal
political theory, the subject is considered capable and justified to act in ways undetermined
by the past. In both Levinas's work and liberal political theory, freedom is considered to be
"the possibility of commencement" (TI 148).
I am heading in a direction in which I, guided by Levinas 's thought, intend to question the
asocial/functional disregard of others by the autonomous self skected thus far. But am I not
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setting up a type of subjectivity that is so asocial and egotistical that it comes as no surprise
that the other is disregard by such an individual? What about communitarian perspectives
that also question the asociality of the autonomous subject just described? Communitarians
have criticised the aforementioned atomistic individualism on at least two fronts: as being
empirically inaccurate and socially undesirable. It is the latter criticism that concerns us
here. But, it will be recalled from chapter 2 that communitarians demand a more sizeable
curtailment of individual autonomy for the benefit of others, in order to secure the social
commitment necessary to sustain the (national) liberal democratic society that makes
extensive individual liberty possible. But, as was noted in chapter 2, there is a good deal of
self-interest behind such a curtailment, for it also serves to secure the selfs freedom (and
privilege) and it is therefore questionable if such concern for and responsibility towards the
other is 'ethicaL' Furthermore, such concern required for others is also highly 'political,' in
that the communitarian subject does not simply have duties to anyone, but mostly to his co-
nationals. The communitarian disregard for the effects of one's actions on outsiders
removes a potential source from which the autonomous subject can be put in question.
3.3. Autonomous freedom in question
Though Levinas argues that the enjoyment and egoism of the separated, autonomously free
subject presupposes the ethical relation and the alterity of the other, an egoism that is
"founded on the infinitude of the other" (TI 216), the case against egoistic freedom can be
strengthened beyond merely viewing it as descriptively forgetful. Asocial freedom can also
be criticised for the practical consequences of living according to such a seemingly
legitimate worldview whereby freedom "consists in negating or in absorbing the other, so
as to encounter nothing" (TI 292). In the self-righteous exercise of my freedom, the other
qua face is negated in that he is treated as an object at my disposal, a unit in a system. In
viewing the other as an object or as a concept, his alterity is suppressed; what overflows the
bounds of the concept is discarded. In the atomistic existence of free individuals living
alongside one another, each in his space, the asocial character of such a way of living
forestalls the approach of the other. In the existent's dominance over and objectification of
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the other, he is seemingly not aware of the other as face. The unique other is negated in
categories of power and knowledge.
Although I seek to dominate and com-prehend the other, I do not possess him. All my
attempts at understanding and dominating the other ultimately slip through my fingers. At
the very moment I 'achieve' understanding and domination, the other's transcendence is
denied. This "scandal of alterity," the alterity of the other that cannot be fully integrated
into my schemes and systems, "presupposes the tranquil identity of the same, a freedom
sure of itself which is exercised without scruples, and to whom the foreigner brings only
constraint and limitation" (TI 203). The other does not counter my freedom as a freedom
similar to and as arbitrary as my own, for that would mean the disappearance of his alterity
"under the same concept," that is, into the synchrony of the same (TI 171). Instead, to be
confronted with the face of the other is to be confronted by what cannot be captured in a
concept or a context.
For the autonomous subject to realise the injustice of his naïve existence, someone must ask
the subject "for an accounting" (EN 30). It is the other as face that does this. The approach
of the other as face puts my freedom into question, freedom that had hitherto been naïvely
exercised. To be faced by the nudity of the other's face is a "crisis of being ... because I
begin to ask myself if my being is justified, if the Da of my Dasein is not already the
usurpation of somebody else's place" (LR 85). It is a crisis of being because the subject can
already recognise how the mere fact of his existence is implicated in the death of the other
(LR 86). If guilty for the mere fact of existence, how could the subject ever hope to defend
his "right to be" (EN 144)?
The negativity of guilt for being becomes positive in assuming responsibility for the other.
However, assuming such responsibility is not decision of an autonomous self who
maintains control over his actions and responsibilities. To be responsible for the other is to
be a 'hostage' to him, to lose a certain measure of control over one's life, one's freedom.
The ethical relation is a "movement [in which] my freedom does not have the last word"
(CPP 58). Responsibility for the other was never agreed to, it does not come from a fault I
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have committed or even something I have done (EN 170). Responsibility comes from a
'time immemorial,' a 'pluperfect past,' since I was born into a world in which the other
already existed. In contrast to the activity of the autonomous subject, to be responsible for
the other is "to catch sight of an extreme passivity" (OB 47), a subjectivity infused with
what the self has no control over.
The limitless character of responsibility stems from the guilt that arises from the selfs very
existence, from the constant effort to purge himself of the inescapable weight of his own
usurping existence; affirming himself by negating himself(TI 244-245).4 We can never do
enough, and even when we act, our actions are fraught with dilemmas and unforeseen
consequences: in a world of limited material goods, giving to one person might mean not
giving to another, both of whom are others to me.5 Assuming responsibility for the other
opens up into ever-increasing responsibility. As I increasingly "divest myself, under the
traumatic effect of persecution, of my freedom as a constituted, wilful, imperialist subject,
the more I discover myself to be responsible; the more just I am, the more guilty I am" (OB
112). In the ethical relation the subject is hollowed out in responsibility and expiation for
the other.
4 "The I, which we have seen arise in enjoyment as a separated being having apart, in itself, the centre around
which its existence gravitates, is confirmed in its singularity by purging itself of this gravitation, purges itself
interminably, and is confirmed precisely in this incessant effort to purge itself' (TI 244-245).
5 In the activity of our own desire and impulse to live (our conatus essendi) we have eaten bread that the other
could have eaten and wihch we could have given to the other. Traditionally understood, responsibility for the
other and for my actions are limited in that the subject naïvely considers itself responsible only insofar as he
very directly caused the misery of the other. Traditional political/moral philosophy has also been at pains to
find the tipping point between the limits of general responsibility and supererogation. Philosophy has assumed
that it is possible to arrive at morally 'correct' decisions so as to leave the acting subject with a clear
conscience about his behaviour. Against a tradition that thinks there are final answers on how to live 'justly'
and thereby secure for the self-interested subject a clear conscience, for Levinas, the subject is responsible
beyond what he intends (EN 3). In a world as complex and integrated as ours, it is impossible to think through
all the consequences of our actions. This means that 'correct' or 'good' decisions should instead be regarded
as 'better' decisions in recognition of our inability to control all harmful effects, which would leave the
subject unable to claim non-culpability. Indeed, "[ijn society as it functions one cannot live without killing, or
at least without taking the preliminary steps for the death of someone" (EI 120). Furthermore, even when
there is sincerity of intentions in the acts of the subject, in an order of more than two people, all persons,
including the subject, find themselves "at the mercy of an outside will" (EN 28). People and the interpretation
of their actions are subject to an order they did not entirely choose. The subject is judged in terms of the
objectivity of his actions, not the intention behind the action (EN 21). In responding to the other in the
political relation there is hence already a distance between the subject, who acts in sincerity, and the other,
who is the recipient of his actions and who interprets these acts in terms in which the objective/impersonal
meaning prevails. The subject's guilt for a certain situation is determined, not on the basis of his intentions,
but predominantly on the basis of impersonal standards (EN 23).
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It has been argued that the autonomous self lives in ignorance and oppression of the other.
Albeit that freedom autonomously exercised is often deeply naïve of its implications, it is
problematic precisely for its naïveté, its overlooking of the other's need, without being
disturbed by this disregard. What should be apparent by now is that Levinas has radically
problematised autonomous freedom. In light of this critique of the autonomous self, we
have to wonder what is to become of the subject; does guilt for having usurped the place of
the other annihilate the subject? Are we to think of ourselves as not free and instead as
forever enslaved to the other in our infinite responsibility before him? Levinas gives two
related responses to this. The first, which we have already hinted at, involves rethinking
freedom as heteronomous responsibility (as opposed to freedom as autonomy) and the
second involves introducing a third person next to the other whereby the legitimacy of my
private pursuits are provisionally restored. Focusing on freedom as heteronomous
responsibility is an attempt to draw out an oft-overlooked category of being, the
interpersonal ethical relation (section 3.4). Having drawn out the ethical aspect of
subjectivity, it becomes possible to sketch a political subject awake to his infinite
responsibility for the other (section 3.5). These two aspects of a 'rehabilitated subjectivity
will be considered in the next two sections.
3.4. Election and substitution
Levinas's philosophy is a reaction against a Western philosophical tradition in which the
sovereign self has been at the centre of all undertaking and questioning. Furthermore,
Levinas questions a "morality founded upon the inalienable right of the conatus which is
also the right and the bonne conscience of freedom" (LR 82). Inmy view, it is exactly such
a 'morality' that we have seen constructed in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate. In
section 2.2, it was argued that despite various gestures of generosity to the other, the self is
always restored as central and preserved in an autonomous and indifferent 'good
conscience. '
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In proximity to the other, the self, the source of all knowledge and questioning is
problematised. In proximity, the self finds himself in the presence of something that
"cannot be resolved into 'images' and exposed;" something resistant to all thematisation
and integration (BPW 80). The other is what refuses to surrender himself to the ego's
attempts at knowledge and rendering things intelligible (BPW 80, EN 58). Although the
other as other remains outside the grip of the self, the self remains in relation with the other,
though not a relation in which the other is reduced to consciousness or captured in
representation. Proximity is contact without grasp. It is a "relationship with a singularity,
without the mediation of any principle or ideality" (BPW 81). It is a relation of
vulnerability, sensitivity to the unique. Although proximity is a difference that cannot be
bridged, it is not indifference. Instead, it is responsibility (OB 139, see also OB 166).
Proximity is the impossibility of abandoning the other (BPW 167).
In proximity I am in a "state of guilt," an accusation "prior to all wrongdoing" (EN 58).
The negativity that surrounds the imperialist subject becomes positive in responsibility, a
responsibility for the other that the ego cannot evade - "there is no choice, for it is always
and inescapably my concern. This is a unique 'no choice,' one that is not slavery" (LR
247). The ego does not contract his responsibility for the other. Instead, proximity is a
relationship with the singular other that comes from "I know not where," summoning me to
"a responsibility toward those whom we do not even know" (BPW 81). It is a responsibility
that is not assumed after reflection and decision, but that is always there. The self finds
himself in situations that he has no control over, that were not his choosing, but yet he is
responsible.
Finding himself responsible in situations that were not his choosing or the result of his
actions, the self finds himself accused for his failure, 'persecuted' by the other. This,
Levinas describes as "subjectivity thrown back on itself' (BPW 88). There is no escape.
The self is, by his "very position, responsibility through and through" (BPW 17, emphasis
in original). Such responsibility for the other, responsibility for what the other does,
preceding freedom and "non-freedom" (CPP 133, OB 116), is the basis of sociality; it is the
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"fact of human fellowship" (BPW 91). Strange as it may seem, persecution by the other is
the foundation of "solidarity" with the other (BPW 82).
But, does the self not sooner or later "set a limit to the passivity of submitting" (EN 59)?
Does the subject not become "crushed" by the extremity of his responsibility for him (TO
77)? Levinas answers in the negative:
Pushed to the end, it consists in inverting its identity, in getting rid of it. If such a desertion of
identity is possible without turning into alienation pure and simple, what else can it be if not a
responsibility for others, for what others do, even to the point of being made responsible for the
very persecution it undergoes. The self is the passivity on the hither side of identity, that of
hostage (EN 59).
Levinas shares liberalism's deep affirmation of the individual as a capable being. But
whereas the liberal affirmation of the individual is a selfish one, one that always returns to
itself (that is, "self-possession, sovereignty, arche" - BPW 80), the Levinasian affirmation
of the individual occurs via the other and lies in the selfs ability to negate himself, to give,
to be hollowed out in responsibility for the other, to be good (TI 305). In the selfs
"empyting itself of its being" in the positivity of asymmetrical responsibility for the other,
the usurping and dominating self is "rehabilitated" (EN 58-59).
In the intimacy of the one-to-one ethical relation, the subject is uniquely situated to
recognise the uniqueness of the other, a uniqueness that has been offended by the
generalisation of institutions, categorisation and theorisation, "the offense of the offended,
or the face" (TI 247). Since the self is always in the presence of the other, the self
recognises himself as the one who, "before all decision, is elected to bear all the
responsibility for the World ... a reversal of being 'persevering in his being' - which
begins in [him]" (EN 60). To be responsible means that no one can take my place and that I
cannot discard my responsibility. As Levinas puts it in a beautiful formulation, to be
responsible means that "I can substitute myself for everyone, but no one can substitute
himself for me" (EIlOl).
Before proceeding, a matter that was only touched upon above requires comment, namely,
the issue of consciously taking up the ethical burden of our responsibility for the other.
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Levinas, wonders, "How can the passivity of obsession find a place in consciousness,
which is wholly, or is in the end, freedom" (OB 102)? The problem lies therein that in
consciousness "everything is intentionally assumed" (OB 102). Intentionality bears the
mark of the autonomous, dominating and contemplating self. Such a reasoned and
contemplated assuming of responsibility for the other, reminds one of Alford's (2004)
interpretation, whereby substitution for the other is understood as having found something
that has been missing in my life, realising it to have been my blindness to the other and his
need, and subsequently becoming responsible. Such an assuming of responsibility for the
other remains self-referential and egoistic. Levinas often warns against such a conscious
taking up of responsibility for the other, for "[t]he just person who knows himself to be just
is no longer just" (BPW 17). The answer to the abovementioned issue of consciously taking
up our responsibility lies in the very definition of responsibility for the other. The urgency
and extremity of the ethical command that issues from the face undoes and overflows our
capacity to control and limit our responsibility (OB 87-88). In contrast to the self who takes
"up a position with regard to its goodness, know[s] itself to be good, and thus lose[s] its
goodness" (OB 57), in facing the other it is rather a case of "the more I am just, the more I
am guilty" - an inability to rest in good conscience (BPW 21).6 Substituting oneself for the
other is "a new orientation of the inner life" (TI 246), and "can only be discreetly. It cannot
give itself out as an example, or be narrated in an edifying discourse. It cannot, without
becoming perverted, be made into a preachment" (EN 99). Although one is not to substitute
oneself for the other "as a victim offering itself in his place," for this still presupposes a
reflective will behind such a decision (OB 145), one is still left with a choice whether to
respond to the other or not, albeit that the extent and urgency of responsibility overwhelms
this freedom. To be good, is not inscribed in subjectivity, for people are not good
voluntarily. Rather, it is in the possibility to be good, in being an exception that freedom
lies (BPW 117).
In substitution, the self is individuated, affirmed through a constant 'purging' of himself as
the centre of its own existence (TI 244), which is not to say that such individuation does not
6 Initially, the awakening of the subject to the other "does not amount to being conscious of this putting in
question" (BPW 16). This does not to mean to say that the taking up of responsibility for the other cannot
later become "an act of reflection" (BPW 18; see also BPW 54, 58).
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occur when the self acts as imperial, independent and in disregard of the other, the way
individuation is usually regarded in political philosophy. However, Levinas delivers an
indictment against the latter way of being when he writes that "[t]he being that perseveres
in being ... outlines the dimension of baseness itself' (CPP 137). In contrast to the egoism
of the separated self, for Levinas, being-for-the-other, a freedom ethically oriented towards
the other, "is the most profound adventure of subjectivity, its ultimate intimacy" (EN 99). It
is, a certain permissible 'perseverance in being' that is discussed in the next section.
3.5. Provisional autonomy: Freedom in the presence of the third
In the previous section, the rehabilitation of the self, whereby guilt for his domination of
the other becomes positive in responsibility for the other, was considered. However,
questions still remain about the place/role of freedom as it is more typically understood in
political philosophy, that is, freedom to be for oneself, to pursue one's own goals. It might
seem as though Levinas has closed off the possibility of speaking about freedom in its
traditional sense through his critique of the imperialist subject and by insisting upon an
infinite responsibility for the other that precedes the subject's freedom. However, Levinas
is not blind to the importance of auto-nomous freedom. His intention in describing the
selfs responsibility that precedes his freedom was to draw our attention to an overlooked
modality of being (responsibility for the other) as the origin of sociality, which stands in
tension with a view of the subject as wholly sovereign, independent and origin of
everything. In Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, for example, Levinas expresses
his aim as "try[ing] to articulate the break-up of a fate that reigns in essence" (OB 8),
directing our attention to what is other and refractory to the thematising and totalising
trends of Western philosophy and the presumed autonomous self behind these trends.
Despite these stated objectives, Levinas recognises that there is very little goodness in the
world (BPW 91), that people generally live as though they were auto-nomous (CPP 136),
and that individual liberty should be institutionally protected (TI 241). This recognition of a
'legitimate' place for freedom, understood as autonomy and independence, is summarised
by the presence of the third party to my relationship with the other.
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In the presence of a third party, who has always been present, I am faced with another other
who is also a face, who "looks at me in the eyes of the other," also summoning me to
responsibility (TI 213). The third party is another other to me, but he is also an other to the
other. I cannot commit myself to one other at the expense of all others. In the presence of
the third I have to divide my responsibility. Paradoxical as it may seem, in order to be just,
I have to limit my responsibility (OB 128). Yet, it is the very ethical relation with the other
as face that informs my relations with numerous others, a relation in which I limit my
responsibility to the specific other (OB 159). "In the very name of the absolute obligation
towards one's fellow man, a certain abandonment of the absolute allegiance he calls forth is
necessary" (EN 203). The limitation of responsibility is the beginning of equality between
others, but which is an equality that also includes me. In equality, unique subjects are
reduced to the same, drawing the self away from a uniqueness realised through substitution
in which no one can take his place to an equality in which beings are regarded as similar,
replaceable and equally responsible. However, it is my inequality before the other that
maintains the equality of a plurality (BPW 90).
Equality stems from the presence of the third, which requires the limitation of
responsibility, and gives rise to rights and justice for me as well (OB 160). The history of
the state with its institutions and laws has partly been an aspiration towards equality
between unique individuals so as to allow citizens similar freedoms (EN 190). In the
presence of the third beings live alongside one another, not 'face-to-face,' in which there
occurs a distancing from the ethical demand that issues from the proximity to the other. In
one sense (the political), a limit to the other's demands on the self is set. It allows the
subject a provisional freedom to be for-itself, but ultimately returning to the other (see
Burggraeve, 1981:41). "The ego can, in the name of this unlimited responsibility, be called
upon to concern itself also with itself' (OB 128). In the presence of the third my 'lot'
assumes significance. In the presence of the third, the relation of responsibility for the other
might be lost sight of, though it cannot entirely disappear, for "it is still out of my
responsibility that my salvation has meaning, despite the danger in which it puts
responsibility, which it may encompass and swallow up, just as the State issued from the
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proximity of the neighbour is always on the verge of integrating him into a we, which
congeals both me and the neighbour" (OB 161).
Apart from the aforementioned legitimisation of care for one's own lot, the egoism of the
embodied being with a will to survive can never be gotten rid of entirely, which is implied
by the endless need to empty myself in responsibility for the other, of which Levinas often
speaks. Without the interestedness of being, the "seduction of irresponsibility," it would not
make sense to describe being-for-the-other as goodness (CPP 137). The "temptation to
separate oneself from the Good is the very incarnation of the subject or his presence in
being" (CPP 137). Furthermore, the subject is a biological being that feels hunger and cold.
Yet, "despite oneself, starting from oneself," one is obliged and has the ability "to give to
the other even the bread out of one's own mouth and the coat from one's shoulders" (OB
55). Sensibility for the other is mere verbiage if it is empty-handed. Vulnerability for the
other acquires meaning only through giving. The giving of bread achieves tremendous
force in knowing the delicious taste thereof, in knowing the pangs of hunger. "Only a
subject that eats can be for-the-other" (OB 74).
There is a constant potential for lapsing into egoism, seeing in the other an obstruction to
my freedom and survival, which is 'war' in Levinas's terminology. Caygill (2002) in
particular has drawn attention to the precarity of peace in Levinas, to how close 'war' is to
peace. The potential for evil lurks around almost every comer. In order to guarantee peace
and enable freedom, institutions are necessary. "Freedom depends on a written text" and
"takes refuge from its own perfidy in institutions" (TI 241). However, political institutions
characteristically reduce unique individuals to objects of manipulation, control and
knowledge. It should be borne in mind that institutions are not merely created to prevent
evil and predatory relations between people, but are also necessary to divide the subject's
responsibility for numerous others.
Levinas warns against abandoning the world to political fatality (EN 99) and against
forgetting the ethical relation in the necessary objectification of politics in the presence of
the third. It is not at all certain that the 'otherwise than being,' "the penetration of the
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human into the being," will triumph, as for Levinas there exist "periods during which the
human is completely extinguished" (EN 114). The rationality and objectivity of politically
necessary institutions tend to alienate the good intentions in which they were created, so
that people experience their own institutions as a 'tyranny' (BPW 15). One should guard
against such an alienating, rational and measured equality. The necessary violence and
objectification of institutions should "always be held in check by the initial interpersonal
relation" (EI 90), for justice "is not a natural and anonymous legality governing the human
masses, from which is derived a technique of social equilibrium,. placing in harmony the
antagonistic and blind forces through transitory cruelties and violence, a State delivered
__.,
over to its own necessities that it is impossible to justify" (BPW 169). The de jure equality
of justice is enabled by the inequality of the self before the other in the ethical relationship.
Justice implies a recognition of the other. It is goodness, as responsibility for the other,
"disrupting the general economy of the real and standing in sharp contrast with the
perseverance of entities persisting in their being" (EN IS?) that makes justice possible.
However, in the objective order of justice, goodness, the one-for-the-other, is regarded and
discarded as an aberration in the system of justice, gratuitous, supererogatory," In
traditional approaches to justice, the assumption that there ought to be a limit to the
subject's responsibility for the other is never controversial. Rather, what is controversial is
where this limit ought to be set. But, to put it in blunt practical terms: how could one
conceivably speak of a limit to responsibility in a world where 30 000 people die every day
due to (preventable) poverty related causes? Does describing the admittedly more exacting
duty to assist others dying from poverty as supererogatory not indicate the normalisation of
self-obsessed individualism? After Levinas, "[r]esponsibility for the neighbour is precisely
what goes beyond the legal and obliges beyond contracts; it comes to me from what is prior
to my freedom, from a nonpresent, an immemorial" (BPW 142).
7 Rawls (TJ 167) distinguishes a "love of mankind" and a "sense of justice," the former being driven by a
greater desire "to give justice" and leads the individual to perform acts of supererogation. Sooner or later, this
benevolent subject is faced with the problem of the third, that is, a division of its benevolence as well as
having to decide the right courses of action. According to Rawls, the two principles of justice he has
identified would steer the benevolent subject when having to decide over the dispersal of his beneficence. It
also demonstrates, in Rawls's view, "why nothing would have been gained by attributing benevolence to the
parties in the original position." To this, Levinas would argue that the benevolence of the ethical relation is
already implied by beings desiring justice, a relation that 'founds' justice.
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I am always in the presence of the third and of the other, that is, I am always in both a
political as well as an ethical relation (OB 158). Another person is both the other and the
third to me - "the face is both the neighbour and the face of faces, visage and visibility"
(OB 160). In fact, proximity starts with the third party (OB 160). When faced by the other,
I can respond 'politically,' seeing the other as my equal, insisting on reciprocity between
us, whereby I do not owe him anything more than he owes me, or, the other can be
responded to 'ethically,' the relation whereby I am responsible for him beyond what is
required by our political equality and reciprocity. This is the ambiguity of society. We are
constantly faced with the choice of how to respond. Levinas mentions this problem with
reference to Cain's answer as to Esau's whereabouts. Cain answered, "Am I my brother's
keeper?" In a world where the third is always present, "Cain's answer is sincere. Ethics is
the only thing lacking in his answer; there is only ontology: I am I, and he is he" (EN 110).
In international society, our 'political' reaction to the other prevails and has become
increasingly justified. Still, a guilty conscience remains.
3.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have extended the critique that originated in section 2.2, where an attempt
was made to show that writers in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate consistently try
to preserve for the self some sphere of autonomy, outside of responsibility for others. In
this chapter, Levinas's thought was used to argue that the self is always in a relation of
responsibility with the other, who represents everyone, a relation that is present even in the
impersonality of justice and institutions. The irrepressibility of the ethical relation shows
the privileged view of the self as demonstrably inaccurate, as well as 'violent' and
oppressive. It also suggests that a more ethical subjectivity lies immanent. In light of the
permanence and inescapability if our ethical responsibility for the other, attempts to
establish some zone of indifference strikes one as attempts to justify our disregard of the
other. Albeit that in the presence of the third, there is some legitimacy for being concerned
with one's own life, such self-regard is never fully legitimate, for our responsibility for the
other is always unfinished.
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CHAPTER 4 - JUSTICE, ORDER AND THE ETHICAL RELATION
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter, the second problematic aspect of the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate
will be considered from a Levinasian perspective. In section 2.3, an attempt was made to
indicate that, despite an ethical recognition of the other at the outset of justice, which
implies recognition of the other as other, what is other becomes suppressed and disregarded
when the issue of global justice is approached in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate.
The problem lies therein that what reminds us of our unfinished responsibility for the other
and of the imperfection of justice are suppressed in the generalisation of justice, leaving us
unconfronted by what reminds us of the imperfections of justice. It is the otherness of the
other, his 'face,' what cannot be integrated into a totality, that reminds us of our infinite
responsibility for him.
This is not to argue that there is no concern for the globally poor other in the writings of the
cosmopolitan-communitarian debate. Indeed, at the outset of justice, cosmopolitans, in
particular, display a considerable degree of generosity towards the poor from other
countries by including them in the scope of justice, even though the poor cannot
significantly reciprocate the benefit they would receive from being included. It is also not
to argue that one can have justice without order, generalisation, universality, objectivity and
objectification. But it is to argue that the unapologetic and unqualified suppression of
(ethical) otherness, when theorising about justice betrays the privileging of an
understanding of justice of which the function is to maintain and regulate order and secure
each person in his autonomy, rather than viewing this function to be the realisation of our
infinite responsibility towards the other. To view justice in terms of order, rather than in
terms of unfinished responsibility and generosity, partially suggests why we do not
consider ourselves unjust for neglecting the global poor, since disregard for the suffering of
others is as it were built into the totalising imperative of the predominant approaches to
justice.
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In an attempt to clarify matters somewhat, below I delineate the tendency to suppress what
is other when thinking about justice into a philosophical and a socio-political component
(sections 4.2. and 4.3 respectively). Regarding the philosophical aspect, the tendency of
theoretical justice to suppress otherness is related to a wider tendency that Levinas has
identified in Western philosophy (4.2.1). For Levinas, the dominant tradition of Western
philosophy has been one that reduces what is other to the same and encloses the other in a
system of thought. Implied by this reduction of what is other to the same is an autonomous
and imperial subject, unquestioning of his right to be and his freedom to categorise and
represent the world and the other for his own purposes, a world in which what is other, and
the ethical responsibility of the self implied thereby, is suppressed. It is in this tendency that
our continued good conscience despite the suffering of the other is partly located, since that
which awakens us to our guilt for neglecting the other, his otherness, is suppressed. That
this disregard of the other in the aspiration to totality need not be so is suggested by the fact
of the other. The other is what ultimately disrupts and resists the closure of a system of
thought (e.g. of justice) (4.2.2), for the other is by definition that which cannot be reduced
to a concept and be contained in a system. That the presence of the other forever hinders the
final closure of all totalities, negates the final word of all (social scientific) generalisation
and shows such abstractions to be 'violent,' do not mean the end of theorisation about
justice. Rather, the presence of the third person next to the other requires a 'theoretical
attitude' (what Levinas terms the 'said'), to for example think about the appropriate system
of justice (4.2.3). It is however imperative that the ethical relation with the other not be lost
sight of, that the 'said' is forever disrupted and informed by the ethical 'saying,' something
the proposed strategy of emphasizing human complexity aspires to and which is discussed
in the next chapter.
Regarding the socio-political aspect of justice, Levinas delineates both an ethical and a
political dimension of social order ('peace' in his terms) (4.3.1). Though both the ethical
and the political are implied by (the need for) social order, political philosophy has
traditionally only paid attention to order as a 'political peace.' In a 'political peace,' the
approach of the other as face, and the ethical accusation implied thereby, is forestalled as
the self permits a limiting of his freedom through a 'social contract' so as to preserve some
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measure of autonomy and legitimate indifference to the other. However, in a political
peace, because freedom itself has not been renounced or put in question, a clashing of
freedoms still occurs. Hence, there is a need for justice as order and for the imposition of
order. It is in the privileged understanding of order as 'political,' and of justice as what
maintains and regulates this 'political' order, and not as what disperses our responsibility
for others, that our general disregard for those who are suffering is partially located.
However, the conflict between various egoisms and the need for order already implies a
relation with what cannot be contained in a system, otherness, an alterity that is ethical.
Herein lies the ethical element of 'peace.' Although the ethical otherness of the other draws
attention to both the limit and the violence of the political order and its institutions, there
remains a need for order. The continued need for an impersonal political order, despite its
violation and neglect of the specific other, lies therein that there is always a third next to the
other who is also an other and for whom we are also responsible. Hence, there is a need for
the impersonality of justice and institutions to reach the other and to protect him from those
who mean him harm (4.3.2). However, although there is an ethical motive behind the
impersonal political order, there is a tendency for the ethical to be overlooked as
institutions aspire to objectivity and politics comes to serve as its own justification. It is
therefore necessary to forever remind the political order of the unfinished responsibility for
the other and to seek a better justice for the sake of the other. For Levinas, the liberal state
is the political form best suited for adapting its institutional complex so as to reduce the
violence against the other in the presence of the third, since liberal justice, by definition,
always questions whether its justice really is justice (4.3.3.).
4.2. Order and the theoretical
4.2.1. Thematisation in traditional philosophy
In this section, the suppression of what is (ethically) other when the issue of global justice
is broached in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate is discussed. By stifling what is
other we are left unconfronted by what reminds us of our individuating and infinite
responsibility for the other and by the fact that justice is always imperfect and insufficient.
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The suppression of otherness in justice leaves us in good conscience, despite having failed
the (globally poor) other so miserably. The tendency to unapologetically and unqualifiedly
smother otherness when writing about justice in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate
can be situated in a preponderant tradition of Western philosophy in which what is other is
reduced to the same (4.2.1). The disruptive force of the other is already implied by the
inability to theorise a 'final' scheme of justice and by the very need for the cosmopolitan-
communitarian debate. The other resists and disrupts generalisation with a force that is
ethical (4.2.2). So much then for locating part of the reason for our disregard of the other's
plight and the inadequacies of global 'justice.' To stave of objections against what might
seem to be an extreme position, since we do, after all, need some form of justice, it is
necessary to note that Levinas also recognises the need for theoretical justice. However,
Levinas adds the caveat that the betrayal of otherness should always be reduced. It is in this
context that we discuss Levinas's distinction between the 'saying' and the 'said' (4.2.3).
Levinas describes his project as trying to put in question "the dominant conception of the
received philosophy" (EN 140). What does he understand as the 'dominant conception' of
philosophy at which he takes his aim? Levinas interprets the history of philosophy as a
persistent attempt to arrive at a universal synthesis/system, whereby every object and
experience is enclosed in consciousness, leaving nothing outside (EI 75). Knowledge is a
rediscovery of the truth, a "return to forgotten knowledge," and a gradual integration of
such knowledge (EN 136). Philosophy does not question the realisability of its totalising
march, but instead considers misunderstandings and shortfalls in knowledge as temporary
obstacles on the way to "truth" (OB 29).
It is important to bear in mind that Western philosophy is more than just a theoretical
disposition - egoism and totalisation also mark the way humans comport themselves in
everyday life (BPW 3). For Levinas, philosophy has traditionally been a privileging of
presence. The sovereign, knowing I is the site where what is other is reduced to the same,
re-presented. In a philosophy untroubled by the alterity of the other, "the I of representation
is the natural passage from the particular to the universal" (TI 126). Intelligibility is
dependent upon an ordering of terms into a system, a totality. In this assembling, the
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subject is "origin, initiative, freedom, present" (OB 78). This melting down of objects into
systems of intelligibility and categories of knowing reflects the subject's imperial freedom,
suppressing and/or ignoring what is other, representing the world to himself. The
synchronising activity of representation is a "return to self as much as an issuing forth from
self' (EN 161).
In Levinas's view of 'traditional' philosophy, the approach of the other qua other is negated
in the primacy the same enjoys over what is other. The other is objectified, which means
that he is reduced to and maintained in a concept (TI 128). What escapes thematisation and
objectification is ignored or suppressed. The other receives his meaning from his
equivalence to the concept, which, in turn, receives its meaning from his overall place in a
system of thought. To comprehend and represent the other in a concept is to prevent, pre-
empt and precede his disruptive force on the totality of the same (TI 124; OB 25).
However, Levinas is not dismissive of a philosophy whereby whatever disturbs the same
"ends up falling back into order" only to yield an order of greater complexity (TISS), with
reason! assuring the coexistence and organisation of various terms into a system (OB 165).
Although philosophy is the writing up of the progression whereby things are "conquered,
dominated, possessed" in a history of thought (CPP 49) and its continuous integration of
the other into the same prevents the approach of the other, such progressive philosophical
integration remains important when Levinas introduces the distinction between the saying
and the said in his later work (see 4.2.3 below). The betrayal of the uniqueness of the other
in the order of the same is necessary and unavoidable, but there are qualitative differences
in these betrayals - some representations being more proximate to the alterity of the other
than other representations. Levinas sees it as the task of philosophy to reduce the betrayal
of the uniqueness of the other in the said (OB 7, 152) and to remind us of the betrayal that
has occurred (OB 44).
1 "Reason is sought in the relationship between terms, between the one and the other showing themselves in a
theme. Reason consists in ensuring the coexistence of these terms, the coherence of the one and the other
despite their difference, in the unity of a theme; it ensures the agreement of different terms without breaking
up the present in which the theme is held. The coexistence or accord between different terms in the unity of
the theme is called a system: the one as a sign of the other, the one as renouncing its figure to trespass over to
the other" (OB 165).
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4.2.2. Disturbing order: The alterity of the other
In knowing, the free self dominates the world in a spontaneity unaffected by the other as
other.
"In evidence, the violence of the encounter with the non-I is deadened. The commerce with
exterior truth as enacted in true cognition is thus not opposed to freedom, but coincides with it.
The search for truth becomes the very respiration of a free being, exposed to exterior realities
that shelter, but also threaten, its freedom" (CPP 49).
Through his acts of understanding and thematisation, the free self violates and negates the
other, "stripping" it of all alterity (EN 9, 180). The 'violence' perpetrated against the other
assumes a being both graspable and eluding every grasp (TI 223). Without this duplicity in
the violated being, it would merely have been an object undergoing labour (TI 223). "The
activity of thought triumphs over all otherness" (EN 126, emphasis added). The activity
behind knowledge is a grasping, an appropriation by a self that sees the world and its
contents as existing for him (LR 76). What in the other exceeds my knowledge is gradually
absorbed by knowledge (TI 295). In knowing, it is as though our sensibility, our
vulnerability to the other as the destitute one, is anaesthetised, repressed and suspended
(OB 64).
It is not only in the 'theoretical attitude' that the face is masked and the self left
unquestioned in his right to be. Also in our complex societies is there "violence" in our
interaction with other beings, where they are approached from "an indirect angle" (CPP
19). In modem societies, we take hold of a being in its absence, "in what is not properly
speaking it" (CPP 19). We relate to others in terms of the concepts and roles by which we
know them, that is, in terms of what they share with other people and not in terms of their
individuality (CPP 19). The objectified person is understood in his relation to other
elements and receives meaning from his place in a system (CPP 20). The other is hidden in
the universality of the terms in which he is represented. The other with whom we interact in
complex society is a being already placed in a category, whose "particularity is already
clothed with a generality," obscuring our view of him as an individual and unique (CPP
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20). In society, our awakening to the other is forestalled since his primary appearance to us
is in terms of a role, a concept. Very often, "the who is a what" (TI 177). When asking who
someone is, the answer usually says what he is. Such an answer refers to a person's place
in a system of relations. As Levinas admits, in daily life it is impossible to interact with
every person as though he were the only person in the world. There is a necessary
demarcation and allocation of roles in society, in which interaction is for the most part
functional and impersonal - "the cobbler makes shoes without asking his customer where
he is going" (EN 21) - and identification with people occurs in line with these
roles/concepts. This objectification of the other in a concept, "obscures the otherness of the
other, the otherness precisely because of which the other is not an object under our control
but a neighbour" (LR 244). Also in the "decency" of the social conventions of "a
community of clothed beings" (LR 243), the other remains hidden. "The most delicate
social relationships are carried on in the forms of propriety; they safeguard the appearances,
cover over all ambiguities with a cloak of sincerity and make them mundane. What does
not enter into the forms is banished from the world" (EE 40). In the state and the equality to
which its citizenry aspires, the uniqueness of the other is lost sight of in the
interchangeability of citizens. In a group, persons relate around a third term that mediates
the exposure of proximity (EE 95). It is in reducing someone outside one's own group to a
member of some race or class that "peace with the other turns into hatred" (BPW 166).
Still, despite the apparent "irrefutable logic of things," despite what seems legitimately
logical, despite the "concepts [being] in agreement with each other," despite the
acceptability of the 'each to his own' of impersonal society, despite everyone fitting into
some socially designated role, in the absence of outright oppression, war, violence (that is,
'political peace') there remains an anxiety about the suffering that has resulted from the
way things work (EN 192, BPW 164). Though we can explain and understand the death
and neglect of the other in the terms of science and social theory, there remains a gnawing
concern for the other that defies all scientific explanation. "The fear of everyone for
themselves in the mortality of everyone does not succeed in absorbing the gravity of
murder committed and the scandal of indifference to the suffering of the other" (BPW 164).
There remains an anxiety that I have turned away from the other, that I have disregarded
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him, that he suffers under the objectivity and impersonality of institutions, that theoretical
generalisations have overlooked him, that I have dominated him. There remains anxiety
about the consequences of my works, all of which I could not have foreseen. The approach
of the other brings my being ill at ease to a head. Fear for the death of the other does not
return to anxiety over my own death (LR 84-5).
When confronted with the other as face, a umque, unassimilated being, the self finds
himself in proximity to a being that ultimately cannot be reduced to and included in the
categories of objective and synthesized knowledge. As face, the other signifies on his own
(BPW 53). He does not derive his meaning from his place in a system of signs. The face
exceeds the categories of representation, it "breaks the system," "refuses totalisation" (EN
34, 281, BPW 53).2 The other is not just another category ("species") characterised by
otherness, but "at once what disturbs order and this disturbance itself' (EN 91, LR 245).
The other resists being 'known;' he escapes the grasp of the totalising ego. In facing the
other as a face, I disregard him in his membership of a genus and regard him in his
particularity (EN 7, BPW 7). The approach of the other is not comprehension; it is "a
neighbouring with what signifies itself without revealing itself, what departs but not to
dissimulate itself' (BPW 77). The alterity of the other, his persistent resistance to
objectification and thematisation, awakens the subject to his domination and muddles his
clear conscience. The other shames the self for the latter's "naïve spontaneity, for [his]
sovereign coincidence with [him]self in the identification of the same" (BPW 17). The
other awakens the subject the oppression that resulted from his assumed sovereignty, an
awakening that has been forestalled by the suppression of otherness in the same. It is the
2 Awakening to the other is a point for 'deconstructing' the totality that had hitherto been aspired to. Derrida
(2001 :4) explains, "In the case of deconstruction, without being anti-systematic, is on the contrary, and
nevertheless, not only a search for, but itself a consequence of, the fact that the system is impossible; it often
consists, regularly or recurrently, in making appear - in each alleged system, in each self-interpretation of and
by a system - a force of dislocation, a limit in the totalisation, a limit in the movement of syllogistic synthesis.
Deconstruction is not a method for discovering that which resists the system; it consists rather, in remarking,
in the reading and interpretation of texts, that what has made it possible for philosophers to effect a system is
nothing other than a certain dysfunction or 'disadjustment,' a certain in capacity to close the system.
Wherever I have followed this investigative approach, it has been a question of showing that the system does
not work, and that this dysfunction not only interrupts the system but itself accounts for the desire for system,
which draws its élan from this very disadjoinment, or disjunction. On each occasion, the disjunction has a
privileged site in that which one calls a philosophical corpus. Basically, deconstruction as I see it is an
attempt to train the beam of analysis onto this disjointing link."
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other that puts the priority hitherto enjoyed by the same into question. Awakening to the
other is a continuous "sobering up," "a permanent revolution" (EN 87-9). To awake to the
other is already to respond, to be responsible - "awakening is obligation" (EN 114).
4.2.3. The needs of politics: Representation and the saying and the said
If all representations and knowledge of the other is an act of violence and a negation of his
uniqueness, what are we to do? First, may we still speak, write, represent and know?
Second, can we even write about alterity, uniqueness, the face, and otherness, and claim the
status for these traits that Levinas does? These words are after all part of universal language
and suggest categories of their own. These are two of the problems that lie behind
Levinas's distinction between the 'saying' and the 'said.' The said is ontological language,
stating what is other in the terms of the same. In the activity of the said the other is
presented and made 'visible.' The saying is the pre-linguistic ethical relation with the other
as face. In this section the 'relationship' between the politically necessary representational
language of the said and the ethical saying that disrupts the said is considered.
Regarding the first problem above: in the presence of the third, it is necessary to know,
compare and judge. To be able to perform these tasks one needs systemised thought, a
hierarchy of terms, an explication of the values underlying such thought, and a pondering of
consequences (the 'said'). The inexpressible saying needs the said to concretely respond to
the other. However, the violence done to the other when thought attempts to hold him in a
concept has already been remarked upon; such an attempt constitutes a betrayal of the
other's uniqueness. It is the task of philosophy to reduce this betrayal on behalf of the 'pre-
original' saying and to instil ambiguity and hesitation against the closure of the said. It is
the case that the saying is "both an affirmation and a retraction of the said" (OB 44).
Regarding the second problem above, in his influential early article on Levinas's work
(before the publication of Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence), Derrida (1978) voiced
the objection that Levinas writes about what cannot be universalised, thematised, and
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captured by using universal, thematising, containing language; the 'Greek' language of
philosophy.' Particularly in Totality and Infinity does Levinas use the language of the
philosophical tradition to (try to) kill off the language of the philosophical tradition, which
Derrida (1978:89) considers a "hallucinatory murder." This problem is compounded by the
positivity of Levinas's language in Totality and Infinity, where Levinas "does not give
himself the right to speak ... in a language resigned to its own failure" (p. 116). In
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, one subsequently witnesses a much greater
linguistic self-consciousness (see Davis, 1996:69-85), as well as the introduction of the
distinction between the saying and the said," in which the inadequacy of the said as'
expressive of the unsayable saying is insinuated.
Saying is the passive inexpressibility of proximity, responsibility, persecution, obsession,
exposure, the approach of the other, the face, etc. It is the fact of our ethical relationship
with the other, the fact of sociality. Saying is an expression that precedes and underlies the
thematisation of the said, but is not "babbling" (BPW 121). The saying is signification, but
which "cannot be assembled" (OB 27). It is 'an-archical.' The saying bears the trace of the
other in the said, but has already retreated from the said (BPW 72). The ethical relationship
cannot be captured in language for this would already mean a departure from passivity. The
self cannot protest his non-responsibility, "because the disqualification of the apology is the
very characteristic of persecution, so that persecution is the precise moment where the
subject is reached or touched without the mediation of logos" (BPW 93). In Blanchot's
words, proximity is "innocent guilt." But how to write about this ethical relation, a relation
that cannot be captured in language, for when such an attempt is made the passivity of the
ethical saying, the uniqueness of the ethical relation with the other, is betrayed? It is in this
regard that Levinas suggests the saying as a trace in the said, insinuating its disruptive
ephemerality by describing the saying as "a movement that already carries away the
3 Derrida's criticism is widely regarded as the as the influence behind the stylistic and methodological
differences between Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, as well as the greater
linguistic self-consciousness detectable in the latter work. See, for example, Bergo (1999:132-147);
Bernasconi and Critchley (1991:xiii); Davis (1996); and Peperzak (1993).
4 Levinas had already briefly used these two terms in Totality and Infinity (p. 260), but confined their use to
the erotic.
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signification it brought" (BPW 70); a "disturbance [that] disturbs order without troubling it
seriously" (BPW 70); and so on.5
The said is a betrayal of the saying (OB 6). It betrays the saying by holding the other in a
theme, a concept, a category. However, this is a very necessary betrayal - the said is needed
to reach the other in concrete situations, to not go to the other with 'empty hands.' It is the
language of science and philosophy, of law and institutions, of knowledge and
representation. It is the task of philosophy to employ language to express the inexpressible,
even if it amounts to an act of 'betrayal' (OB 7; CPP 148). However, describing the said as
a betrayal of the ethical saying, "amounts to denouncing neither rationality nor the structure
of intentional thought, nor the synchronisation of the diverse that it implies, nor the
thematisation of being by synthetic thought, nor the problematic of ontology" (EN 165). As
mentioned, the presence of a third who is another other next to the other requires the
universality and objectification of institutions, justice, laws and political decisions. In
society, there arises the need for a "theoretical attitude" to social and scientific problems
(EN 103). In society, scarce resources have to be allocated, and therefore it is necessary to
compare and judge as objectively as possible. What occurs in comparison is an
objectification of unique persons, a comparison of the incomparable (EN 165).
Saying, the ethical relationship with the other that underpins universal thought and
institutions, acts as corrective to the betrayal of the said, it tries to "unsay" the said (BPW
107), to remind us of the unique behind the objectified, the ethical relation parallel to the
political relation. One can detect a hint of the saying in the said in a moment of hesitation
between the said as an imposition of order, and the said as "a proposition made to a
neighbour" (OB 47, emphasis added). Levinas sees it as the task of philosophy to reduce
the betrayal of the saying committed in the said (BPW 107). There is potential for reducing
the betrayal of the saying in the said, since the absorption of the saying in the said does not
5 Other examples of attempts at expressing the inexpressible include describing the saying as an entering "in
so subtle a way that unless we retain it, it has already withdrawn" (BPW 70); "withdraw[ing] before entering"
(BPW 70); "one diplomat mak[ing] an exorbitant proposition to another diplomat, but this proposition is put
in such terms that, if one likes, nothing has been said. The audacity withdraws and is extinguished in the very
words that bear and inflame it" (BPW 70); "advanc[ing] while retreating" (BPW 70); "stripping beyond all
nudity" (BPW 121); and "a passivity more passive than all passivity" (BPW 121).
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exhaust the saying in manifestation - but opens into even greater complexity. The betrayal
of the ethical saying in the thematisation of the said can be reduced through the
development of forms of the said that are more approximate to the ethical relation and the
alterity of the other.
Thus far, it may have appeared as though there is a chronological order to the saying and
the said. This is not so. When Levinas speaks of the saying as 'pre-original,' it is meant to
draw attention to the 'anarchical' ethical relation that underpins the 'arche' of the said.
However, we cannot return to the origin of the ethical relation (much like one cannot return
to a state of nature from which society 'developed'). The saying, responsibility for the
other, does not belong to "the order of presence" (OB 10); it can only remain implicit in our
social interaction. The saying is the fact of "astonishing human fraternity in which
fraternity, conceived in Cain's sober coldness, would not by itself explain the responsibility
between separated beings it calls for" (OB 10).
However, I am always already in the presence of the third, that is, in a situation where the
saying has been betrayed in the said. In the presence of more than one other, justice,
institutions and the making of objective decisions are necessary and unavoidable. However,
as mentioned in the previous chapter, there is the danger that, in the striving to establish
objective institutions and theories, the objective order becomes fossilised in a forgetting of
the interhuman. However, the saying still requires the objectification and thematisation of
the said. What are we to do? The dilemma we have to confront consists in
inquiring how to reconcile ... the ethical requirement of the face that meets me, dissimulated by
its appearance, and the other as an individual and as an object. How to enter into this
comparison of incomparables without alienating the faces? For beings are not compared as
faces, but already as citizens, as individuals, as a multiplicity of in a genus and not as
'uniquenesses' (EN 205).
Further questions arise: How is a greater confrontation of the self by the other as face to be
brought about? How is the other to break through the plasticity of forms that arrests his
alterity? In short, how is a more ethical politics possible, and more germane to this chapter,
how is a more ethical and a more ethically suggestive representation of the other to be
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achieved, ethical here retaining all the Levinasian connotations of proximity, responsibility,
substitution, etc?
In response to these questions, and in conclusion, it is necessary to make two distinctions.
First, it is necessary to distinguish between a political order amenable to interruption by the
saying and an order less so. In the next section, liberal democracy is claimed to be the
political form most welcoming of ethical interruption. Secondly, one should distinguish
between a said more informed by the ethical and a said less so, measured by the extent to
which the rights of the other have been realised and the complexity with which other people
are socially and institutionally regarded. In chapter 5, an emphasis on human complexity is
proposed as a strategy whereby greater recognition and consideration of the other as other
can be brought about.
4.3. Justice, order, and the institutional
4.3.1. Two types of social order
In this section (4.3) I attempt to isolate and discuss the suppression of the ethical in justice
in its socio-political dimension. In terms of the research problem, the suppression of the
ethical relation with the other has translated into a disregard for the extremely poor global
other. Part of the reason for this disregard can be located in the predominant view of justice
as being concerned with order, rather than, for instance, our responsibility for others.
However, the aspiration to social order and a justice that maintains it tend to stifle our
relation with the other as other, an ethical relation. The other is the point at which the whole
system of justice is put in question for its neglect, oppression and violation of the unique
other. Face-to-face with the other, we are all shown to be unjust, to have failed him. The
concern for and the privileging of political order have subdued the ethical accusation that
issues from the face of the other, superficially 'sparing' us from guilt. Below, after having
extracted the ethical component in the impersonal political order (4.3.1), this section
proceeds to recognise that despite the violence of justice and institutions, there remains a
need for these, even though there is a propensity in the political order to suppress and forget
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the ethical relation (4.3.2.). It is therefore necessary to continuously pierce the political
order with reminders of our infinite responsibility for the other. In this regard, liberal
democracy is discussed as the political form most amenable to ethical interruption (4.3.3.).
But, it is the immanence of the ethical in social order that is considered next.
Levinas opens up the issue of the presence of the ethical relation in the social order,
('peace,' in his terms) through the following musing:
It is extremely important to know if society in the current sense of the term is the result of a
limitation of the principle that men are predators of one another, or if to the contrary it results
from the limitation of the principle that men are for one another. Does the social, with its
institutions, universal forms and laws, result from limiting the consequences of the war between
men, or from limiting the infinity which opens in the ethical relationship of man to man (EI
80)?6
The type of 'peace' (order) most common to political philosophy is of a kind that hardly
recognises the ethical relation with the other, a (an originally) Hobbesian peace as it were.
As the Hobbesian struggle between "allergic egoisms" becomes suspended, a "rational
peace" develops, subjecting everyone to reciprocal restrictions making life alongside one
other possible. One is reminded in particular of the contractarian tradition in which self-
interested individuals reach an agreement on the "rational truth" that is to govern egos that
have not renounced their freedom (EN 190). Such 'peace' is "calculation, mediation, and
politics" (BPW 111). Institutions regulate the socially agreed upon limitation of our
reciprocal responsibility and freedom so as to guarantee "everyone the tranquillity of their
happiness and the freedom to possess the world" (BPW 164). Such a withdrawn and
disinterested political arrangement is "the bourgeois peace of the man who is at home with
himself behind closed doors, rejecting the outside that negates him" (BPW 165).
Importantly, in political peace, the egoism of interested being is not denounced; order is
merely a truce (BPW 111). To be for oneself remains unquestioned and legitimate as long
as it falls within the bounds of impersonal justice and morality.
In 'contrast' to a political peace in which there is an equal limitation of individual freedom,
responsibility and claims upon one another, Levinas also describes an ethical 'peace.' As
6 For different formulations of this question, see BPW 169, OB 159-161, LR 247-8, of which a striking one
asks "whether the political order defines man's responsibility or merely restricts his bestiality" (LR 248)?
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opposed to the confrontation with the other in which the ego tries to bend the other to his
will, subjugate the other's freedom to his own purposes, and, failing that, establish a
political peace that does not renounce egoistic freedom, in ethical peace the other confronts
us as 'face.' In Levinas 's terms, the face of the other denotes the irreducible alterity of the
other, his weakness and vulnerability before me, as well as the ethical command that issues
from his presence. The other is a being that cannot be reduced to my wishes, to my
objectification of him - he always escapes the categories imposed on him. Despite "my
domination and his slavery, I do not possess him" (BPW 9). In his weakness, I can kill the
other. But "this power is quite the contrary of power" (BPW 9). At the very moment I kill
the other, he, as an alterior being, has escaped me.
Sure, in killing I can attain a goal; I can kill as I hunt or slaughter animals, or as I fell trees. But
when I have grasped the other in the opening of being in general, as an element of the world
where I stand, where I have seen him on the horizon, I have not looked at him in the face, I
have not encountered his face ... To be in relation with the other face to face is to be unable to
kill (BPW 9).
The face is "what resists me by its opposition and not what is opposed to me by its
resistance" (CPP 19), an opposition that is "straightaway ethical" (EI 85). The other as face
puts into question my egoistic freedom that had up till now tried to dominate him. But
instead of annihilating the subject through a realisation of, and shame for his domination of
and violence against the other, the self is reaffirmed as unique in his responsibility for the
other. The other's presence as face induces my freedom to responsibility and "founds" it
(TI 203). Unlike the indifference that develops in political peace where equals live
alongside one another, ethical peace goes from me to the unique other, "in desire and
goodness, where the I both maintains itself and exists without egoism" (TI 306, EN 194).
Ethical peace is more than the mere integration of what is different into a system, a totality,
but is rather the "incessant watch" over the alterity of the other, even within the
objectifying ambit of political institutions (BPW 166).
So what is the answer to Levinas's 'extremely important' question above? Are we predators
of each other or are we for each other? I shall insist that the point of Levinas's question is
rather to demonstrate that peace/order stems from both relations (predatory and ethical).
Evidence for this interpretation can be found in Levinas's assertion that the limitation of
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violence has always required "both the hierarchy taught by Athens and the abstract and
slightly anarchical ethical individualism taught by Jerusalem" (BPW 24, emphasis
removed). Clearly, in general understanding and approach the former view of peace
predominates - selfish peace so as to have autonomous freedom. In chapter 2, examples of
such peace in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate were discussed, where the freedom
of the individual is reasonably and equally curtailed, so as to preserve some freedom for the
self outside responsibility for the other. Cosmopolitans were indicated to preserve the
independence of the self by, for example, laying the burden of responsibility with
institutions; emphasizing human equality; leaving the individual with avenues for escape
from responsibility for the other by demanding only that the subject makes a 'reasonable'
effort to realise a greater justice; and so on. Raphael (1990: 113) perhaps sums up the
predominance of a political peace by 'contrasting' justice with generosity and charity,
which he regards as "going beyond" justice. By having created a zone for the self where he
can consider himself justified in his disregard of the other, the possibility of the self having
his 'right to be' put in question by the other becomes less likely. The dissipation of the
individualising ethical accusation against the self shows the prevailing of a political relating
to the other, suggesting that the cosmopolitans are themselves blocking the morally
progressive goals they aspire to through their preservation and installation of the
autonomous self.
However, and this is central to a Levinasian approach, the ethical relation with the other
cannot be entirely suppressed, even when a political balance of forces obscures the ethical
peace of the subject's being-for-the-other (LR 247). As an example of the irrepressibility of
the ethical relation, Levinas cites the guilty conscience of Europe at the zenith of its
modernity; a history that promised "peace, freedom and well-being" based on the "light
projected by a universal knowledge on the world and human society." However,
this history does not recognise itself in its nrillennia of fratricidal, political, and bloody
struggles, of imperialism, of human hatred and exploitation, up to our century of world wars,
genocides, the Holocaust, and terrorism; of unemployment, the continuing poverty of the Third
World; of the pitiless doctrines and cruelties of fascism and National Socialism, up to the
supreme paradox where the defense of the human and its rights is inverted into Stalinism (BPW
163, see also EN 191).
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These abominations constitute a "break in the universality of theoretical reason" (BPW
163). This 'break' also constitutes an "ethical moment" because there remains an anxiety
about the life of the other, even though the universal law or any other law does not hold us
specifically responsible. This concern for the other is an ethical moment because of its
recognition that our injustice is "independent ... of any belonging to a system, irreducible
to a totality and refractory to synthesis" (BPW 165).
Levinas goes even further in locating the ethical relation with the other person. He finds the
ethical relation with the other even in war: "war presupposes peace, the antecedent and
non-allergic presence of the other" (TI 199). Recognition of the face is presupposed in the
war of conflicting egos (TI 222, also LR 247). War "is neither the hunt nor struggle with an
element. The possibility, retained by the adversary, of thwarting the best-laid calculations
expresses the separation, the breach of totality, across which the adversaries approach one
another. The warrior runs a risk; no logistics guarantees victory" (TI 222-223). War is
waged against the other. War would not result if humans were merely elements of a totality,
a system in which they mutually and finally define each other, but exist in isolation from
each other. Instead beings overflow and resist the concepts and forces that seek to arrange
them into a system. In both war and peace there is an assumption of "beings structured
otherwise than as parts of a totality" (TI 222).7 The strategic peace that stems from a
reasoned containment of violence, presupposes disinterestedness, passivity and patience
(OB 16). However, the potential for generosity suggested by "the transcendence of the
antagonist" (TI 222) is soon subsumed and forgotten in the objectivity of institutions, the
legitimate claiming of rights for oneself, and the living alongside one another of equal
beings.
Despite the détente of a political peace in which the other is kept at bay and the self deems
himself permitted to live indifferent to the need of the other, there remains an irreducible
7 For Levinas, violence against the other is already an indication of the alterity of the other, of his resistance to
totalisation (TI 223). At the moment the other is killed, he has escaped my power. "To kill is not to dominate,
but to annihilate" (TI 198). It is the face of the other that resists the murderous instinct. "The infinite paralyses
power by its infinite resistance to murder, which, firm and insurmountable, gleams in the face of the other, in
the total nudity of his defenceless eyes, in the nudity of the absolute openness of the Transcendent. There is
here a relation not with a very great resistance, but something absolutely other: the resistance of what has no
resistance - the ethical resistance" (TI 199, emphasis in original).
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interpersonal relation with the other, and therefore with all other people. The face of the
other is a point in the universe where the tranquillity, impersonality and indifference of the
political order and all attempts to establish and maintain this order, are put in question. But,
since there is always a third person next to the other who also regards me as other, there is a
need for the impersonality of politics, institutions and justice.
4.3.2. Justice, order and institutions
Despite the 'violence' institutions perpetrate against the other, Levinas should not be taken
as dismissing the need for institutions, justice and theoretical knowledge, quite the
contrary' Whilst remembering the selfs 'pre-original' ethical responsibility, the need for
justice lies in the presence of the third next to the other. The third represents the whole of
humanity with which the self stands in a relation of infinite responsibility (TI 213). "The I
is in relationship with human totality" (EN 22-23). "If I am alone with the other, lowe him
everything; but there is someone else" (EI 90). There is always someone else. The third is
"wounded" by my "amorous dialogue" with the other in the secrecy of our interpersonal
relation, which the third regards as "wrong" in its exclusion of him. The intimacy of such a
"society of love" is "a pious intention oblivious to real evil" (EN 20-21). So, the presence
of the third signifies the limitation of responsibility for the specific other so as to respond to
multiple others that also command my ethical response (EN 105). In order to be just, one is
to limit one's responsibility to the specific other and disperse it to all others.
How am I to limit my responsibility for the other? Who should I respond to? Whose side
should I be on? How do I know who is right and who is wrong? What has happened
between two others? What have they done to each other (EN 166)? How are we to
implement decisions? And so on. In a plurality, it becomes necessary to know, compare and
g For Levinas, the ethical relation is more fundamental than justice and institutions, and the systemisation and
objectification these entail, a priority he asserts in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, "The conjuncture
in which a man is responsible for other men, the ethical relationship, which is habitually considered as
belonging to a derivative or founded order, has been throughout this work approached as irreducible. It is
structured as the one-for-the-other. It signifies outside of all finality and every system, where finality is but
one of the principles of systematisation possible. This responsibility appears as a plot without a beginning,
anarchie" (OB 135).
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judge. And there is a need for institutions, which have limited capabilities, to concretely
disperse our responsibility for the multitude, in mindfulness of the 'pre-original' ethical
relationship. Justice is needed to decide who is guilty and who is innocent. It is necessary to
'know.' After all, as Levinas infamously remarked, "There are people who are wrong" (LR
294).9 The imperative to 'know' includes the need for theoretical reflection (EN 104). But,
despite insisting that "[i]n order to be just it is necessary to know" (EN 204), Levinas does
not provide us with principles according which to judge. It is in this absence that the
significance of the theorisation of the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate lies, a debate in
which writers try to establish the appropriate relation between the other and the third (and
also the self) and thereby provide us with principles according which to judge and make
decisions.
It is important to note that in the presence of the third the self is granted equality with the
other and the third. My equality stems from the fact that in the presence of the third "I am
approached as an other by the others" (OB 158), but also because the presence of numerous
others to whom the self is responsible requires an equal limitation and division of the
subject's responsibility among multiple others. Institutions are required to regulate the
distribution of responsibilities, to determine the substance of equality. In the equality of
citizens in a polis, there is "justice even for me" (EI 99). In the political order, the subject
may ask the other for an accounting and insist upon respect for his rights and interests
against those of the other. A strong conception of rights (e.g. that ofNozick, 1974) reminds
one of the vehemence with which it is possible to resist the other's claim in the ambiguous
social relationship and thereby to try to justify the one's usurpation of the other's place.
While it is true that, in the presence of the third, the Levinisian self is salvaged and he
'borrows' time to be for himself, the burden of responsibility for the other inescapably
weighs on one. In society the self is pulled in two directions. On the one hand, there is the
reminder that the idea of equality "cannot be detached from the welcoming of the face, of
which it is a moment" (TI 214), which is why Levinas sees the origin of "morality" as not
9 Levinas made this remarked during a radio interview on the topic of the massacring of Palestinian refugees
by Christian soldiers with the complicity of the Israel Defence Forces at the Chatilla and Sabra refugee camps
in Lebanon in 1982. See also section 1.4 above.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
94
lying in equality, but in substitution for the other, "in the fact that infinite exigencies, that
of serving the poor, the stranger, the widow, and the orphan, converge at one point of the
universe" (TI 245). However, and on the other hand, in the presence of the third, there "is
an incessant correction of the asymmetry of proximity in which the face is looked at" (OB
158). So, the self is simultaneously in a double relation with every other, in both a political
and an ethical relation, the 'ambiguity of society.' In society it is necessary to make a
choice - do I treat jhe other politically, that is, insisting on my rights against his, referring
him to institutions for his needs, accept responsibility only so far as the law determines,
etc.; or, do I relate to the other ethically, that is, accepting my infinite responsibility
towards him, accepting that there is "a surplus of my duties over my rights" (EN 60),
recognising that I can see sufferings of the other that institutions cannot (BPW 23). So,
when Levinas writes that 'justice remains justice only, in a society where there is no
distinction between those close and those far-off, but in which there also remains the
impossibility of passing by the closest" (OB 159), he is drawing attention to the double
relation in which we stand with other people; we relate to the other at an impersonal,
political level, as well as at a concrete, interpersonal ethical level. In the quoted remark
above, Levinas is further expressing a concern that in the formalism and formulaic nature
of objective justice there is the tendency to overlook the 'human.' According to an equal
division of our responsibility for one another in the presence of the third, I do not owe
someone more than what is required by law, convention or morality when I merely regard
him as one of a multitude. However, when I regard him as an other, lowe that person my
infinite responsibility.
To clarify somewhat, consider Rorty and Levinas on the matter of not responding to the
other in the presence of the third. To create some space for the self away from
responsibility for others, Rorty draws a sharp distinction between the public and the private
spheres. Rorty reaches a moment of in/decision - for him there is no indication when
private (for oneself) or public (for the other) concerns should prevail. Similarly, for
Levinas, there is some justification for (temporarily) not acting for the other - this is one of
the meanings of equality. Is the self to relate to the other politically or ethically? Not acting
for the other can be further legitimised through appeals to spurious, though legitimate
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principles (see MacIntyre, 1981:6-21). Furthermore, in both Rorty and Levinas, there is not
only an unease about having abandoned the other; there is also a bad conscience about the
effects of the autonomous selfs exercise of freedom, about "the tendencies to cruelty
inherent in searches for autonomy" (CIS 144). However, the difference between these two
writers is that Levinas is less willing to accept the equal legitimacy of choosing either way,
despite recognising a certain legitimacy of private concerns in the political order of the
said. The infinity of the selfs responsibility for the other, the permanence of his sentience
for the suffering of the other, always leaves the subject ill at ease about not tending to the
other. The relative ease with which Rorty turns away from the other towards private
concerns, despite his credentials as a thinker deeply concerned about the suffering of
others, already points to the precarity of the ethical.
In the presence of the third, it is necessary that our responsibility for the other be realised
through institutions. Indeed, part of the raison d'être of institutions is to concretely attend
to the needs of others that are beyond the reach of the self. Part of the ongoing history of
progressive politics, that is, politics more imbued with an ethical concern for the other, has
been a striving to eliminate arbitrary discrimination by the institutions of the state, that is,
to treat like cases alike. However, another aspect of institutional progress has been for
institutions to become more sensitive to difference, to make finer distinctions in the way
people are treated, reflecting a realisation that justice sometimes requires people to be
treated differently. Be that as it may, institutions, as the implementers of justice, objectify
the unique persons over whom they stand, regardless of institutional complexity and
sensitivity.
Problematically, it is characteristic of institutions to aspire to universality and objectivity
and thereby 'violate' the other through their objectifying treatment of him and to fail in
meeting the other's infinite need. Furthermore, through the objectifying gaze of institutions
and the application of impersonal law, there occurs a general suppression of the humanity,
the uniqueness, of the self and the other. Despite Levinas's view that the interpersonal
ethical relation enables the impersonality of justice, and that there is a need for the ethical
relation to move to the impersonal order of justice, the interpersonal tends to become
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anaesthetised in the order of justice. In the political order, the self and the other are equal to
all others. Under the gaze of institutions, the self and other are regarded as equivalent to the
concept, which in tum receives its meaning from its place in the system of justice. Such a
loss of singularity runs counter to the ethical individuation required for carrying out one's
responsibility for the other. Recognition and assumption of responsibility for the other
requires the self to view himself as individual, unique, 'elected,' outside of what he has in
common with other people. Similarly, the uniqueness of the other is absorbed in the
impersonal political order. So, despite the good intentions that may go into seeking and
establishing justice, "politics left to itself bears a tyranny within itself; it deforms the I and
the other who have given rise to it, for it judges them according to universal rules, and thus
as in absentia" (TI 300). In fact, the interpersonal relation is, by definition, that which
cannot be perfected through the state. For Levinas, "the negative element, the element of
violence in the state, in the hierarchy, appears when the hierarchy functions perfectly, when
everyone submits to universal ideas. There are cruelties because they proceed from the
necessity of the reasonable Order. There are, if you like, the tears that a civil servant cannot
see: the tears of the other" (BPW 23).
To try to remedy the inevitable political disregard of the otherness of the other, "it is
necessary to defend subjectivity ... because the I alone can perceive the 'secret tears' of the
other" (BPW 23). Individualism is important not for its own sake, but for the sake of the
other. It will be claimed below that liberal democracy is the political form best suited to
such individuation, and is most permissive and enabling of processes that (aspire to) expose
us to what suggests the otherness of the other.
4.3.3. The ethical potential of the liberal state
The unpreventable violence of justice and the state against the other has been noted. Faced
with the 'determinism of politics,' the ethical is always under threat. "The interhuman'"
10 "The interhuman, properly speaking, lies in a non-indifference of one to another, in a responsibility of one
for another, but before the reciprocity of this responsibility, which will be inscribed in impersonal laws,
comes to be superimposed on the pure altruism of this responsibility inscribed in the ethical position of the I
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perspective can persist, but can also be lost, in the political order of the City where the Law
establishes mutual obligations between citizens" (EN 100). Even in a perfectly just system
is there a violation of the other. In his responsibility for the other it is the task of the self to
draw attention to and try to correct the inevitable institutional violence against the other.
For the autonomous subject, protected in his autonomy by the state, to awaken to his
injustice "a new situation is required: someone must ask [the subject] for an accounting"
(EN 30), which is to say that the subject should be confronted by the other as face. Moral
progress, that is, greater and more intense concern about a greater diversity and a greater
number of people, requires a return to the "foundational inter-humanity" (EN 165).
In a politics more aware of the ethical, there would be an intense and constant 'vibration'
between the ethical and the political, between being for the other and being for oneself,
between guilt before the other and insisting upon one's rights against the other, an
ambivalence, an acknowledgement of ambiguity and complexity, hesitation before every
decision. I I Increased ethical awareness would require, firstly, the noticing of the other
outside of the categories in which he is usually understood and contained, a situation more
suggestive of the other's uniqueness, his face; and secondly, the self would also be prone to
consider himself guilty for having usurped the place of the other, being more willing to
question his own right to be. Both of these elements suggest a greater recognition of the
ethical relation with the other, and which will hopefully lead to tangible advances. These
two aspects of a more ethically aware politics mutually influence each other, but there are
many factors that run counter to their coming about.
Though one cannot be certain that a greater recognition of the ethical relation with the other
will concretise in a more ethical political order, what Levinas does seem quite certain of is
that the liberal state is the political form best suited to a pursuit of moral progress. In the
qua 1. It is prior to any contract that would specify precisely the moment of reciprocity - a point at which
altruism and disinterestedness may, to be sure, continue, but at which they may also diminish or die out" (EN
100).
II For a corresponding, Levinas-inspired view, see Critchley (2004: 182-183), who argues for "an anarchic
disturbance of politics. This is the anarchy of the relation of proximity and substitution with the other."
Critchley concludes that "[i]f we are not to resign ourselves to the finally defeatist position ... that politics is
rare, .. .if we are going to face and face down the political horror of the present, and Levinas's work has
always been dominated by that horror, then I think politics has to be empowered by a metapolitical moment of
disturbance, an anarchic ethical injunction and the experience of an infinite ethical demand."
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ensumg discussion, Rorty's view of the liberal state is used to echo, supplement and
provide a contrast with Levinas's view thereof. One is struck by their similar view of the
liberal state as a political form in continuous search for a better justice, as well as it being
the form of state most accommodating to such a pursuit. Consider their exact words: For
Levinas, in the liberal state 'justice is always a revision of justice and the expectation of a
better justice" (EN 196), "always concerned about its delay in meeting the requirement of
the face of the other" (EN 203). Rorty, though still reflecting a view of moral concern as
based on solidarity, sees a virtue of liberal society as trying to shake off the "curse" of its
inevitable "ethnocentrism" (CIS 198); "ethnocentrism" referring to the privileging of
certain social categories, practices, relationships and discourses that might have the effect
of suppressing the otherness of certain persons and obscuring their vulnerability, suffering
and oppression. Such blindness to the other is reduced in the liberal state where the
citizenry "prides itself on constantly adding on more windows, constantly enlarging its
sympathies" (ORT 204). It appears as though Rorty and Levinas's "sentient disposition
towards the other's suffering" (Critchley, 1996:33), inspires their offbeat characterisation
and endorsement of the liberal state.12
It is the freedoms people enjoy in liberal societies, relative to other political forms, as well
as the built-in responsiveness of democratic government, that make liberal democracies so
well suited to be deeply concerned with the other (as other). Irony, which Rorty only sees
as private, enables the public association with, and concern for (strange) other, oppressed
people. Although some citizens might deem concern for strange other people as unpatriotic
or offensive, in liberal societies tolerance of plurality and social association is a public
virtue and is judicially enforced. Furthermore, the material security of people in liberal
12 It is interesting to note that one finds find a similar assessment of democracy as the political form best
suited to permit otherness in the (Foucauldian) writings of William Connolly (1987; 1991). In a democracy
the imperatives of common goals and respect for individual freedom stand in an irresolvable tension, although
political institutions 'discipline' society in order to make the pursuit of common goals possible. Connolly
desires an emphasis on "the persistent ambiguity between the democratic appreciation of individuality and its
drive to extend popular control over common areas of life ... By enabling [democratic governance's] own
ambiguity to become more overt it encourages us to be wary of doctrines that glorify normalisation by
defining it as harmonisation; it encourages us to treat normalisation as an ambiguous good to be qualified,
countered, and politicised" (Connolly, 1987: 16). In this study, a strategy of emphasizing human complexity is
able and intended to disrupt stable perceptions of others and bring to light the oppression that accompanies
'normality. '
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societies makes group loyalty largely irrelevant to securing the means of survival (TP 180).
It is the breathing space proffered freedom in liberal societies that enables the exposure of
injustice, oppression and suffering. Apart from liberal societies being an environment
conducive to asking for a reckoning in the name of the other, other liberal features such as
freedom of expression, liberal education, government support for the arts, and so forth,
assist in and encourage the creation of more nuanced images of the other (and the self),
representations more approximate to the uniqueness of the other, as well as making the
subject aware of ways in which he has personally oppressed or disregarded the other.
Liberal societies, by definition, welcome the constant struggle on behalf of oppressed
otherness, making "life easier for poets and revolutionaries" (CIS 60).
Despite the aforementioned heady humanism of the liberal state, the need for the state to
objectify and categorise unique persons remains necessary and unavoidable, given the
exigencies of governing a complex society, but also given the importance of the principle
of equality. A large part of the historical struggle for equality has been for the equality of
all citizens before the law. Though there has been a progressive trend to make ever finer
and more sensitive distinctions in order to take account of social diversity, when it comes to
applying the law, liberal societies treat like case alike. This translates into, for example, a
similar categorisation of persons according to their crimes and a concomitant
marginalisation of their uniqueness, of sentimental stories that might evoke pity. In a
society based on "procedural justice" "guardians of universality" are not to pay too much
attention to what is other about the criminal. "For if we had watched the war criminal grow
up, had travelled the road he had travelled, we might have had difficulty reconciling the
demands of love and of justice. But it is well for society that in most cases our ignorance
permits us to avoid this dilemma. Most of the time, justice has to be enough" (ORT 205-
206). Here, Rorty is emphasizing the importance of equality and objectivity, though he
leaves a backdoor for taking into account the uniqueness of a person, the 'road he had
travelled'. Without leaving such a backdoor ("most of the time, justice has to be enough")
Rorty would have undermined and contradicted his view of liberal society as constantly
asking whether and how it has been cruel and oppressive, by, for example, listening to a
"long, sad, sentimental story" (TP 184).
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Though the other always takes precedence over the self in the one-to-one ethical relation, in
the political relation, that is, in the presence of more than one other, there is a need for
justice and judgement. In the terms of Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, where the
distinction between the saying and the said plays an important role, the ethical saying needs
the language, institutions, knowledge and written texts of the said to regulate responsibility
for the other, to decide who is guilty, to prescribe what to do. However, the liberal state is
always aware of its violation of the other and mindful of the ethical relation with the other,
"a state questioning itself' (EN 205), and as such "legislation [is] always unfinished,
always resumed, a legislation open to the better. It attests to an ethical excellence and its
origin in kindness from which, however, it is distanced ... by the necessary calculations
imposed by a multiple sociality, calculations constantly starting over again" (EN 229-230).
As with Rorty, Levinas recognises the (inevitable) suppression of otherness in justice, the
"bad conscience of justice" (EN 230) (forgetting 'the road the other has travelled,' in
Rorty's terms), whilst also strongly associating the imperative to somehow let sensitivity to
otherness seep into the system of justice with the liberal state. If one were to identify a
difference between Rorty and Levinas on the issue of justice in the liberal state, it would be
that there is a greater willingness on the side of Rorty to accept the static objectivity of
justice. For Levinas, 'justice always [has] to be perfected against its own harshness (EN
229, emphasis added). By contrast, consider Rorty's explanation that moral duties in a
liberal democracy are divided between "agents of love" and "agents of justice." Agents of
love draw attention to people who have not been considered as equals in the workings of
justice and proceed to show why these people should be included as equals. On the other
hand, agents of justice, or "guardians of universality, make sure that once these people are
admitted as citizens, once they have been shepherded into the light by the connoisseurs of
diversity, they are treated just all like the rest of us" (ORT 206, emphasis added).l3
13 What one finds here, albeit implicitly, is Rorty reverting to his view that solidarity is the basis for moral
concern, that once strange people have been shown to be like us, they may join us as equals. One of the
problems with solidarity, and by the same token, equality, is that it covers over the face of the other and the
election of the responsible self, as both the self and the other become interchangeable with other units in the
system.
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Despite the attention that has been paid to the affinities between the social thought of these
two writers throughout this article, and despite the concern of both for the suffering of other
people, we have been led to a point of divergence between Rorty and Levinas, which turns
on their disagreement over the legitimacy of a tum away from concern and responsibility
for the other. For Rorty, concern with the suffering and oppression of the other may end
when the other is granted rights equal to his or her former oppressors. Furthermore, for
Rorty, the self may consider himself justified in being concerned with his own private
quests for self-creation, even in the face of the suffering of others. In Levinas's view, the
equality of the other before the institutions of the state is not enough, for, in equality, there
is an unavoidable element of violence against the other, a violence that "appears even when
the hierarchy functions perfectly" (BPW 23). So, it remains incumbent upon the self to see
the "the tears [of the other] that a bureaucrat cannot see" (BPW 23). Further, the infinite
responsibilities of the Levinasian subject cannot accept the 'equal validity' of the liberal
split between the public and the private. So, when Rorty thinks that pretty much all we need
for moral progress to occur is for there to be more liberals, Levinas disagrees through a
rhetorical question asked seventy years ago, "We must ask ourselves if liberalism is all we
need to achieve an authentic dignity for the human subject" (RH 63)?
4.4. Conclusion
In this chapter an attempt was made to extend a critique that originated in section 2.3,
where a tendency of writers in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate to suppress
otherness when approaching the issue of justice was identified. The suppression of justice
has been argued to be problematic for leaving us in a good conscience despite the fact that
justice is always imperfect and that we have always failed in our responsibility towards the
other, especially insofar as he is the globally poor other. Having dissected the suppression
of otherness in justice into its philosophical and socio-political dimensions, (ethical)
otherness was claimed to lie immanent, suggesting the potential for a stronger ethical
response to the global other.
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Both sections 4.2 and 4.3 ended with an assertion of the importance for order to be
interrupted by reminders of an unfinished responsibility for the other. In chapter 5, it will
be suggested that an emphasis on human complexity can function as an insinuation of the
saying in the said and can steer us towards a better (global) justice.
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CHAPTER 5 - POLITICAL ACTION AND THE COMPLEXITY OF THE OTHER
5.1. Introduction
This study has been concerned with the question of why people do not consider themselves
guiltier with regard to their neglect of the global poor, particularly in light of the Levinasian
premise that the self stands in an ethical relation with every human being, who is an other
to him. In section 2.2 and in chapter 3 it was argued that the predominant and privileged
view of the self in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate is of the individual as
autonomously free, which indicates a 'political' relating to the other, rather than an 'ethical'
posture towards him. In section 2.3 and chapter 4 it was argued that, in the search for
universal theories and organising principles of justice, what is other has been suppressed,
thereby leaving the (autonomous) self undisturbed by what reminds him of his unfinished
responsibility for the global other and hence in good conscience despite the suffering of the
other.
In this chapter, the focus is on a third way in which the ethical relation with the extremely
poor global other has been suppressed. A third reason for our indifference to the extremely
poor global other can be located in the cosmopolitan strategy of emphasizing human
equality, the effect of which is to suppress that which awakens us to our responsibility for
the other, namely his uniqueness. In light of this criticism, a Levinasian 'strategy' is
suggested, whereby human complexity' is emphasized instead.' Such a 'strategy' has the
I I understand human 'complexity' as synonymous with human 'multifacetedness' and do not intend any
association with, for example, complexity theory or the study of systems.
2 With regard to the 'strategy' that is to be sketched, it should be noted that some of Rorty's ideas, although
not explicitly referred to, form a background against which the strategy can be understood. It is however
necessary to leave Rorty in the background, for his thought brings with it the problematic view of moral
concern as based on solidarity, a problem that is addressed in the rest of this footnote. It is useful to start with
Rorty's own opposition to emphasizing human equality so as to elicit moral concern. To say we should be
concerned with someone's plight because that person is a human being and therefore deserving of it is, for
Rorty the pragmatist philosopher, not a particularly convincing reason. Rather, moral concern is based on
solidarity, loyalty to a group, and therefore exclusive and contrastive, so that pointing out that someone
should be helped because he is a human being is "a weak, unconvincing explanation of a generous action." A
stronger motivation for helping someone would be because he is 'one of us,' where 'us' necessarily contrasts
with some 'they' (CIS 191).
Solidarity with certain groups, and therefore not with many other groups, is the consequence of having been
born into a certain society and context of moral and social relations. But Rorty recognises that the
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dual benefit of first, reminding us of the ways in which we have been naively unjust, by
pointing out aspects of human life that we have been paying insufficient attention to,
thereby directing us towards the type of things a more just order would try to correct; and
second, being more suggestive of the uniqueness of the other, which is what awakens us to
our responsibility for him.
5.2. The problem with emphasizing human equality
Cosmopolitan political theorists, almost by definition, are deeply concerned about the
suffering of the extremely poor global other, a situation they often seek to address in their
writings where they try to convince us, first, that the current global distributional order is
contingency of our solidarity with certain groups can lead to an equally contingent disregard of those who are
not part of our group. It is therefore necessary to continually extend our "our sense of 'we' to people we have
previously thought of as 'they" (CIS 192). Having extended our solidarity to different groups of people, we
are to persist in asking if "what we have recently gained in solidarity cost us our ability to listen to outsiders
who are suffering" (ORT 13)? It is further necessary to fight off the tendency to narrow one's circles of
concern and loyalty when times are tough, when one's 'survival' becomes dependent on which group one
belongs to (JLL 45, TP 180). Rorty inscribes liberal societies with such a perpetual questioning of its own
solidarities. Liberal societies, by definition, pride themselves on their tolerance for plurality and for their
continuous attempts at trying to shake off the "curse" of ethnocentrism, that is, the inevitable initial myopia of
having to "start from where we are," through a commitment to create an ever larger and more pluralistic
society (CIS 198).
As mentioned, moral concern for others is based on viewing strange people as similar to us. But, how do we
arrive at seeing others as similar to us, especially since Rorty denies the possibility of reaching into the ether
for an image of the essential man, for a universal similarity we should all aspire to (CIS 94; ORT 167-185)?
Rorty's answer is that solidarity/moral concern "is not discovered by reflection but created ... by the
imaginative ability to see strange people as fellow sufferers" (CIS xvi). Our inability to see people as such
translates into a continued disregard or oppression of them, since they are not really 'human' in our eyes. It is
through a piecemeal process of 'sentimental education' that our 'imaginative abilities' are expanded and
realigned. Sentimental education is the creation of moral concern and consideration through activities such as
description and redescription; the drawing of attention to previously unnoticed or cruelty, suffering and
oppression; the new articulation of familiar situations in ways that now elicit emotional reactions where old
articulations did not; familiarising people with different and strange other people; the telling of sentimental
stories; helping others find the words to articulate their lives in their own terms; etc.
However, and here lies my concern, one needs to think of the people we come to see as like ourselves and
subsequently included into our 'we.' Are our imaginations not usually opened to groups and persons we are
already somewhat aware of, more rounded characters that already have some power of self-expression, of
forcing us to listen, of creating toeholds from whence our public imaginations and policies can be expanded?
To generalise, Americans are most likely to see other Westerners as being like them, an (unfortunate)
affirmation of Huntington's (1998) assessment. But this leaves the problem of concern for those beyond our
national borders who are threatened by extreme poverty largely unaltered: relatively well-off Americans
continue to consider themselves closest to those who need their help the least. Weare left with a situation in
which the weakest and most marginal are also least able to gain our understanding, a 'foothold' in our
imaginations, a problem 'solidarity' seems unlikely to solve.
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unjust, and second, that we ought therefore to rectify this injustice. I agree. The problem
appears when considering the strategy cosmopolitans employ to (try to) convince us that we
ought to rectify global distributive injustice, for their strategy struggles to activate an
acknowledgement and acceptance of one's personal responsibility for the other.
In order to convince us of our responsibility for the global other, cosmopolitans stress our
fundamental human equality as a reason for having to treat the global other better.'
Cosmopolitans argue that if we theoretically consider all people as equal in some relatively
substantial sense, that is, substantial enough to give their interests due consideration in say,
a global original position, then the global distribution of wealth would be shown to be
unjust and we would therefore have to treat the global poor better/with more consideration.4
If one grants the premise that humans are substantially equal, then the conclusion that
humans ought to be treated so will fall into place. However, as we can see, a gap has
opened up between considering the poor as substantially equal in a theoretical exercise, and
treating the poor as substantially equal in reality, for the fact that thousands die daily from
preventable, poverty related causes indicate that we do not show them much consideration
in actuality.'
In order to narrow the gap between the theoretical regard of the poor as substantially equal
to us and our disregard of them in reality, cosmopolitans can be understood as setting the
issue within two frameworks of distributive justice, 'justice as mutual advantage' and
'justice as impartiality,' (presuming that people want to behave justly) (see section 2.4).
3 On the cosmopolitan consideration of each person as being of equal moral concern, see Beitz (1994:124-
125).
4 Pogge (1989:240-259) argues that whether we imagine persons in a global original position as
representatives of states, members of states, or first and foremost members of a global society, global
distributive justice would be a much more salient issue and "the social position of the globally least
advantaged [will become the] touchstone for assessing our basic institutions" (p. 242).
5 For Rorty, to say that members of a group are oppressed or neglected (i.e. not treated with equal
consideration) is to say that the rest of us do not view them as "full-fledged" (TP 219). Rorty claims that
pragmatists like him see "personhood as a matter of degree, not as an all-or-nothing affair" (TP 219), which
does not mean that the poor/women/blacks fit naturally into this category, but merely that the articulations of
who they are and what it is like to be them are still undesiredly dependent on and obstructed by the language
of the dominant binary (the rich/men/whites) in which the oppressed find themselves. For a group to be
considered full-fledged "in a given society is a matter of double negation: it is not to think of oneself as
belonging to a group that powerful people in that society thank God they do not belong to" (TP 224, emphasis
in original; see TP 202-227).
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'Justice as mutual advantage' means that those persons who participate in a scheme of
social cooperation should be rewarded according to their contribution. It is for this reason
that cosmopolitans stress the level of global economic integration so as to portray the world
as participating in such a joint venture for social gain. However, this approach to justice is
limited because the poorest of the poor are also the most 'superfluous' to the global
economy, since their participation in it is marginal at most and they are therefore least
likely to be permitted into a sharing of the spoils. 'Justice as mutual advantage' therefore
leaves those cosmopolitans are most concerned about, the extremely poor, out of the ambit
of justice. This limitation of 'justice as mutual advantage' leads cosmopolitans to resort to a
view of 'justice as impartiality,' whereby the views and interests of all those affected by
practices and institutions in the global political economy are given equal consideration,
rather than restricting justice to all those who have contributed to the global product. This
move by cosmopolitans makes the scope of justice universal, since global institutions in
some way or other affect everyone. However, reverting to justice as impartiality, as we can
see, leads us back to the original problem in the 'real world' where people do not treat one
other with equal consideration.
The option cosmopolitans take at this point is to emphasize that we are indeed all equal,
although this cannot be 'proved.' By rhetorically stressing the equality of the global poor to
us, cosmopolitans are hoping to convince us that the global poor should be treated with
greater regard, which would presumably translate into a greater alleviation of their plight.
Since the more considerate treatment of these non-fellow citizens, especially with regard to
global distributive justice, is highly unlikely to be institutionally enforced or the benefit of
their inclusion reciprocated, such increased consideration constitutes a gratuitous treatment
of the other, an 'ethical' response to him.
By terming the gratuitously more considerate treatment of the poor global other 'ethical,'
with all its Levinasian connotations, we begin to see deeper into the problematic character
of the cosmopolitan strategy of emphasizing human equality. The non-reciprocal ethical
treatment of the other implies the recognition of the other as 'face,' as absolutely different
from everyone else, a uniqueness that is ethical. The 'face' of the other exposes me to his
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vulnerability, my domination and neglect of him, thereby putting me to shame and
summoning me to an infinite and asymmetrical responsibility for him. However, the
constant emphasis on human equality goes in the opposite direction for it masks the
uniqueness of the other, obscuring that which reminds me of my infinite and asymmetrical
responsibility for him and thereby undermining that which cosmopolitans desire, namely
the gratuitous better treatment of outsiders. Even the guilt that stems from the ethical
accusation established through a theoretical consideration of the other as equal is
dissipated, as the other is constantly rendered 'faceless' by this cosmopolitan strategy."
The cosmopolitan emphasis on human equality as that which is supposed to steer us
towards a more humane world, is, in Levinas's view, the very opposite, "a levelling of the
idea of fraternity" (EE 95-96). "That all men are brothers is not explained by their
resemblance" (TI 213-4), but by the their irreducible difference, but which is not
indifference. 'Fraternity' is the simultaneity of being in an ethical and a political relation
with the other.Ï This duality informs my relation with every person, who is both a specific
other to whom lowe everything, and a general other who is my equal. An emphasis on
equality negates the interpersonal ethical relation and renders the subject indifferent to the
other.
In response to the research question of this study, I have argued above that a third reason
for why we are left indifferent to the suffering of the extremely poor global other is partly
due to a strategy cosmopolitans employ, the intention of which is to evoke greater concern
6 Rendering the self as equal to the other clashes with the asymmetry of the ethical relation by implying an
ultimate reciprocity between self and other. Equality establishes for the self a sphere in which he may be
complacently auto-nomous, undisturbed by the fact that his very act of existence is 'murderous and
usurpatory.' An emphasis on equality further dissipates the individuating ethical accusation against the self in
the ethical relationship with the other, the selfs 'election' as uniquely responsible. Since my awakening as
uniquely responsible for the other is 'preceded' and implied by proximity to the other as face (the other as
'activating' element in the interpersonal relation), in this chapter, I only pay attention to the negation of the
uniqueness of the other and not to the negation of the selfs individuating election as responsible.
7 Levinas explains, "Fraternity is radically opposed to the conception of a humanity united by resemblance ...
Human fraternity has then two aspects: it involves individualities whose logical status is not reducible to the
status of ultimate differences in a genus, for their singularity consists in each referring to itself ... On the other
hand, it involves the commonness of a father, as though the commonness of race would not bring together
enough ... Monotheism signifies this human kinship, this idea of a human race that refers back to the approach
of the other in the face, in a dimension of height, in responsibility for oneself and for the other" (TI 214); see
also Critchley (1992:227).
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for the poor global other, but which in fact contributes to our indifference. In light of my
criticism of the cosmopolitan strategy, whereby cosmopolitans emphasize human equality
in order to bring about moral progress in international relations, it is necessary to make a
few, somewhat more practical suggestions that bear the potential for eliciting more concern
for and consideration of the world's poorest people. This is what I seek to do in the next
section. Although the 'strategy' that is proposed is rather bare, it will at least attempt to
give somewhat more practical content to the Levinasian idea that the political is to be held
in check and informed by the interpersonal relation with the other. These more practical
suggestions are also intended to convey the view that there is an alternative/supplement to
what cosmopolitans propose and that I have therefore not criticised a strategy that is
necessarily the best we could do.
5.3. A 'Levinasian strategy': Emphasizing human complexity
In contrast to a cosmopolitan approach that emphasizes human equality, and insofar as our
aim is to elicit greater concern for the global poor, I propose that we pursue a 'strategy' that
emphasizes, describes and draws attention to human complexity. But before considering
this somewhat more practical suggestion in greater length and setting it in a Levinasian
context, there are three preliminary issues that I would like to address with regard to
political action for the sake of the other. These concern the (i) subject himself, (ii) political
action for the sake of the other, and (iii) what is understood by a 'better justice.' After
discussing these three matters, I return to a discussion of the politically strategic emphasis
on human equality.
(i) The possibility for ethical action in the realm of the political is located in the subject. As
Levinas reminds us, in order to defend the other, it is necessary to defend subjectivity
(BPW 23). In this study, the prevailing form of the political self, as reflected by the
writings in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, has been depicted as having by and
large disregarded his ethical responsibility for the other and has insisted upon his own
autonomy and interests at the expense of the other. In spite of such a negative assessment of
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the cosmopolitan and communitarian self, there remains the possibility for him to be good,
to act for the other. Indeed, without the temptation and possibility of selfishness, one would
not have been able to speak of goodness and generosity. The practical problem that is to be
confronted is how to increase the likelihood of ethical concern and goodness towards the
other.
The self is always in a relation with the other who is at the same time a unique person and a
member of a genus, equal and similar to everyone else; the situation of "fraternity" (TI
214). That I am always in a relation with the other as other, that is, that there is always an
ethical element to my relation with another person, means that I am always responsible for
other people, responsible "for those [I] do not even know" (BPW 81). To be a self means to
have been singled out as inescapably responsible, the point upon which "[a]U the suffering
and failure of the world weighs" (BPW 94). To be responsible means that I must assume
everyone's burden without anyone being able to relieve me of mine. This is not to cram the
subject into the 'category of the unique' (which would be a contradiction in terms). Rather,
the election of the self as responsible for the other "is to restore to the soul its egoity, which
supports no generalisation" (OB 127).
Already in Existence and Existents did Levinas inscribe the self with the ability to arise, the
capacity to act without the action having had any preceding cause. Although our world is
replete with complacency towards and neglect of the other, in the self resides the possibility
to act, to act for the sake of the other, regardless of the extent of the oppression that
confronts him, regardless of the height of the odds stacked against him. It is always
possible to be for-the-other; in this regard, the subject is free.8 Levinas celebrates this
capacity of the self to act, even when his influence is likely to be negligible, when, with
reference to the Nazi period, he wrote that "[t]o act for remote things at the moment in
which Hitlerism triumphed, in the deaf hours of this night without hours - independently of
8 During an interview, Levinas explained, "The truly difficult thing to understand is that one can hear and
understand this commandment [that issues from the face]. Being persisting in being, that is nature. And that
there can be a rupture with nature, yes; but one must not attribute to it the same force as nature has. There is a
moment where the idea of freedom prevails - it is the moment of generosity. Here there is a moment where
someone plays without winning. That is Charity. For me, this is very important. Something that one does
gratuitously, that is grace. You [the interviewer] are reasoning as if the act were not gratuitous. The idea of
the face is the idea of gratuitous love, the commandment of a gratuitous act" (IWHA 176).
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every evaluation of the 'forces in presence' - is, no doubt, the summit of nobility" (BPW
51).
(ii) In the few paragraphs above, a number of references were made to action. To act, even
when it is for the other, is fraught with difficulties. If the other and I were the only two
people in the world there would be no problem. In this 'society of two,' I can be forgiven
for the wrong I have done the other. Forgiveness assumes that there is a person who had
borne the full weight of the wrong and as such exclusively and completely possesses over
the right to pardon. The other can judge my intentions and deeds, since he is the only one
affected by them. However, since I am always in the presence of the third, my wrong to the
other might not appear to be so from the perspective of the third. My good deed towards the
other might offend the third. Since, in the presence of the third, I cannot foresee all the
consequences of my actions and I affect those I never intended to, "I act in a sense that
escapes me" (EN 20). It is not possible to be forgiven, since I do not know who to ask for
forgiveness, and the third cannot forgive in the name of the fourth. My very seeking for
forgiveness from the third might be an offence to the fourth. For the most part, in a
plurality, I am judged, not by my intentions, but by the consequences of my actions, which
are determined according to an impersonal standard. In the presence of the third, "[t]he
objective meaning of my action prevails over its intentional meaning;... I am at fault for
something not reflected in my intentions" (EN 20). I have to consider the third in my
actions: it is the start of a need for knowledge, impersonal morality, principles of justice
and law. I am to be judged according to objective/inter-subjective standards.
Furthermore, in the presence of the third these objective standards are also necessary in
another sense, for it is necessary to judge what has passed between the other and the third,
who is also an other. We wonder, "What are they doing, these unique ones, what have they
already done, to each other? For me, it would be to fail in my first-personal responsibility
... were I to ignore the wrongs of the one toward the other" (EN 195). This, for Levinas, is
the "moment of justice" (EN 195). If there were only the other and I, he would always be
first. In the presence of the third, however, I may also judge the third according to
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impersonal standards and ask him for 'an accounting' insofar as he has wronged me, but
more importantly, insofar as he has wronged the other.
Here lies the importance of, for example, the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, which
tries to stipulate principles and arrange them into a hierarchy so as to guide our decisions on
how we are to adjudicate the interaction between self, other and third at a global level. Yet
the very fact that (the issues in) this debate exists (and persists) shows that there are no
obvious principles and standards of judgement. Should we, for example, judge in terms of
utilitarian, libertarian, communitarian, or liberal principles? Should we decide on a liberal
approach to inform our judgement, then we are faced with the further problem that liberals
themselves do not agree about which liberal principles should take precedence. In fairness,
theorists in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate have highlighted most of the principal
issues that pertain to the problem of global responsibility and justice, even though they
have not come up with answers that are convincing to everyone, nor are they likely to ever
do so. The knowledge developed in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate represents
some of the best answers and guidelines we have as to how we should divide our
responsibility in the presence of a global third, yet there is always a sense in which we are
'acting in the dark. '
(iii) Writers in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate set their prescriptions, proposals,
and criticisms within a framework of justice, a totality. Levinas also often speaks of justice,
but always very abstractly. Justice, for Levinas, is what is required and begins in the
presence of the third. Is it possible to derive some narrower, less abstract sense of what
Levinas means by justice? What, more concretely, is a "better justice" (EN 196)?
The first thing to note is that justice is always imperfect and unfinished and it is therefore
necessary to aspire to a 'better justice.' In a plurality, institutions are needed to convey and
disperse my responsibility for distant others, to make social life possible, address social
problems, offer protection from those who intend harm, and enforce legal justice. However,
in their impersonality and objectivity institutions always fail, violate and overlook the other
to varying degrees since institutions cannot deal with the other as an individual with unique
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characteristics and needs, but can merely treat the other as a type (BPW 23; Burggraeve,
1981:49). It is because of their impersonality and objectivity that institutions fail to see the
"tears of the other" (BPW 23).
Levinas further writes that justice is "always has to be made more knowing in the name, the
memory, of the original kindness of man toward his other" (EN 229, emphasis added).
What does Levinas mean by 'made more knowing'? To make justice more knowing it is
necessary to remind it of all the ways in which its rationality and objectivity violate,
obstruct, fail, objectify, oppress and forget the other. It is in the name of our pre-original
responsibility for the other that justice has to be confronted with its failings. (Below, I shall
claim that this is one of the things the proposed 'strategy' aims to do.) Within the objective
order of justice and the impersonality of its institutions there remains a role for the subject,
for institutions cannot attend to the other's most idiosyncratic needs. Where institutions fail
or cannot reach, the self is in a much better position to not 'pass by the closest.'
A more concrete sense as to what would constitute a 'better justice' still eludes us. It seems
as though Levinas's endorsement of human rights might provide a clue. Levinas supports
the notion of human rights, which he sees as an acknowledgment of the, "in a sense, a
priori" and universal fact of each person's absolute dissimilarity (DF 117-119). He lists a
number of human rights to be endorsed, including the "fundamental rights" (what Rawls
would describe as 'basic liberties"), plus further rights such as the "right to social
advancement" and the "right to the refinement of the human condition" (DF 120).
However, Levinas remains coy about the more precise content of these rights. He also
recognises the need "to ascertain the urgency, order and hierarchy of these various rights"
(DF 120), a solution that is not attempted in Levinas's own writing. Again, one has to
return to the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate for fuller suggestions as to what the
content and priority of human rights should be. However, the jostling over which rights
should prevail and the conflict between selfish beings to have their rights recognised as
9 Some of the more important "basic liberties" include "political liberty (the right to vote and hold public
office) and freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the
person, which includes freedom from psychological oppression and physical assault and dismemberment
(integrity of the person); the right to hold personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as
defined by the concept rule of law" (Tl 53).
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fully as possible (a 'political peace') should always be informed by the original ethical
generosity, an asymmetrical concern for the rights of the other before a concern for mine,
"a surplus of my duties over my rights" as it were (EN 60, OB 159). The central argument
of this study has indeed been that this ethical asymmetry has been lost sight of in the
cosmopolitan-communitarian debate.
Still, the vagueness of Levinas's discussion of human rights has not brought us any closer
to what we are to understand by a 'better justice.' That institutions violate and suppress the
uniqueness of the other has been stated numerous times. Levinas's view that, although
"[t]here are no politics for accomplishing the moral, ... there are certainly some politics
which are further from it or closer to it" (IWHA 177),10 can be rephrased as saying that
different institutional arrangements can be more or less violent to the other. Put differently
again, a better justice refers to an institutional arrangement in which the other is considered,
protected and maintained in a greater complexity and sensitivity. For our purposes, this
need not only refer to institutions, but can refer to society as a whole, for some societies are
also more moral than others. Admittedly, this still leaves open the question as to which
rights of the other should be considered, protected and maintained as most important. But
to say that a society regards and treats the other in a greater complexity, suggests a more
humane, tolerant, considerate and caring order, one in which human rights, and indeed
human fullness, are more fully respected, protected, realised and promoted.
In light of the above preliminaries, every self has a responsibility to bring about a society
that maintains and treats the other as complexly and as sensitively as possible. Since much
injustice and cruelty is committed unwittingly and unintentionally, a political strategy that
emphasizes and describes human complexity will help us to become aware of the
(unnoticed) ways in which we have neglected and oppressed the other, and of all the ways
in which he should be protected and cared for. I I However, an element is missing, that of
10 Levinas goes on to say, "I believe that it is absolutely obvious that the liberal state is more moral than the
fascist state, and closer to the morally ideal state" (IWHA 178).
II Rorty has written, "We have to stop talking about the need to form distorted to undistorted perceptions of
moral reality, and instead talk about the need to modify our practices so as to take account of new descriptions
of what has been going on" (TP 206). While 1 still see the aspiration to an undistorted perception of moral
reality as a useful exercise, and, for pragmatic reasons, do not see matters in such oppositional terms as Rorty,
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'activating' our concern for the other. For Levinas, it is imperative that the political be
forever interrupted by the ethical; the question is how? Awakening us to our responsibility
for the other is the second function of the proposed strategy, which sets out to describe and
emphasize human complexity to the greatest extent possible.
Throughout this dissertation, writers in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate have been
criticised for suppressing various aspects of the ethical relation with the other, which has
resulted in us being left in good conscience, despite having failed the global other. At the
start of this chapter it was argued that the cosmopolitan strategy to convince us of our guilt
and responsibility for the global poor is counterproductive given that its emphasis on
human equality numbs that which incites us to responsibility for the other, namely glimpses
of him as different, unique. So, it seems as though our task is to confront the world with the
'face' of the other, to accuse the world of having left the other to quite literally 'die alone.'
It is imperative that we "expose" the 'skins' of complacent selves to "wounds and outrage,"
that we elicit a "suffering for the suffering of the other" (CPP 146)Y In order to bring the
he does express one of the functions of an emphasis on human complexity, which is to provide 'new
descriptions of what is going on.'
12 Of great, analogous relevance is a particular aspect (that of the relationship between spatial proximity and
the willingness to inflict harm upon another person) of the psychologist, Stanley Milgram's (1974) classic
study of obedience to authority. In Milgram's experiment, participants were led to believe that the effect of
punishment on learning was being tested. Two people would arrive at the testing laboratory; one was
designated to be the 'teacher' and the other the 'learner.' This designation ofroles was rigged, as the 'learner'
was indeed an actor and the 'teacher' was to be the object of study. During the experiment, the teacher was
told by an accompanying 'researcher' (also an actor) to ask the learner questions on word pairs he had studied
before and to administer incrementally stronger electric shocks (which were not real) to the learner (the actor)
with every wrong answer. As the teacher 'increased' the voltage, the learner/actor's reaction progressed from
a grunt, to wanting to be released, to an "agonised scream" (p. 5). The object of the experiment was to see
how far ordinary people (the 'teachers ') would go in administering electric shock to another person when told
to so. What Milgram discovered was that despite protesting and being uncomfortable with the suffering they
were inflicting, a "substantial proportion" (p. 5) of these ordinary people administered the severest level of
shock.
What is of particular concern in Milgram's experiment is the fact that obedience to authority (therefore
cruelty to the learner) was "significantly reduced" as the learner was brought into greater physical proximity
to the teacher. In the most distant situation the learner was placed in another room without the possibility of
verbal communication with the teacher; the learner could only bang on the wall or make a light flash to
indicate his answer. To create a situation in which there would be greater proximity between teacher and
learner, verbal communication was enabled. At the next level of proximity, the learner was placed in the same
room as the teacher, and in the most proximate situation the teacher had to force the learner's hand onto the
shock place. (See also the discussion of Milgram's experiment in Bauman, 1989: 151-168.)
It should be recalled that there is no spatial sense to Levinas 's notion of 'proximity.' Still, Milgram's
experiment should be thought analogously to what the 'strategy of complexity' is trying to achieve, which is
to make the other as face more pervasive in the life of the self. In this regard, it is interesting to note the
Levinasian ring to some of the explanations Milgram himself offers as to why obedience/cruelty was reduced
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world into proximity to the other, to expose third parties to his 'face,' it is claimed that
actions aimed at conveying the other in as great a complexity as possible can help us do
this.13 Complexity/difference is therefore not important for its own sake (and therefore to be
maintained at all costs), but insofar as it insinuates the uniqueness of the other.
Of course, this 'strategy' immediately has to confront the objection that all representations
of the other betray his alterity and suppress his otherness. Granting this, the claim made
here is that there are representations (and positionings) of the other and articulations of his
situation that are more suggestive of his otherness and my ethical responsibility for him.
That this is so is suggested by the opposite, namely an extreme form of negating the other's
uniqueness, his de-humanisation through racist and stereotyped representations whereby the
way is paved for social and political disregard, maltreatment or 'disciplining.t '" Though
one cannot be sure of the direction of causality, there seems to be a direct correlation
between the fullness with which people are viewed and the extent of the concern we have
for them. Is it not generally the case that the people we are most indifferent towards are also
those most absent from our imaginations, those persons/groups we know least about?
Returning to the group of people I am most concerned with in this study, the global poor, is
it not the case that we generally know very little about them, compared to say, Americans?
And, for example, is this not part of the reason that while the world reacted with great
sympathy for the victims of the September 11th attacks in which more than three thousand
when the leamer/victim was made more proximate to the teacher. Milgram surmised that making the learner
more proximate was the result of making the suffering of the learner less abstract, of letting the learner
"intrude on the subject's awareness," of bringing "the actions of the subject ... under scrutiny by the victim,"
and of strengthening the link between the subject's actions and the leamer's suffering (pp. 36-39). A strategic
emphasis on human complexity seeks to render the suffering of the other more immediate, more intrusive into
our good consciences, bringing the other into a position where the subject can see the link between his
disregard and the suffering of the other and consider himself' scrutinised' by the other.
13 A 'strategy' that emphasizes human complexity does not replace pointing out the numerous ways in which
the global poor are treated unjustly from an impartial perspective, as 'impartial' considerations remain
important for identifying injustice and proposing the shape of international institutions. A strategy of
emphasizing human equality does not replace impartial cosmopolitan perspectives, but merely aims at what
the cosmopolitan emphasis of human equality unintentionally counters, namely increased ethical concern for
the other.
14 On the 'politics of recognition,' see Taylor (1994). On the wider 'redistribution vs. recognition' debate, see
the exchange between Fraser and Honneth (2003). While both Fraser and Honneth are committed to the
progressive and emancipatory goals of critical social theory, they disagree about the best theoretical approach
to pursue such social justice. Fraser attempts to maintain both the issues of recognition and redistribution in a
single framework of social justice, whereas Hormeth's argument subordinates the issue of redistribution to
within a framework of recognition.
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people died, we do not pay much attention to the fact that every day approximately 30 000
children die from preventable illnesses, which translates into more than 10million deaths
per year (UNDP 2003:5; World Bank, 2004)! It is my contention that there is a relationship
between the fullness with which we view people and the concern we have for them, and a
large part of the reason is that a fuller conception of a person is a stronger suggestion of his
uniqueness and the ethical command that issues from the fact of his uniqueness.
Levinas addresses the problem of the need for representational, ontological language to
compare incomparable persons in the presence of the third through his distinction between
the saying and the said. The saying is the nonlinguistic ethical proximity to the other, while
the said is ontological language in the service of the said (see also section 4.2.3). The
saying as proximity "lends" itself to the order of the said (OB 44), because the language,
representation and thematisation of the said are necessary to speak to, with, about, and for
the other in order to have justice. Although the said betrays the uniqueness of the other and
the intimacy of the ethical relation through the use of universal language and by trying to
contain the uncontainable in a concept, this betrayal is interrupted by the possibility of
unsaying the violence and inadequacy of the said, by pointing to the ambiguity in language
and to the impossibility of closing a system of thought, by retaining the right to be
'sceptical.' Levinas's assertion that the betrayal of the other in the said should be reduced
(BPW 107) is read as corresponding to the view of a more just order as one in which the
other is depicted, held and treated in greater complexity and sensitivity.
A final issue that needs to be addressed concerns the vehicle(s) for exposing us to the
greater complexity of the other. It is true that Levinas already assigns philosophy the dual
task of articulating a more sensitive and sophisticated justice while at the same time
disrupting justice by reminding us that justice has already failed the other, which is why
Levinas describes philosophy as "the wisdom of love at the service of love" (OB 162).
However, as political strategy, reliance on 'philosophy' is too elitist and would thus prevent
the average person from politically acting for the other. The type of philosophy Levinas has
in mind should certainly be included in a strategy of emphasizing complexity, but what I
have in mind is not quite as highbrow. Taking our cue from Rorty, film, television
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programmes, print and electronic journalism, political activism and works of fiction can all
be employed to express and draw attention to previously unnoticedlunarticulated aspects of
the human situation.i ' There is no threshold of what constitutes a new or unique
articulation, it depends very much on the audience, since, what for many people seem
interesting or novel, might be old hat for the rest of us. The idea is rather to expand the
fullness of the other in our imaginations, to bring us ever closer to an edge where we can
peer into the depth of his unfathomable uniqueness, a uniqueness that is ethical. Very
importantly, our strategy can bring those beyond our borders into a much greater proximity
to us.
5.4. Conclusion
Having criticised the cosmopolitan strategy of emphasizing human equality and similarity
as suppressing the uniqueness of the other, which is what incites us to responsibility for
him, a 'strategy' of emphasizing human complexity, difference and uniqueness was
proposed. Such a strategy was seen as having the benefit of making us aware of many of
the ways in which we are naively unjust, which is of particular significance if we are to
understand a relatively more just society as one in which the other is treated and maintained
in the greatest complexity and with the greatest sensitivity possible. A strategy of
describing and drawing attention to human difference and complexity was considered to
hold a second advantage, especially in light of our earlier criticism of the cosmopolitans.
The advantage lies therein that an emphasis on human uniqueness, although a betrayal of
the other's alterity, is more suggestive of the other as face, and therefore more likely to
awaken us to our ethical responsibility for the other. Through vehicles such as journalism,
film, literature, television, political protest and also philosophy, there is the possibility of
evoking greater and deeper recognition of the uniqueness of the other, especially the poor
IS Though Rorty is more explicit about these matters, Levinas also attributes an important role to the arts, the
press and political activism as vehicles for progressive change. According to Levinas, the striving for a
greater justice can be "heard in the cries that rise up from the interstices of politics and that, independently of
official authority, defend the 'rights of man'; sometimes in the songs of the poets; [or] sometimes simply in
the press or in the public forum of the liberal states" (EN 196).
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other beyond our borders, exposing us to the 'wounds and outrage' he has been suffering
amid our indifference.
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CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION
This study set out to better understand our general and persistent lack of individual concern
and guilt for disregarding the poorest members of the global population, thousands of
whom die daily from preventable, poverty-related causes. Such indifference to the global
poor becomes paradoxical in light of the moral philosopher Emmanuel Levinas's central
claim that the self is infinitely and inescapably responsible for the other person. Armed
with this Levinasian premise, the principal debate about the extent of transnational
responsibility, the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, was confronted to search for some
understanding as to why those of us who are particularly able to assist the poor feel very
little guilt for having done so little.
Guided by the research problem and a Levinasian approach, three significant features of the
cosmopolitan-communitarian debate were identified. (A) Theorists in the cosmopolitan-
communitarian debate were shown to preserve for the self as much autonomy as possible,
an autonomy that was interpreted as indicating a limit to the selfs responsibility for the
other. A sphere of 'legitimate' disregard of the other (autonomy) is staked out, by, for
example, fixing some point of equality between people, locating responsibility for the other
with institutions, rendering an ethical or a political response to the other as equally
legitimate, or by maintaining a split between the public and the private. By institutionally
and theoretically limiting the responsibility the self is required to feel for the other, and
through the general prioritising of the value of freedom above all others, the self is
legitimated in being concerned with himself rather than with the other. (B) When
approaching the issue of global justice, cosmopolitans and communitarians were shown to
suppress what is other in their aspiration to establish general organising principles of global
justice. While one has to admit that the generality of justice requires the suppression of
otherness to some extent, cosmopolitans and communitarians never display any reticence in
doing so. (C) Amongst cosmopolitans particularly, there is a large measure of concern for
the extremely poor segment of the world's population. In trying to build a case for why the
world's poor should be included in the considerations of global distributive justice,
cosmopolitans stress the degree of global integration, based on the principle that those who
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contribute to a scheme of social cooperation should be included in deciding how the spoils
are to be divided. Failing to convince that the world is deeply enough integrated for the
poorest of the poor to be considered participants in this 'scheme,' cosmopolitans resort to a
view of justice as impartiality, so as to argue/assert that the poor should be considered as
participants in the 'conversation' over global distributive justice.
Why are these three aspects of the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate problematic in light
of the research question? (A) If one accepts Levinas's premise that the ethical relation is
always part of my relationship with the other, then the assumed and protected centrality of
the subject in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate is not just empirically questionable,
but also morally unfortunate, for it seeks to legitimise that which is ultimately illegitimate,
my domination of and priority over the other. By establishing a limit to the subject's
responsibility for the other, and by granting primacy to the value of freedom, the self is
reassured and 'legitimised' in his usurpation of the world and the place of the other. Feeling
himself justified in limiting his responsibility for the other, the self is unlikely to awaken to
the other, to realise the injustice of his very being and his disregard of the other, and to take
up his responsibility for the other. (B) Justice can never be finished. By suppressing what is
other when thinking about justice, we are left in good conscience about the incompleteness
of justice. It is the otherness of the other that reminds us that the function of justice is not
merely to maintain order, but also partly to effect our asymmetrical responsibility for the
other; justice always has to be improved and expanded in the name of our interpersonal
responsibility for the other. (C) Greater concern for the global poor requires an ethical
generosity from those in a position to help. Generosity, an act for the other that does not
demand reciprocity, implies recognition of and a relationship with the other as face, as
different. However, the cosmopolitan strategy to exact such gratuity is to emphasise human
equality in order to demonstrate how we have fallen short of treating the poor global other
as an equal. While well intentioned, this strategy has the unfortunate consequence of
suppressing the other's difference, which is what awakens us to our asymmetrical
responsibility for him. So, while the cosmopolitan strategy intends to elicit greater concern
for the other, it in fact tends to numb us to the other as other, leaving us in indifferent as to
our personal failure to act for him.
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Based on the interpretation of the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate advanced in this
study, our indifference to the suffering of the extremely poor global other is hardly
surprising based on (A) the privileged position of the self vis-a-vis the other; (B) the
suppression of ethical otherness when thinking about justice; and (C) the self-defeating
suppression of what reminds us of our responsibility for the other in cases where
cosmopolitans aspire to elicit greater concern for the other. By having cast the issue of our
transnational responsibility for the other, or rather, our failure to be and consider ourselves
responsible for the global other, in the aforementioned terms, one is enabled to raise a
number of questions and steer future research towards issues not (sufficiently) dealt with in
this study or elsewhere.
First, the cosmopolitan and communitarian privileging and preservation of the autonomous
self has been interpreted as an attempt to legitimise what cannot be legitimised, since,
through the very act of being I have already dispelled the other from where I am and am
therefore unjust. It would be useful to relate the preponderant view of the self (as
autonomously free), as held by writers in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, to wider
social and theoretical factors that reinforce this view of the self. At least two such social
factors are salient. The first concerns the burgeoning global human rights culture. It is
impossible to deny the positive difference the growing global recognition of human rights
has brought about. However, one may wonder whether the individualistic tenets of human
rights do not harbour a dark side. I am not referring to a communitarian criticism of human
rights, whereby human rights are viewed as obstructing the achievement of
national/communal goals. It is possible to ask if human rights do not provide the subject
with an excuse to respond to the other politically, for the normative weight and legitimacy
of human rights enable the self to 'legitimately' claim various rights against the other, such
as the subject's right to private property (a dispelling of the other); his right to privacy
(indifference to the other); right to self-determination (a dispelling of the other at a
communal level); and so forth. A second trend that seems to legitimise the subject in being-
for-itself, but that also forces the subject into such a self-regard, is the pervasive acceptance
and implementation of a neoliberal economic agenda, an economic orientation that is
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underpinned by highly individualistic tenets. Neoliberal economic policies set the self
within a more competitive economic arena and in greater confrontation with others,
encourage consumerism and materialism, values that do not augur well for 'giving the
bread from one's mouth,' as Levinas would have it. A first step would require a close
description of the (idealised) view of the self that underlies neoliberal economic
individualism. A further step would entail an inquiry into how our economic individualism
affects the selfs relations with others, especially his ethical concern for the other.
Second, in the ethical relation with the other, the self "is under the weight of the universe,
responsible for everything" (OB 116), even for the persecutions he undergoes (EI 99).
When asked during an interview if such responsibility to everyone for everything is not
"intolerable," Levinas answered, "I don't know if this situation is intolerable. It is not what
you would call agreeable, surely; it is not pleasant, but it is the good" (EN 203). Elsewhere,
Levinas puts it even more bluntly, "In a sense nothing is more burdensome than a
neighbour. Is not this desired one the undesirable itself' (OB 88)? The extremity of the
ethical accusation under which the subject finds himself lets it stand to reason that this is a
situation that the self seeks to evade, or at least forestall, since recognition of the other as
face leads the subject to be progressively displaced and hollowed out in responsibility for
the other. Above, mention was made of the capacity of human rights/neoliberal
individualism to reinforce and legitimise the subject against the ethical accusation that
issues from the other. However, instead of resisting the other politically, a flight towards
anonymity provides a less confrontational avenue for not responding to the other as face. In
anonymity the self can evade the ethical command and the individual (indeed,
individuating) response it requires, by dissolving the ethical accusation against him into the
anonymity of the group. There are two major routes along which the self can veer towards
anonymity when confronted by the individualising ethical accusation, when having to
answer for one's 'right to be.' The one route lies in fading one's identity into a
concept/group, whereas the other avenue lies in the living alongside one other of a
legislated mass society, where beings are equals and thus interchangeable. Regarding the
first route, cosmopolitans have criticised the "comfort of patriotism and its easy
sentiments" (Nussbaum, 1999a:7), although this criticism is usually intended to encourage
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
123
people to adopt an impartial point of view. Patriotism and all 'we-feeling' should be
questioned for the dissipation of the ethical accusation it facilitates. Regarding the second
route towards anonymity: the impersonal, objective order of deeply regulated mass society,
in which humans are objects of knowledge, justice and bureaucratic control, provides the
subject with a hideout from the ethical accusation directed against him. In the monadic
existence of persons in regulated society, we find unique persons reduced to concepts,
albeit that these concepts are ever more refined. In the growing control and regulation of
life in complex societies, people are 'known' as units in a system. In such an "idealism,"
and in the institutional imposition thereof, "all ethics [is reduced] to politics. The other and
the I function as elements of an ideal calculus, receive from this calculus their real being,
and approach one another under the domination of ideal necessities which traverse them
from all sides. They play the role of moments in a system, and not that of origin" (TI 216).
The increasing rationalisation and institutional regulation of our lives, mediates human
interaction through a concept/principle/regulationllaw and thereby increasingly undermines
the im-mediacy of the face-to-face relation. Furthermore, societal rationalisation means that
the needs of people are institutionally dealt with, or at least expected to be. In such
societies, life occurs increasingly alongside one other, making indifference to the other ever
more possible. Although sociality, the one-for-the-other, is the command "not to remain
indifferent to [the other's] death, not to let the other die alone" (EN 169, see also EN 145-6,
186), the impersonality of mass society seems to be instituting indifference through its
rationalisation and segmenting of social life, which reminds one of Levinas's warning that
"there exists a tyranny of the universal and the impersonal, an order that is inhuman though
distinct from the brutish" (TI 242). Bauman's (1989) Modernity and the Holocaust is an
important work for the links it establishes between social rationalisation, overwhelming
bureaucratisation and ethical indifference. Such work needs to be extended, fleshed out,
applied to other case studies, and connected to societies less exceptional than the Third
Reich.
Third, in the work of Levinas we find a deep endorsement of liberal democracy because of
the ability of this political form to question its own justice in the aspiration to a better
justice. However, although I am in agreement with Levinas, this idea is very
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underdeveloped. One finds a similar view of liberal society in the work of Rorty, but also
he does not go to great lengths to describe the features of liberal society that permit such a
self-questioning justice. We are not sure if this capacity for ethical self-questioning is to be
located in the electoral mechanism, the independent judiciary, the free press, wide-spread
liberal arts education, the protection of individual liberty, the freedom of speech, the level
of material well-being, etc. An answer would presumably include a combination of these
features of liberal society. One could further consider the presence of these liberal
democratic features at the global level, or at least, the potential for their coming about. But,
perhaps more pressingly, and more germane to the research question of this study,
questions need to be asked about how the ethical capacities of democracy are being eroded
by nationalism, money politics, catchall politics, special interests, political apathy, and so
forth, in the hope of identifying a path along which a more ethically concerned polity can
be achieved.
A fourth and final area for investigation revolves around the ethical penetration of the
political. In Levinas's work, and in this study, this idea is not given much content, though it
is often stated. It is important for the ethical to interfere and disrupt the impersonal political
order, for politics tend to lose sight of the ethical, and therefore risks sliding into 'tyranny.'
Furthermore, the impersonal order of justice has forever to be more 'knowing' and more
'just' in the name of the 'pre-original' ethical for the other. Still, what one has to
understand by an 'ethical reminder' has to be given more substance.
This study has taken Levinas's ethical thought at face-value and has treated it primarily as
an analytical instrument in order to expose our indifference to the extremely poor global
other, as reflected by the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate. But, does Levinas's thought
offer more than the mere enabling of analysis? The answer is yes. Although Levinas does
not prescribe a specific course of action, reading his work, in which the ethical imperative
is inextricably meshed with descriptions of the ethical relation, leaves one forever unable to
rest in good conscience amid the suffering of others. After Levinas, it is impossible to say
that the suffering of the poor is not my concern. It is in this unsettling of our complacency
that a promise for a more just order resides.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
REFERENCES
African Development Bank (2004) African Development Report. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Allen, J. (1998) "The situated critic or the loyal critic? Rorty and Walzer on social
criticism" in Philosophy and Social Criticism. 24(6). 25-46.
Alford, C.F. (2004) "Levinas and political theory" in Political Theory. 32 (2). April. 146-
171.
Anderson, B. (1983) Imagined communities: Reflections on the origins and spread of
nationalism. London: Verso.
Archibugi, D., Held, D. and Koehler, M. (eds.) (1998) Re-imagining political community:
Studies in cosmopolitan democracy. Cambridge: Polity.
Aristotle (1982) The Politics. Translated by T.A. Sinclair. Revised by T.J. Saunders.
Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Barnard, F.M. (1965) Herder's social and political thought: From Enlightenment to
nationalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Barry, B. (1973) The liberal theory ofjustice. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Barry, B. (1989a) Democracy, power and justice: Essays in political theory. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Barry, B (1989b) Theories ofjustice. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Barry, B. (1995) Justice as impartiality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Barry, B. (1998a) "International society from a cosmopolitan perspective" in Mapel, D.R.
and Nardin, T. (eds.) (1998) International society: Diverse ethical perspectives.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
126
Barry, B. (1998b) "The limits of cultural politics" in Review of International Studies. 24(3).
307-319.
Barry, B. (1999) "Statism and nationalism: A cosmopolitan critique" in Shapiro, I. and
Brilmayer, L. (eds.) (1999) Globaljustice. Nomos 41. New York: New York
University Press.
Bauman, Z. (1989) Modernity and the Holocaust. Ithica: Cornell University Press.
Bauman, Z. (1998) "What prospects of morality in times of uncertainty?" in Theory,
Culture and Society. 15(1). 11-22.
Beitz, C.R. (1979a) "Bounded morality: justice and the state in world politics" in
International Organization. 33 (3). Summer. 405-424.
Beitz, C.R. (1979b) Political theory and international relations. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Beitz, CR, (1988) "Recent international thought" in International Journal. 43. Spring. 183-
204.
Beitz, C.R. (1994) "Cosmopolitan liberalism and the states system" in Brown, C. (ed.)
(1994) Political restructuring in Europe: Ethical perspectives. London: Routledge.
Beitz, C.R. (1999a) "Review article. International liberalism and distributive justice: A
survey of recent thought" in World Politics, 51. January. 269-96.
Beitz, C.R. (1999b) "Social and cosmopolitan liberalism" in International Affairs. 75 (3).
July. 515-529.
Beitz, CR. (2000) "Rawls's Law of Peoples" in Ethics. 110 (4). July. 669-696.
Bergo, B. (1999) Levinas between ethics and politics: For beauty that adorns the earth.
London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
127
Bernasconi, R and Critchley (eds.) (1991) "Introduction" in Re-reading Levinas.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Bernasconi, R. and Wood, D. (eds.) (1988) The provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the
other. London: Routledge.
Black, S. (1991) "Individualism at an impasse" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 21 (3)
September. 347-379.
Bloechl,1. (ed.) (2000) Theface of the other and the trace of God: Essays on the
philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. New York: Fordham University Press.
Brown, C. (1992) International relations theory: New normative approaches. New York:
Harvester- Wheatsheaf.
Brown, C. (2002) Sovereignty, rights and justice: International political theory today.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Burggraeve, R. (1981) The ethical basis for a humane society according to Emmanuel
Levinas. Catholic University of Louvaine: Sylloge Excerptorum e dissertationibus
ad gradum doctoris in Sacra Theologia vel in lure canonico consequendum
conscriptis. 53 (2).
Cammack, P. (2002) "The mother of all governments: The World Bank's matrix for global
governance" in Wilkinson, R. and Hughes, S. (eds.) (2002) Global governance:
Critical perspectives. London: Routledge.
Campbell, D. (1996) "The deterritorialization of responsibility: Levinas, Derrida, and ethics
after the end of philosophy" in Alternatives. 19.455-484.
Campbell, D. (1998) National deconstruction: Violence, identity, and justice in Bosnia.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
128
Caney, S. (2001) "Review article: International distributive justice" in Political Studies. 49.
974-997.
Caygill, H. (2002) Levinas and the political. London: Routledge.
Cochran, M. (1996) "The liberal ironist, ethics and international relations theory" in
Millenium. 25(1).29-52.
Cochran, M. (1999) Normative theory in International Relations: A pragmatic approach.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cohen, J. (ed.) (1996) For love of country: The limits of patriotism. Boston: Beacon Press.
Cohen, R.A. (2001) Ethics, exegesis and philosophy: Interpretation after Levinas.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Connolly, W.E. (1987) Politics and ambiguity. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Connolly, W.E. (1991) Identity/difference: Democratic negotiations of political paradox.
Ithica: Cornell University Press.
Cox, R.W. (1981) "Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international relations
theory" inMillennium. 10(2). 126-55.
Cox, R.W. (1996) Approaches to world order. With Timothy Sinclair. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Critchley, S. (1992) The ethics of deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas. First edition.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Critchley, S. (1996) "Deconstruction and pragmatism: Is Derrida a private ironist or a
public liberal?" in Mouffe, C. (ed.) (1996) Deconstruction and pragmatism.
London: Routledge.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
129
Critchley, S. (1998) "Metaphysics in the Dark: A Response to Richard Rorty and Ernesto
Laclau" in Political Theory. 26 (6). December. 803-817.
Critchley, S. (2004) "Five problems in Levinas ' s view of politics and the sketch of a
solution to them" in Political Theory. 32(2). April. 172-185.
Critchley, S. and Bernasconi, R. (eds.) (2002) The Cambridge Companion to Levinas.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dagger, R. (1999) "The Sandelian republic and the unencumbered self' in Review of
Politics 61(2). 181-208.
Davis, C. (1996) Levinas: An introduction. Oxford: Polity Press.
Derrida, J. (1978) Writing and Difference. Translated by Bass, A. London: Routledge and
Kegan and Paul.
Derrida, J. (1999) "Hospitality, justice and responsibility: A dialogue with Jacques Derrida"
in Kearney, R. and Dooley, M (eds.) (1999) Questioning ethics: Contemporary
debates in philosophy. London: Routledge.
Derrida, J. (2001) "I have a taste for the secret" in Derrida, J and Ferraris, M. (2001) A taste
for the secret. Translated by Donis, G. Edited by Donis, G and Webb, D.
Cambridge: Polity.
Erskine, T. (ed.) (2003) Can institutions have responsibilities? Collective moral agency
and international relations. New York: Palgrave.
Franceschet, A. (2001) Sovereignty and freedom: Immanuel Kant's liberal internationalist
'legacy'" in Review of International Studies. 27(2).209-28.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
130
Fraser, N. (1989) "Solidarity or singularity? Richard Rorty between romanticism and
technocracy" in Malachowski, A. (ed.) (2002) Richard Rorty. Volume III London:
Sage Publications.
Fraser, N. and Honneth, A. (2003) Redistribution or recognition? A political-philosophical
exchange. London: Verso.
Frost, M. (1996) Ethics in international relations: A constitutive theory. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Germain, R.D. (2002) "Reforming the international financial architecture: The new
political agenda" in Wilkinson, R. and Hughes, S. (eds.) (2002) Global governance:
Critical perspectives. London: Routledge.
Gilligan, C. (1982) In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Gilpin, R.G. (1986) "The richness of the tradition of political realism" in Keohane, R.O.
(ed.) (1986) Neorealism and its critics. New York: Columbia University Press.
Hand, S. (ed.) (1996) Facing the other: The ethics of Emmanuel Levinas. Surrey: Curzon
Press.
Held, D. (1995) Democracy and the global order: From the modern state to cosmopolitan
governance. Cambridge: Polity.
Herzog, A (2002) "Is liberalism "all we need"? Levinas's politics of surplus" in Political
Theory. 30 (2).204-227.
Holden, B. (2000) Global democracy: Key debates. London: Routledge.
Huntington, S.P. (1998) The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order.
London: Touchstone Books.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
131
Hurrell, A. (2001) "Global inequality and international institutions" in Metaphilosophy.
32(1).34-57.
Hutchings, K. (1999) "Political theory and cosmopolitan citizenship" in Hutchings, K and
Dannreuther, R. (eds) (1999) Cosmopolitan citizenship. London: Macmillan Press.
Jones, C. (2001) Globaljustice: Defending cosmopolitanism. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Jordaan, E. (forthcoming) "Affinities in the social thought of Rorty and Levinas" in
Philosophy and Social Criticism. 32.
Kant, I (1970 [1795]) Political writings. Edited by H Reiss. Translated by H.B. Nisbet.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kekes, 1. (2002) "Cruelty and liberalism" in Malachowski, A. (ed.) (2002) Richard Rorty.
London: Sage Publications.
Krasner, S.K. (1993) "Sovereignty, regimes, and human rights" in Rittberger, V. and
Mayer, P (eds.) (1993) Regime theory in International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Kymlicka, W. (1989) Liberalism, community and culture. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Levinas, E. (1969) Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority. Translated by Alphonso
I
Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
Levinas, E. (1981) Otherwise than being or beyond essence. Translated by Alphonso
Lingis. The Hague: Marthinus Nijhoff.
Levinas, E. (1984) "Interview with Richard Kearney" in Kearney, R. (1984) Dialogues with
contemporary continental thinkers: The phenomenological heritage. Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
Levinas, E. (1985) Outside the Subject. Translated by Smith, M.B. London: Athlone Press.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
132
Levinas, E. (1985) Ethics and infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo. Translated by
Cohen, R.A. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
Levinas, E. (1987) Collected philosophical papers. Translated by Lingis, A. Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Levinas, E. (1987) Existence and Existence. Translated by Lingis, A. The Hague:
Marthinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Levinas, E. (1987) Time and the Other. Translated by Cohen, R.A. Pittsburg: Duquesne
University Press.
Levinas, E. (1988) "The paradox of morality: An interview with Emmanuel Levinas" by
Wright, T., Hughes, P. and Ainley, A. in Bernasconi, R. and Wood, D. (eds.) (1988)
The provocation of Levin as: Rethinking the Other. London: Routledge.
Levinas, E. (1989) The Levinas reader. Edited by S. Hand. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Levinas, E. (1990) "Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism" in Critical Inquiry 17.
Autumn.
Levinas, E. (1990) Difficultfreedom: Essays on Judaism. Translated by Hand, S. London:
Athlone Press
Levinas, E. (1991) "Interview with Raoul Mortley" in Mortley, R (1991) French
philosophers in conversation. London: Routledge.
Levinas, E. (1996) Basic philosophical writings. Edited by Peperzak, A.T., Critchley, S.
and Bernasconi, R. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Levinas, E. (1998) Entre nous. On thinking-of-the-Other. Translated by Smith, M.B. and
Harshav, B. London: Athlone Press.
Linklater, A. (1982) Men and citizens in the Theory of International Relations. London:
Macmillan.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
133
Linklater, A. (1998a) "Citizenship and sovereignty in the post-Westphalian European state"
in Archibugi, D., Held, D. and Kohler, M. (eds.) (1998) Re-imagining political
community: Studies in cosmopolitan democracy. Oxford: Polity.
Linklater, A (1998b) The transformation of political community: Ethical foundations of the
post-Westphalian era. Oxford: Polity.
Lu, C. (2000) "The one and many faces of cosmopolitanism" in Journal of Political
Philosophy. 8(5). 244-67.
Luban, D. (1985a) "Just war and human rights" in Beitz, c.R. et al. (eds.) (1985)
International ethics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Luban, D. (1985b) "The romance of the nation-state" in Beitz, C.R. et al. (eds.) (1985)
International ethics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Luban, D. (2002) "Intervention and civilization: Some unhappy lessons from the Kosovo
War" in De Greiff, P. and Cronin, C. (eds.) (2002) Globaljustice and transnational
politics: Essays on moral and political challenges of globalization. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
MacIntyre, A. (1981) After virtue: A study in moral theory. London: Duckworth.
Malachowski, A. (ed.) (2002) Richard Rorty. London: Sage Publications.
McCarthy, T. (1990) "Private irony and public decency: Richard Rorty's new pragmatism"
in Malachowski, A. (ed.) (2002) Richard Rorty. Volume III London: Sage
Publications.
Mendus, S. (1993) "Different voices, still lives: Problems in the ethics of care" in Journal
of Applied Philosophy. 10(1). 17-27.
Mendus, S. (1996) "Some mistakes about impartiality" in Political Studies. 44(2). 319-327.
Milgram, S. (1974) Obedience to authority: An experimental view. London: Tavistock.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
134
Miller, D. (1988) "The ethical significance of nationality" in Ethics. 98(4). 647-62.
Miller, D. (1993) "In defence of nationality" in Journal of Applied Philosophy. 10(1).3-16.
Miller, D. (1994) "The nation-state: A modest defence" in Brown, C. (ed.) Political
restructuring in Europe: Ethical perspectives. London: Routledge.
Miller, D. (1998) "The limits of cosmopolitan justice" in Mapel, D.R. and Nardin, T. (eds.)
(1998) International society: Diverse ethical perspectives. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Morrice, D. (2000) "The liberal-communitarian debate in contemporary political
philosophy and its significance for international relations" in Review of
International Studies. 26(2). 233-51.
Mulhall, S and Swift, A. (1992) Liberals and communitarians. Oxford: Blackwell.
Nagel, T. (1991) Equality and partiality. New York: Oxford University Press.
Nardin, T. and Mapel, D.R (eds.) (1992) Traditions of international ethics. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Nozick, R. (1974) Anarchy, state and utopia. Oxford: Blackwell.
Nussbaum, M.e. (1997) "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism" in Journal of Political
Philosophy. 5 (1). 1-25.
Nussbaum, M.C. (1996a) "Patriotism and cosmopolitanism" in Cohen, J. (ed.) (1996) For
love of country: The limits of patriotism. Boston: Beacon Press.
Nussbaum, M.C. (1996b) "Reply" in Cohen, J. (ed.) (1996) For love of country: The limits
of patriotism. Boston: Beacon Press.
O'Neill, O. (1986) Faces of hunger: An essay on poverty, justice and development.
London: Allen and Unwin.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
135
O'Neill, 0 (1996) Towards justice and virtue: A constructive account of practical
reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
O'Neill, O. (2000) Bounds ofjustice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Peperzak, A. (1993) To the other: An introduction to the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas.
West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press.
Pogge, T.W. (1989) Realizing Rawls. Ithica: Cornell University Press.
Pogge, T.W. (1992) "Cosmopolitanism and sovereignty" in Ethics. 103(1). October. 48-75.
Pogge, T.W. (1994) "An egalitarian Law of Peoples" in Philosophy and Public Affairs. 23
(3). Summer. 195-224.
Pogge, T.W (1997) "Group rights and ethnicity" in Shapiro, I and Kymlicka, W (eds.)
(1997) Ethnicity and group rights. New York: New York University Press.
Pogge, T.W. (1999) "Human flourishing and universal justice" in Social Philosophy and
Policy. 16 (1). Winter. 333-361.
Pogge, T.W. (ed.) (2001a) "Priorities of global justice" in Global justice. Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers.
Pogge, T.W. (2001b) "Priorities of global justice" in Metaphilosophy. 32(112). January. 6-
23.
Pogge (2002) World poverty and human rights: Cosmopolitan responsibilities and reforms.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Rawls, J. (1985) "Justice as fairness: Political not metaphysical" in Philosophy and Public
Affairs. 14(3) Summer. 223-251.
Rawls, J. (1999) A theory ofjustice (Second edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rawls, J. (1999) Collected Papers. Edited by S. Freeman. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
136
Rawls, J. (1999) The law of peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rengger, N.J. (1992) "A city which sustains all things? Communitarian and international
society" in Millennium 21(3).353-69.
Rorty, R. (1989) Contingency, irony, solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rorty, R. (1991a) Objectivity, relativism, and truth: Philosophical papers. Volume I
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rorty, R. (1991b) Essays on Heidegger and others: Philosophical papers. Volume II.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rorty, R. (1996) "Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism" in Mouffe, C. (ed.) (1996)
Deconstruction and pragmatism. London: Routledge.
Rorty, R (1996) "Response to Simon Critchley" in Mouffe, C. (ed.) (1996) Deconstruction
and pragmatism. London: Routledge.
Rorty, R. (1998) Achieving our country: Leftist thought in twentieth-century America.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rorty, R. (1998) Truth and progress: Philosophical papers. Volume III Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Rorty, R. (1998) "Justice as a larger loyalty" in Cheah, P. and Robbins, B. (eds.) (1998)
Cosmopolitics: Thinking and feeling beyond the nation. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Rorty, R. (1999) Philosophy and social hope. London: Penguin.
Rorty, R. (2001) "Response to Molly Cochran" in Festenstein, M. and Thompson, S. (eds.)
(2001) Richard Rorty: Critical dialogues. Oxford: Blackwell.
Rousseau, J-J. (1968) The social contract. Translated M. Cranston. Harmandsworth:
Penguin.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
137
Sandel, MJ. (1984a) "Morality and the liberal ideal" in The New Republic. May ih• 15-17.
Sandel, MJ. (1984b) "The procedural republic and the unencumbered self' in Political
Theory. 12(1). February. 81-96.
Sandel, MJ. (1998) Liberalism and the limits of justice. Second edition. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Satz, D. (1999) "Equality of what among whom? Thoughts on cosmopolitanism, statism
and nationalism" in Shapiro, I. and Brilmayer, L. (eds.) (1999) Globaljustice. New
York: New York University Press.
Scheffler, S. (1999) "The conflict between justice and responsibility" in Shapiro, I. and
Brilmayer, L. (eds.) (1999) Globaljustice. New York: New York University Press.
Sen, A. (1992) Inequality reexamined. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Shapcott, R. (2001) Justice, community and dialogue in International Relations.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shue, H. (1980) Basic rights: Subsistence, affluence, and USforeign policy. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Simmons, W.P. (1999) "The third: Levinas's move from an-archical ethics to the realm of
justice and politics" in Philosophy and Social Criticism. 25(6). 83-104.
Singer, P. (1985) [1972] "Famine, affluence and morality" in Beitz, C.R. et al. (eds.) (1985)
International ethics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Tamir, Y. (1993) Liberal nationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Taylor, C (1979) "Atomism" in Kontos, A (ed.) (1979) Powers, possessions and freedom:
Essays in honour ofCB. Macpherson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
138
Taylor, C. (1994) "The politics of recognition" in Gutmann, A. (ed.) (1994)
Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Taylor, C. (1995) Philosophical arguments. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Thomson, J.E. and Krasner, S.K. (1996) "Global transactions and the consolidation of
sovereignty" in Art, R.J. and Jervis, R. (eds.) (1996) International Politics:
Enduring concepts and contemporary issues. Fourth edition. New York: Harper
Collins, College Publishers.
UNDP (2003) "Human Development Report 2003 charts decade-long income drop in 54
countries" at http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/pdf/presskitlHDR03_PR2E.pdf
(14/01/2004).
UNDP (2003) Human Development Report 2003. New York: Oxford University Press.
Vincent, R.J. (1986) Human rights and international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Walzer, M. (1983) Spheres of justice. New York: Basic Books
Walzer, M. (1990) "The communitarian critique ofliberalism" in Political Theory. 18(1).
6-23.
Walzer, M. (1994) Thick and thin: Moral argument at home and abroad. Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press.
Wenar, L. (2002) "The legitimacy of peoples" in De Greiff, P. and Cronin, C. (eds.) (2002)
Global justice and transnational politics: Essays on moral and political challenges
of globalization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wilkinson, R. (2002) "The contours of courtship: The WTO and civil society" in
Wilkinson, R. and Hughes, S. (eds.) (2002) Global governance: Critical
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
139
perspectives. London: Routledge.
Woods, N. (ed.) (2000) "The challenge to international institutions" in The political
economy of globalization. London: Macmillan.
World Bank (2004) World Bank development indicators. Washington, D.C.
World Health Organisation (2004). The World Health Report 2003: Shaping the Future
(www.who.intlwhr/2003/en/chapterl-en.pdf, 2004).
Wyschogrod, E. (2000) Emmanuel Levinas: The problem of ethical metaphysics. New
York: Fordham University Press.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
